Indiana Law Journal
Volume 89

Issue 1

Article 10

Winter 2014

FRAND's Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing
Commitments
Jay P. Kesan
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, kesan@illinois.edu

Carol M. Hayes
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, carol.mullins@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kesan, Jay P. and Hayes, Carol M. (2014) "FRAND's Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing
Commitments," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 89 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol89/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

FRAND’s Forever:
Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments
∗

∗∗

JAY P. KESAN AND CAROL M. HAYES

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 231
I. PATENTS, ESSENTIALITY, STANDARDS, AND SSO POLICIES ............................... 235
A. PATENTS AND INNOVATION ..................................................................... 235
B. INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDS ...................................................... 237
C. ESSENTIAL PATENTS IN STANDARDS ........................................................ 240
D. REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY SSOS PRIOR TO STANDARD ADOPTION ...... 244
E. HIGHLIGHTING FRAND PROBLEMS—A HYPOTHETICAL......................... 246
F. SSOS AND IPR POLICIES .......................................................................... 252
II. STANDARDS, LITIGATION, AND LEGAL THEORIES ............................................. 256
A. LITIGATION OVER FRAND COMMITMENTS ............................................. 258
B. THE LAW OF FRAND COMMITMENTS AND TRANSFERABILITY ............... 261
III. FRAND COMMITMENTS AND THE LAW OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY ...................... 286
A. ANALYZING A PROPERTY APPROACH TO FRAND COMMITMENTS ............. 287
B. ANALOGIZING TO THE LAW OF SERVITUDES.............................................. 294
IV. FRAND COMMITMENTS, INJUNCTIONS, AND LIABILITY .................................. 304
A. INJUNCTIONS AFTER EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE ...................................... 305
B. PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES ................................................. 307
C. ITC EXCLUSION ORDERS ......................................................................... 310
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 312
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................. 314
INTRODUCTION
Not all wars involve heavy munitions. Some wars are fought with court filings.
The smartphone patent wars are being fought to see who will dominate an
increasingly valuable market. According to a study by Nielsen in the summer of
2012, over 55% of mobile subscribers in the United States own smartphones.1 And
the demographic that is acquiring smartphones keeps getting younger. Nielsen further
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1. Young Adults and Teens Lead Growth Among Smartphone Owners, NIELSEN
NEWSWIRE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2012/young-adults
-and-teens-lead-growth-among-smartphone-owners.html.
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indicates that 74% of young adults between twenty-five and thirty-four years old own
a smartphone, and 58% of American teenagers between the ages of thirteen and
seventeen own a smartphone.2 This is a battle for profits, but more than that, this is a
battle for long-term customers who are starting to use sophisticated technologies at
younger and younger ages.
But the current patent war is also broader than smartphones. The year 2012 saw a
number of new developments in patent litigation over smartphones and related
technologies. This includes disputes over the 802.11 wireless standards, or Wi-Fi,3
without which many smartphones would just be phones and many modern homes
would have CAT 5 cables snaking from room to room to allow gaming consoles,
laptops, and other devices to share the same network connection. These are not
patents on technologies that only a small subset of the population uses. These patents
involve everyday technologies that many of us take for granted, from smartphones to
video game consoles to streaming videos.
Patent litigation in this area has been making headlines, in part because some of
these cases are between two parties that are already household names. In August
2012, Apple successfully obtained a jury award against Samsung in excess of $1
billion, but the court subsequently reduced the damages award by over $450 million.4
In November 2012, Nokia began filing in courts around the world to enforce a
Swedish arbitration decision declaring that Research In Motion, the maker of
Blackberry smartphones, must reach a new licensing agreement with Nokia for
wireless technology patents or else stop selling Blackberry products that use Wi-Fi.5
In May 2012, a German court granted Motorola’s request for an injunction against
Microsoft over the latter’s use of patented technologies relating to the H.264 video
encoding standard and the 802.11 wireless standard6—but in the United States in
September 2012, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the injunction was not self-enforcing.7
And these are just three examples of disputes between large companies that actually
practice the patents in issue. A discussion of patent assertion entities (PAE),8 which

2. Id.
3. Univ. of Miami Leonard M. Miller Sch. of Med., Wi-Fi/802.11 Standards,
MIAMI.EDU, http://it.med.miami.edu/x275.xml.
4. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2013 WL 772525, at
*1, *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2013).
5. See Eingestellt von Florian Mueller, RIM Loses Arbitration, Has to Agree with
Nokia on Royalties or Stop Selling WiFi Products, FOSS PATENTS (Nov. 28, 2012, 11:07
AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/11/rim-loses-arbitration-has-to-agree-with.html.
6. Gen. Instrument Corp. v. Microsoft Deutschland GmbH, Landgericht Mannheim
[LG] [Regional Court of Mannheim] May 2, 2012, (Ger.), available at http://
www.scribd.com/doc/94523005/Translation-of-Mannheim-2O240-Ruling-Motorola-v
-Microsoft; INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, H.264: ADVANCED VIDEO CODING FOR GENERIC
AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES (2013), available at http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264.
7. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). The injunction
would have prohibited Microsoft from selling the Xbox 360 or any product incorporating
Windows 7 or Windows Media Player 12.
8. The label “PAE” was promoted by the FTC in its 2011 report to distinguish a
specific type of non-practicing entity (NPE). FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.
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are often referred to disparagingly as “patent trolls,” is outside the scope of this
Article, but they too have sought hundreds of millions of dollars in royalties from
the deep pockets of technology giants.9
This Article focuses on disputes concerning patents that are essential to
technology standards. During the creation of a standard, the standard-setting
organization (SSO) will typically require members who hold standard essential
patents (SEPs) to make a commitment to license these patents on fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.10 However, the legal effect of this
FRAND commitment is sometimes unclear, and this lack of clarity is especially
problematic when the dispute is international in nature because jurisdictions may
view these commitments very differently. U.S. courts, for example, may be more
willing to recognize third-party beneficiary rights in the FRAND contract than
some European jurisdictions.11 U.S. courts may also apply the equitable test of
eBay v. MercExchange12 to foreclose injunctions when the infringed patent is an
SEP.13 On the other hand, U.S. courts are less likely to apply antitrust law to
foreclose anticompetitive use of SEPs than European courts.14
With this Article, we aim to reframe the discussion of FRAND commitments in
a way that will be beneficial to the many participants affected by disparate
treatment of licensing commitments made in the standard-setting context. The
conceptual framework we propose characterizes FRAND commitments as creating
a property interest, instead of merely creating a contract or a condition that affects a
competitive relation. To address the question of remedies, we apply this theory to
support a contention that injunctions against the use of SEPs would be adverse to
the public interest.
As discussed in Part II, FRAND commitments are awash in case law and court
decisions but are bereft of a discussion of their theoretical underpinnings. This
Article fills that void by developing a conceptual framework for understanding

9. See, e.g., VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:10-CV-417, 2013 WL 692652 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 26, 2013); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D. Del. 2012);
Charles Arthur, VirnetX Adds iPhone 5 to New Apple Lawsuit After $368m Trial Win, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2012, 1:21 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/nov/09
/apple-virnetx-patent-iphone-5 (noting ongoing litigation); Christina Bonnington, Jurors Say
Apple iPhone Infringes on Three MobileMedia Patents, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2012, 3:23 PM),
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/12/iphone-infringes-patent/ (quoting Florian Mueller
for the premise that MobileMedia is a patent licensing and assertion entity, though it
undertakes its activities on behalf of Sony, Nokia, and MPEG-LA). On VirnetX’s website,
the company explicitly states that their “portfolio of intellectual property is the foundation of
[their] business model.” Gabriel Patent Licensing, VIRNETX, http://virnetx.com
/licensing/patent-licensing-2/. Thus, it is probably not unreasonable to categorize VirnetX as
a patent assertion entity.
10. Because we frequently use acronyms in this Article, we have included a Glossary in
the Appendix.
11. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 888 (“German courts, unlike some U.S. courts and
commentators, do not interpret the RAND commitment to create a contract enforceable by
third parties or to foreclose injunctive relief.”).
12. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
13. See Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 877.
14. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
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FRAND commitments using property theory. This Article focuses on FRAND
commitments and five problems arising repeatedly with respect to these
agreements: (1) whether the FRAND obligation transfers to subsequent assignees
of the patent; (2) whether FRAND commitments should apply to patents acquired
after making the FRAND commitment (i.e., after-acquired patents); (3) whether
nonmembers of the SSO should have the same standing as SSO members to
enforce FRAND commitments; (4) how to understand the word “essential” in the
phrase “standard essential patents” (SEPs); and (5) whether the FRAND
commitment should impact remedies available in patent litigation, either from the
perspective of the patent owner or the beneficiary of the FRAND commitment.
Different types of analysis were required for each of these five problems. For
the nonmember and after-acquired problems, resolution could be reached largely
through analysis of accepted legal approaches. To understand essentiality, we
evaluated the problem from a more practice-based approach, relying on
representations by industry representatives with whom we consulted. Our analysis
of the issues relating to remedies shifted more toward the theoretical, with
emphasis on the well-established approach of Calabresi and Melamed to property
and liability rules, while applying the current law pertaining to injunctions in patent
litigation. We found, however, that the currently applied legal theories are
insufficient to support the transferability of FRAND commitments, and that in fact
some existing case law suggests that a property theory offers a better vehicle for
transferability. To our knowledge, this Article represents the first attempt at
applying U.S.-based property law and theory to the issue of FRAND commitment
transferability. As discussed in Part III, our property approach begins with the
theoretical foundations provided by Hohfeldian analysis of jural relations, before
narrowing the focus to a more specific analogy to the law of servitudes.
This Article is organized as follows. In Part I, we introduce some of the major
issues that arise in the context of interoperability and standards, with a focus on the
presence of FRAND commitments.15 This Part includes a detailed hypothetical to
illustrate what we view as some of the most significant potential issues. In Part II,
we analyze how the law may apply to FRAND commitments under several
different theories, how some of these issues have been treated by courts thus far,
and how current theories apply to the problems raised in our hypothetical. In Part
III, we expound on a new theory that FRAND commitments can be viewed as
creating an interest analogous to a servitude in real property. In Part IV, we
examine the issue of whether the owners of SEPs should be able to obtain

15. In the United States, these terms are sometimes referred to as “reasonable and
nondiscriminatory,” or RAND. Judge Posner wrote recently that “the word ‘fair’ adds
nothing to ‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory.’” Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp.
2d 901, 911–12 (N.D. Ill. 2012). However, because “FRAND” is often used to describe these
terms in the United States anyway, and it is how these terms are typically described in
analysis elsewhere (including Europe), we use the term FRAND in this report instead of
RAND to better encompass the international scope of the discussion. Adopting the acronym
“FRAND” might also simplify searches for relevant information, as fewer words in the
English language contain the consecutive letters F-R-A-N-D than contain the consecutive
letters R-A-N-D.
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injunctions against the implementers of standards for which the SEP owners made
FRAND commitments.
I. PATENTS, ESSENTIALITY, STANDARDS, AND SSO POLICIES
A. Patents and Innovation
There is much criticism of patent litigation and the potential effects it can have
on innovators. Some claim that patent litigation may have the effect of stifling
innovation,16 but David Kappos, the former director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), stated recently that the smartphone patent wars are
themselves a sign that the U.S. patent system works to promote innovation.17
Regardless of which side has a more persuasive argument, the interplay between
law, technology, and society is abundantly clear. This is a high technology world,
shaped by computing, networking, and communications technologies. Many of
these technologies are protected by the intellectual property laws of the United
States. Congress’s authority to regulate patents stems from the Constitution, which
empowers Congress to enact laws to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”18 Thousands of innovations over the last half century have come together to
shape modern computing. Supporters of modern intellectual property law attribute
many of these innovations to the protections afforded inventors under patent law.19
Inventors who successfully obtain a patent are granted a legal monopoly for the
life of the patent, which is currently twenty years from the date of first submission
of the application.20 During this patent period, the inventor who retains ownership
of the patent can recoup her investment, with three main options available to do so:
by being the only person allowed to practice the patent, by licensing the patent to
others and collecting royalties, or by practicing the patent and granting licenses

16. Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars
-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html.
17. Steve Lohr, Smartphone Patent Wars Show the System Works, Patent Chief Says,
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20
/smartphone-patent-wars-show-the-system-works-patent-chief-says. For more discussions
about the possible effects of patents and patent litigation on innovation, see Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO
GENETIC TESTS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH,
AND SOCIETY (2010), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS
_patents_report_2010.pdf (“The Committee also found that patents have been used to narrow
or clear the market of existing tests, thereby limiting, rather than promoting availability of
testing.”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
19. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2002) (referencing and contesting the standard
economic theory of IP rights, which argues that weaker IP rights will result in decreased
innovation).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
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simultaneously. Hovenkamp notes that organizations may also obtain patents for
defensive motives, such as allowing the organization to practice inventions in a
way that minimizes the threat of patent litigation.21
Modern innovation typically builds on earlier innovation, in a way that
Professor Carl Shapiro likens to standing atop a pyramid rather than, as Newton
originally described the progress of science, standing “on the shoulders of giants.”22
The pyramid metaphor communicates that often, one innovation relies on many
earlier innovations, which each in turn rely on even earlier innovations. It logically
follows that many modern inventions may rely to some extent on technologies that
are still covered by patents held by others.23 Some scholarship indicates that in
areas where innovation is cumulative—that is, more like the pyramid metaphor—
strong intellectual property (IP) rights can impede innovation.24
In this IP-centric context, patent litigation typically follows a fairly predictable
pattern. A patent holder may notify the alleged infringer that a particular product
infringes on his technology and demand royalties. The patent holder may then file
suit against the alleged infringer if the parties are unable to reach an agreement.
The patent holder’s goal in an infringement action may be damages, often in the
form of court-ordered royalty payments, or an injunction to prevent the defendant
from practicing the patent holder’s invention.25 Professor Golden notes that
historically, if the patent holder thought he could obtain an injunction, the patent
holder might also use the potential injunction as leverage to obtain a settlement for
a higher royalty payment than the alleged infringer would have been willing to pay
otherwise.26 The alleged infringer is likely to defend by arguing either that the
asserted patent was invalid, or that if it was valid, there was no infringement.27

21. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1119, 1137 (2012).
22. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119–20 (Adam B. Jaffe,
Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters
/c10778.pdf; see also Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of
Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 752
(2007) (“[T]he cumulative nature of innovation means that almost all innovations are linked
to other innovations to some degree.”).
23. See Adam Speegle, Note, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse of the
Standard-Setting Process, 110 MICH. L. REV. 847, 848 (2012) (noting that the majority of
consumer electronics are “aggregations of independent patented technologies that are
packaged together”).
24. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1948 (referencing economic scholarship); see also
Menell, supra note 22, at 753 (“[T]he trend of digital technology toward greater
collaborative creativity and costly enforcement seems unlikely to support traditional
conceptions of ownership and control.”).
25. See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 514
(2010).
26. See id. at 508.
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (listing available defenses to assertions of patent
infringement).
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B. Interoperability and Standards
These patterns of arguments regarding patent infringement and validity also
arise in the context of standardized technologies. When this happens, the impact is
potentially much broader. James Surowiecki of Wired asserted in 2002 that
“without standardization there wouldn’t be a modern economy.”28 While this
statement was put forth largely with mass production and mass communication in
mind, it is similarly true for the modern computing industry.
The complications arising from the aggregate nature of innovation are
compounded by the modern need for technologies—especially communication
technologies—to be interoperable. The ability of gadgets to interact with each other
is of paramount importance in this age in which information is exchanged across
thousands of miles in a matter of seconds.29 Device interoperability gives
consumers more options in how they use technologies. Interoperability also
increases network effects—that is, the positive effects that emerge as more people
adopt the technology.30 Network effects are especially prevalent in the Internet,
computer, and telecommunications (ICT) industries. This is partly because the cost
of creating the technology decreases as more users adopt the technology and partly
because, as Merges and Kuhn observe, innovations in these industries are the most
effective when large numbers of people adopt them, and one way to encourage
wide adoption is to standardize the technology.31
In the ICT industries, the establishment of standards is important for the twin
goals of achieving higher levels of interoperability and obtaining greater network
effects. Sometimes, an industry may establish de facto standards through wide
usage,32 but other times, standard-setting organizations (SSOs) formally establish
standards through detailed processes.33 SSOs are generally voluntary collectives in
which representatives from multiple private companies, who are often competitors
of each other, work together to establish technology standards.34 Speegle notes that
consumers and industry both benefit from an efficient use of the standard-setting

28. James Surowiecki, Turn of the Century, WIRED, Jan. 2002, at 85, available at http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.01/standards.html.
29. See Stacy Baird, The Government at the Standards Bazaar, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 35, 38 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of interoperability in information
technology).
30. Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (“Standardization spurs network effects because a program
that interoperates with a variety of programs and files is more valuable than one that works
only in isolation.”).
31. See id. at 5 (stating that in the case of “network goods” like software, a product
becomes more valuable when more people use it); id. at 7 (stating that standardization allows
for greater interoperability between different software components).
32. The Blu-ray/HD DVD conflict is an example of a “standard war” in a de facto
standard-setting context. In lieu of a separate organization determining the final
specifications, the winner of the standard war was determined by the market. Speegle, supra
note 23, at 848.
33. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1898–99.
34. See id. at 1947 (noting that SSOs “are built on agreements among horizontal
competitors”).
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process because the resulting technologies are more interoperable and are more
quickly adopted by consumers.35
Because of the aggregate nature of innovation and the prevalence of patents in
the ICT industries, many standards set by SSOs implicate proprietary technologies
that are still covered by patents. This increases the possibility of abuse, either
through patent ambush or patent holdup. Patent ambush in the standards context
might arise where a patent holder learns that a proposed standard implicates claims
covered by his patent or patent application but does nothing either to inform the
SSO or to assert his rights until after the standard has been adopted.36 On the other
hand, Merges and Kuhn describe patent holdup as arising when a patent holder
refuses to license a relevant patent on expected terms, thus “holding up” the
progress of disseminating a new technology, regardless of whether the SSO was
aware of the patent holder’s interest when creating the standard.37 Chien and
Lemley note that patent holdup is an especially pernicious threat in the case of
multicomponent products where the claims of the asserted patent cover only a
small part of the product.38 Thus, the importance of protecting IP rights must be
balanced against preventing abusive tactics in order to protect consumers,
competition, and innovation in these industries.39
SSOs, aware of the potential abuse of patents in the context of standards, often
adopt intellectual property rights (IPR) policies aimed at curbing such abuses to
remove potential barriers to standard adoption.40 For instance, to facilitate the
adoption of standards, SSOs often require patent holders to agree to license
essential patents on FRAND terms.41 Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee
suggest that FRAND commitments are intended to curb possible attempts to exploit
the increased market power that comes with owning a patent that is used in a
standard.42

35. Speegle, supra note 23, at 848–49.
36. M. Sean Royall, Amanda Tessar & Adam Di Vincenzo, Deterring “Patent Ambush”
in Standard Setting: Lessons from Rambus and Qualcomm, 23 ANTITRUST, no. 3, Summer
2009, at 34, 34.
37. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 10 (stating that patent holdup can either be in
the form of “bait-and-switch,” where the patentee increases the licensing cost unexpectedly,
or “snake-in-the-grass,” when it is a third party that unexpectedly asserts a patent). Merges
and Kuhn refer to snake-in-the-grass holdups as “strategic rent-seeking.” Id. at 25.
38. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39 (2012).
39. See id. at 6; Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 49. Chien and Lemley also note that
much patent infringement litigation in this sort of context involves inadvertent infringement.
Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 6.
40. See, e.g., INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION &
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON PATENT
POLICY FOR ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC (2d ed. 2012), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub
/itu-t/oth/04/04/T04040000010003PDFE.pdf.
41. See id. at 7–8.
42. Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for
Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007).
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However, companies in high technology industries often possess large patent
portfolios, making it difficult for the company representatives who are involved
with the standard-setting process to know if the company owns essential patents.
Additionally, a patent may be bought and sold multiple times during its lifetime,
and these patent transfers may complicate FRAND commitments. Patent transfers
in the standards context raise two important questions related to the patents at issue
and the implicated parties: (1) has the new patent holder obtained a patent covering
a technology that is subject to a FRAND commitment, and (2) is the new patent
holder a party that will be bound by a FRAND commitment?
Once a standard is set, standard adopters are locked in, and switching costs are
often very high if new circumstances arise—for example, if a patent owner starts
suing every company that makes products that comport with the standard.43 It is
likely to be difficult to anticipate where these possible abuses might come from. A
company may appear suspicious if it acquires a large number of patents, but the
company might be acquiring these patents for defensive purposes, with no intention
to assert them in litigation except in counterclaims. Similarly, Merges and Kuhn
warn that post-standard patenting may be a sign of bad faith strategic rent-seeking,
but a study by Layne-Farrar indicates that less than a third of patents obtained after
a specific standard was finalized were opportunistic.44 But if patent holdup does
occur, this can increase the cost of the technology for consumers and also cause
significant delays and inefficiencies in the standard-setting process.45
One of the most pervasive issues in the SSO context is that FRAND is rarely if
ever defined in advance of a conflict.46 SSOs generally do not get involved with
setting licensing terms, which Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee note may be
in part due to the possible antitrust concerns if an SSO existed as an organization of
competitors that also discussed pricing strategies.47 Instead, SSOs adopt vague
language requiring fairness and reasonableness, leaving it to the courts to determine
what license terms would be fair and reasonable.48 The courts and the parties in the

43. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 6 (noting the problems of lock-in and
collective switching costs in the standards context).
44. Compare id. at 25 (suggesting that the timing of patent applications might indicate
bad faith on the part of the applicant), with Anne Layne-Farrar, Innovative or Indefensible?
An Empirical Assessment of Patenting Within Standard Setting, INT’L J. IT STANDARDS &
STANDARDIZATION RES., July–Dec. 2011, at 1, 13 (noting that the author’s analysis of
forward citations indicates that only between 10%–30% of patents obtained after a standard
is set are actually opportunistic).
45. Speegle, supra note 23, at 849.
46. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (determining an appropriate FRAND royalty).
47. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 678–79. It may be worthwhile to consider the
possibility of creating a limited antitrust exception, such as that available for insurance
companies under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006). Such an
exception could avoid possible antitrust concerns raised by the activities of some SSOs or
patent portfolio management entities. Such a proposal would be driven in part by the market
benefits that might accrue if patentees and/or licensees could, for example, share information
related to pricing and licensing payments. However, this substantial and perhaps
controversial reform proposal is beyond the scope of this Article.
48. See Speegle, supra note 23, at 853 (arguing that the FRAND commitments are too
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conflict may then apply economic models or legal tests to determine the value of
the patent’s contribution to the standard or the whole product,49 and this type of
approach may be taken by scholars as well.50
C. Essential Patents in Standards
Before we turn to a more thorough examination of the behavior of SSOs, we
must explain one of the foundational issues to which we will refer: essentiality. By
doing so, this Part will also lay the groundwork for resolving one of the five issues
that this Article examines.
Above, we noted that one of the major questions that arises in the context of
FRAND commitments and patent transfers concerns which patents the agreements
apply to.51 This question often turns on the concept of essentiality. Many times,
standards will rely on proprietary technologies still under patent, often called SEPs.
The IPR policies of SSOs often refer to SEPs as being covered by FRAND
commitments, and require SSO members to disclose SEPs that the members own.52
When disclosed, the term “declared essential patents” may be used to describe
these patents, indicating the unverified nature of the patent’s essentiality.53
But what are SEPs? Often, SEPs are characterized as technologically essential
patents,54 and this technological essentiality is tied closely with the interoperability
focus of the standard. However, the concept of essentiality encompasses many
ideas, and discussions of essentiality sometimes use the same term to refer to
different ideas. Lemley warns that an understanding of essentiality that is too broad
threatens to complicate the process of IP disclosures,55 but in our view an
understanding that is too narrow also threatens to undervalue certain technologies.
In this Part, we aim to explain and clarify some of the possible meanings of
essentiality in the context of standards.
When the Department of Justice (DOJ) evaluates entities for possible antitrust
issues, the DOJ may issue business review letters.56 The DOJ has evaluated several

vague and “often provide at most a questionable foundation on which to base litigation over
patent licensing disagreements”).
49. See, e.g., Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13.
50. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 676. Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and
Schmalensee apply economic models to various possible circumstances, and they conclude
that the equilibrium royalty rate will be highest when there is no competition, lower when
there is imperfect competition, and minimal when there is perfect competition. Id. at 692–93.
51. See supra Part I.B.
52. See, e.g., INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N ET AL., supra note 40, at 2.
53. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2012).
54. E.g., EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI Intellectual Property Rights
Policy, in ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE 35, 41 (2011), available at http://www.etsi.org/images
/etsi_ipr-policy.pdf (defining “essential” as referring to technical, but not commercial,
essentiality).
55. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 1959 (warning that the inclusion of “unnecessary
patents will complicate the disclosure and licensing processes”).
56. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2012).
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patent pools relating to technology standards, including MPEG-LA in 199757 and
two pools relating to the DVD standard in 199858 and 1999.59 The DOJ ultimately
permitted the actions of these entities, with one of the important factors being that
each pool was limited to essential patents.60 However, the DOJ did not address how
essentiality should be interpreted, just whether the pool’s approach to essentiality
was acceptable.61 In the MPEG-LA letter, the DOJ noted with approval that
MPEG-LA’s patent pool was limited to patents that were “essential to compliance”
with the MPEG-2 standard.62 In the First DVD Letter, the DOJ approved of the
pool’s definition of essentiality as being “necessary (as a practical matter) for
compliance” with the standard.63 In the Second DVD Letter, the DOJ approved of
the pool’s definition of essential patents as being patents that would be “necessarily
infringed,” or for which “there is no realistic alternative.”64
After discussing essentiality with industry members,65 we posit that there are
three primary possible types of essentiality: (1) core essential, meaning the patent is
technologically essential to a core function of the standard; (2) noncore essential,
meaning the patent is technologically essential to an optional function of the
standard; and (3) commercially essential, meaning the patent’s claims cover an
option that is not technologically essential to the standard, but other factors exist
making the patent commercially essential. A standard may also discuss
technologies covered by “non-essential” patents, meaning the patent claims of a
single patent may describe one of several alternatives for implementing the core or
noncore features described by the standard.
These three primary options also partially mirror the approaches taken with
respect to the MPEG-2 and DVD standards, as approved by the DOJ. For the

57. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., DOJ, to
Gerrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) [hereinafter MPEG-LA Letter],
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf.
58. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., DOJ, to Garrard [sic]
R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter First DVD Letter], available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf.
59. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., DOJ, to Carey R.
Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter Second
DVD Letter], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf.
60. See First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 15; MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 16;
Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 16.
61. See First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 11; MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 11;
Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 13.
62. MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 9.
63. First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 11.
64. Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 3.
65. In the initial stages of our research, we received feedback from industry
professionals at companies including Google, Microsoft, Research In Motion, and IBM. This
collaboration was made possible by our participation in the Symposium on Management of
Intellectual Property in Standard-Setting Processes, which was held in October 2012 by the
Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy at the National Academy of Sciences.
Bd. on Sci., Tech. & Econ. Policy, Symposium on Management of Intellectual Property in
Standard-Setting Processes Agenda, NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://sites.nationalacademies
.org/PGA/step/PGA_070838.
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MPEG-2 standard, “essential to compliance”66 is fairly strong wording that we
would interpret as referring to core essentiality. As referenced in the First DVD
Letter, “necessary (as a practical matter) for compliance”67 can be understood as
including core essentiality and noncore essentiality, and potentially also
commercial essentiality. The Second DVD Letter’s reference to patents for which
“there is no realistic alternative”68 indicates that this third pool might consider
commercially essential patents to also be essential.
Based on our communications with industry representatives, we posit that
commercial essentiality may be understood along a continuum, from broad to
intermediate to narrow. Under our broad definition, a technology would be
commercially essential when nearly unanimous market demand for the option
renders it necessary for competitors to include that option in order to compete. Our
intermediate view of commercial essentiality emphasizes technologies that enable
interoperability, which developers of complementary technology will need to use in
order to make their products compatible. Thus, while the broad view might
characterize patented features as commercially essential based on their popularity
in the market, the intermediate view relies on popularity of a technology that is tied
to interoperability. Our narrow definition, in contrast, would limit commercial
essentiality to non-essential patents that are nevertheless included within the
standard. There are two main options for a non-essential patent to be considered a
commercially essential patent: (1) the alternative technologies would be too costly,
leaving only one technology that is commercially feasible; or (2) one of the options
is preferred over others by such a great margin that it is not commercially feasible
to instead implement one of the alternatives.
Opinions vary as to whether commercially essential patents should be treated the
same as technologically essential patents. Lemley argues that FRAND
commitments should only apply to essential patents, reasoning that allowing
FRAND commitments to apply to non-essential patents would “complicate the
disclosure and licensing processes” and could result in members disclosing patents
with the twin goals of (1) avoiding nondisclosure liability and (2) obtaining royalty
payments.69 But Lemley characterizes patents that are “necessary as a practical
matter” as being essential,70 echoing the definition of essentiality referenced in the
First DVD Letter, which suggests that Lemley might view essential patents as
including some commercially essential patents, not just technologically essential
patents. It is unclear, however, whether Lemley would adopt a broad, intermediate,
or narrow characterization of commercial essentiality. On the other hand, Professor
Shapiro defines essential patents as patents that are “necessary to comply with [the]
standard,”71 similar to the “essential to compliance” definition referenced in the
MPEG-LA Letter.72 This narrower wording suggests that Professor Shapiro would
view the term “essential patents” as being limited to technologically essential

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 1.
First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 3.
Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 3.
Lemley, supra note 19, at 1959.
Id. at 1958.
Shapiro, supra note 22, at 136.
MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 9.
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patents. If this “necessary to comply” language is taken literally, Shapiro’s position
might also be read as limiting technological essentiality to core essential patents. A
related problem concerns the possibility that non-essential patents could later
become commercially essential, and whether these newly essential patents should
be treated as subject to earlier FRAND commitments.
SSOs vary in how they address the question of technologically versus
commercially essential patents.73 Whether a technology is considered an SEP is
largely determined by the SSO’s IPR policy. Commercially essential patents are
considered SEPs by only a minority of SSOs. The Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) is one of the few SSOs
that permits commercially essential patents to be SEPs, and the IEEE-SA’s
definition adopts the narrow view of commercial essentiality that only covers
otherwise non-essential technologies that were already mentioned in the standard.74
At this point, an illustration may be helpful. One aspect of the smartphone patent
war concerns the use by competitors of some of the patented design elements of
Apple products, like slide-to-unlock.75 A broad definition of commercially essential
might characterize this feature as commercially essential if nearly all smartphone
users demand it. Slide-to-unlock is an example of a user interface technology that
may be very popular but has little if anything to do with the underlying
functionality of a smartphone. Google takes an intermediate approach to
commercial essentiality, arguing that some popular technologies are so central to
interoperability and necessary for complementary technologies that they should be
viewed as de facto standards, with relevant patents treated as SEPs.76 Slide-tounlock would not be considered commercially essential under an intermediate
definition because it is a feature that only concerns the user interface and not
interoperability. The IPR policy of IEEE-SA provides an example of the narrow
view of commercial essentiality, defining an “essential patent claim” as a claim that
“was necessary to create a compliant implementation of either mandatory or
optional portions” of the standard, for which there is “no commercially and
technically feasible non-infringing alternative.”77 Slide-to-unlock would probably
not be considered narrowly commercially essential, because it is likely that the
designers of a product could come up with many different ways to activate a
device.78

73. Compare EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 41 (excluding
commercial essentiality), with INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, IEEE-SA
STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.1 (2012), available at http://standards.ieee.org/develop
/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf (including commercial essentiality).
74. INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73.
75. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
76. John Paczkowski, Google Says Some Apple Inventions Are So Great They Ought to
Be Shared, ALL THINGS D (July 20, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20120720/google
-claims-popularity-has-made-some-apple-patents-de-facto-essentials/.
77. INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6.1 (emphasis
added).
78. For example, consider our device activation technique in the hypothetical set forth
below in Part I.E, where we consider a Widget activation method that involves waving the
Widget in the air like a magic wand.
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In our view, SSOs should be permitted to consider commercially essential
patents as SEPs but should make it explicit in their IPR policies if they do so. In the
absence of an explicit provision, it may be appropriate to limit the term “essential
patent” to one or both types of technological essentiality. If commercially essential
patents are considered to be SEPs, we suggest adopting the narrow definition of
commercial essentiality. The narrow definition encourages innovation above the
standard, since any such improvements would be treated as proprietary
technologies instead of being swallowed by the standard. The biggest problem with
the broad definition of commercial essentiality is that there is no ex ante
determination—the more successful the improvement, the more likely the
improvement will be declared to be a standard, essential at some unknown future
time, thus reducing the value that an innovator can realize by improving on a
standard. Regardless, parties would still be free to include broadly commercially
essential patents in licensing negotiations.
Even if a clear definition of essentiality is adopted, that will not resolve all of
the problems that companies have when determining whether they own patents that
should be declared as essential to the SSO. This determination requires the SSO
members to search through all of the patents that their respective companies own,
which some compare to looking for a needle in a haystack.79 But we expect that if
this is a known variable, the above characterizations of essentiality will greatly
assist in the process of categorizing known patents into the proper type of
essentiality. It is to the difficulty of meeting SSOs’ requirements that we now turn.
D. Requirements Imposed by SSOs Prior to Standard Adoption
SSOs generally adopt IPR policies that set forth their members’ obligations with
regard to intellectual property implicated by the standard.80 During the
standard-setting process, a board or committee may request that members disclose
relevant patents, and it may also seek commitments from patent holders to license
these patents on either royalty-free (FRAND-RF) or FRAND terms to anyone who
requests a license.81

79. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 677 (referencing findings of empirical work by
Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole). Declaring that a patent is essential is often a
judgment call. Id.
80. E.g., EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 35–36 (requiring
members to disclose essential patents and commit to licensing essential patents on FRAND
terms).
81. FRAND-RF and FRAND terms are often seen as alternatives to one another. In the
standards context, parties occasionally cross-license on FRAND-RF terms, as Apple allegedly
offered to do if ETSI adopted its design for a new nano-SIM card as essential to a new
standard. Eric Slivka, Apple Offers Royalty-Free Patent Licenses to Push Proposed Nano-SIM
Standard, MACRUMORS.COM (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:47 AM), http://www.macrumors.com/2012
/03/26/apple-offers-royalty-free-patent-licenses-to-push-proposed-nano-sim-standard/.
In
some cases, SSOs might also treat FRAND-RF licenses as a punitive measure, as in the case
of SSOs that include provisions in their IP policies requiring members to license on FRANDRF terms if they own essential patents that they fail to disclose. E.g., VITA STANDARDS ORG.,
VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 14 (rev. 2.6 2009), available at http://www.vita.com/home
/VSO/vso-pp-r2d6.pdf.
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Depending on the member’s business model, however, requiring the disclosure
of all potential SEPs might be very costly and burdensome. A member company
with a large patent portfolio, for instance, might have hundreds of patents that are
potentially relevant to a standard that is being developed. In such a situation, the
member would have to read through each claim of every potentially relevant patent
to identify patents that might be essential to a standard that has not yet been
finalized or adopted. Having attorneys review all of these patents would likely be
cost prohibitive, but the main alternative to doing so would be to assign the task to
experienced technical professionals who are familiar with the proposed standard,
thereby taking these individuals away from their normal responsibilities.
Thus, companies may have an incentive to not undertake expensive
investigations of their own patent portfolios for the purpose of disclosing specific
patents as potential SEPs. However, such companies may be more willing to make
a blanket commitment to the SSO to license any SEPs on FRAND terms without
identifying the SEPs individually. Such blanket commitments can save time on the
front end but will not obviate the need to eventually examine the patent portfolio
for SEPs, especially if part of the portfolio is being assigned to another company.
If the company makes a broad commitment, what happens if one of the patents
that might be covered is then transferred? The IPR policy of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) is seemingly written with this situation in mind.
In section 7, concerning assignment and transfer of patent rights, the ITU requires
members to make reasonable efforts to secure an assignee’s agreement to be bound
by commitments that the patent owner reasonably believes it made to the ITU.82
Thus, the question becomes whether there is a reasonable belief that the transferred
patent was covered by this broad commitment.
Broad commitments would likely be less appealing to patent owners when the
SSO requires licensing to be on royalty-free terms. Because patent owners would
be unlikely to make broad commitments to license their entire patent portfolio on a
royalty-free basis, these broad commitments are likely to only appear when the
SSO emphasizes FRAND commitments and the availability of royalties. Some
SSOs allow patent owners to choose between committing to FRAND-RF licensing
and FRAND licensing.83
FRAND commitments are generally between the patent holder and the SSO.
However, apart from the amorphous language requiring that licenses be fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, the SSO generally provides no guidance for
what terms will be acceptable.84 It is also not always clear from the language of the
IPR policy if the policy covers: (1) core essential and noncore essential patents; (2)
only core essential patents; or (3) both types of technologically essential patents as
well as commercially essential patents. Even if the policy specifically enumerates
commercial essentiality, parsing the language will likely be necessary to determine

82. INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N ET AL., supra note 40, at 5.
83. See, e.g., AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY ch. IV, art. 12 (2008), available at http://www.avs.org.cn/en/
(click on “IPR Policy”).
84. Part of the reason that SSOs do not specify what FRAND means may be that SSOs
want to avoid any appearance that their organizations exist for price-fixing purposes that
would be illegal under antitrust law. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 678–79.
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whether the IPR policy refers to broad, intermediate, or narrow commercial
essentiality.
Standards are very important in industries with large network effects. When a
standard is widely adopted, small companies can compete with large companies on
a national level, or even a global level, by innovating and creating a new
technology that is nonetheless interoperable with technologies already broadly
accepted and used by the public.85 Interoperability can aid in the adoption of the
new technology by easing the transition from the old to the new. Thus, standards
can be used to support a competitive environment, but misuse of SEPs can interfere
with this goal. Ideally, SSOs would effectively address potential problems in the
standard-setting process ex ante, and parties that own SEPs could be trusted to not
take advantage of standards to demand higher royalties from competitors than the
individual patents would warrant on their own. The patent litigation of the last few
years, however, suggests that this may be an area in need of policy oversight.86
E. Highlighting FRAND Problems—A Hypothetical
There are several major problems with patents and standards that will become
more visible in the near future, and there is a dire need to determine the optimal
legal theories to use in resolving these problems. To illustrate the issues, consider
the following hypothetical situation. A chart depicting the relationships between
parties and patents follows the hypothetical.

85. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *5
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“SSOs seek to promote widespread adoption of their standards
because the interoperability benefits of standards depend on broad implementation.”).
86. See infra Part II.
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FRAND COMMITMENTS IN THE WIDGET WORLD
The Widget is a technology that is growing in popularity because of its ability to
help people communicate. However, there are many ways to make a Widget. Widgets
can be designed in a number of sizes, or using a number of different technologies.
Widgetech makes one Widget that relies on combining a five-inch Widget-1A with a
Widget-2C that transmits data at a frequency of 120 MHz. It currently licenses the
patent for the five-inch Widget-1A from Gizmo, Inc. and holds the patent for the
Widget-2C used in its Widget. Widgecom makes another Widget that relies on
combining a three-inch Widget-1D with a Widget-2B that transmits information at a
frequency of 20 MHz. Widgecom licenses the patent for the three-inch Widget-1D
from G-Tech Corp. and the patent for the Widget-2B from HF Gadget, Inc.
It has become obvious that the Widget technology has the potential to be very
beneficial for consumers, but currently, customers of Widgetech cannot change to
Widgecom’s service, and vice versa, because the two Widget technologies are too
different. Because Widget technologies are not uniform, most people have elected to
instead continue using Wadgets, an older technology that does not work as well or
have as many features as the Widget, although the Wadget does allow content to be
broadcast to a television. The Widget industry forms an SSO with the intent of
developing a standard for Widget technology. Widgetech, Gizmo, G-Tech, and HF
Gadget are all members of this SSO. Widgecom, however, does not join the SSO. The
Widget SSO focuses on the current specifications used by Widgetech and Widgecom
to determine what the standard should be, and thus has four different options for a
Widget specification.
Widget-1A and Widget-2C
Widget-1D and Widget-2B

Widget-1A and Widget-2B
Widget-1D and Widget-2C

After evaluating the different options for Widgets, the five-inch Widget-1A and a
20 MHz Widget-2B are eventually adopted as essential elements of the Widget
standard, and Gizmo and HF Gadget both disclose to the SSO that they have patents
on these respective technologies. The Widget SSO also addresses the possibility that
consumers may want to use the Widget to broadcast to their televisions, so the
organization notes that if a Widget producer wishes to make its Widget compatible
with this purpose, the producer should use the Widget-3 technology, which is covered
by a patent owned by Doodad LLC. Gizmo’s Widget-1A and HF Gadget’s Widget2B are both core essential patents for the Widget, and the Widget-3 is a noncore
essential patent. Doodad LLC is not a member of the Widget SSO, but it is a member
of the Wadget SSO, which adopted their Widget-3 patent as a core essential patent.
Upon the SSO’s request, all of the SSO members (including Gizmo; G-Tech; and
HF Gadget) sign an agreement with the SSO promising to license their relevant
patents on FRAND terms to parties that wish to adopt the standard. Shortly after the
standard has been finalized, Gizmo buys Doodad LLC’s patent portfolio, and HF
Gadget sells its patent portfolio to PatBuy, Inc. PatBuy is a patent assertion entity that
relies on patent royalties for most of its revenue.
A year after the standard has been set, the market for Widgets has grown, and
consumers are almost universally demanding that Widgets include the capability of
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broadcasting content to televisions, thus retaining one of the benefits of the Wadget.
The Widget-3 patent, while initially a noncore essential patent, may also now be a
commercially essential patent under the narrow definition thereof, even though it was
not commercially essential when the standard was announced.
Though none of its technologies were included in the standard, G-Tech has entered
the standard-compliant Widget market, having licensed the Widget-1A and Widget2B included in the standard. In addition, the G-Tech Widget also includes a patented
technology that it calls Widget-4, whereby the product is activated by waving the
Widget in the air with a clockwise circular motion and turned off by waving it in the
air with a counterclockwise circular motion. The motion-sensing activation mode has
proven so popular with consumers that every Widget owner wants to own a Widget
with Widget-4 capabilities, and some market research indicates that 95% of current
Widget consumers will not make a future purchase of a Widget if the Widget does not
have Widget-4.
After spending the better part of last year making their Widget production capable
of producing Widgets that adhere to the new standard, Widgecom and Widgetech start
to produce standard-complying Widgets. When the standard was announced,
Widgecom sent a letter requesting a license for the Widget-1A patent to Gizmo, and a
letter indicating an intent to continue licensing the Widget-2B patent to HF Gadget.
Similarly, Widgetech sent a letter to Gizmo indicating an intent to continue licensing
the Widget-1A patent, and a letter to HF Gadget requesting a license to practice its
Widget-2B patent. Widgetech also decides that it wants to include a feature in its
Widget to allow broadcasting to televisions, so it sends a letter to Doodad LLC to
request a license for the Widget-3 patent. Additionally, Widgetech adds Widget-4
capability to its Widget, and sends a letter to G-Tech to request a license.
Widgecom’s attempt to license from Gizmo reaches a stalemate, and an acceptable
royalty payment cannot be determined. Widgetech and Widgecom receive a letter
from HF Gadget stating that they no longer hold the Widget-2B patent, but the letter
does not say who the patent was assigned to. Widgetech receives a similar letter from
Doodad LLC concerning the Widget-3 patent. G-Tech responds to Widgetech’s
request with a cease and desist letter, threatening litigation if Widgetech infringes the
Widget-4 patent.
Gizmo sues Widgecom for infringing its Widget-1A patent and sues Widgetech for
infringing its Widget-3 patent. Gizmo is seeking an injunction to prevent Widgetech
and Widgecom from using these patents in their products.
PatBuy sues Widgetech and Widgecom for infringing its Widget-2B patent and is
seeking a very high royalty of 20% of the sale price of each unit sold that infringes the
claims of the Widget-2B patent. Widgecom produces proof of its existing license of
the Widget-2B patent, and the court quickly dismisses PatBuy’s claim based on wellestablished law that preexisting licenses are binding against subsequent patent owners.
G-Tech sues Widgetech for infringing its Widget-4 patent and seeks an injunction
against sales of Widgetech products that include Widget-4.
Widgetech and Widgecom both argue that even in cases where a license did not
already exist, all of the patent owners are obligated to license these patents on FRAND
terms, and thus the court should assist the parties in setting the terms of the license
agreements.
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The issues in this hypothetical can be visualized using the chart shown below.

WIDGET SSO
DOODAD LLC
(NONMEMBER)
WIDGET-3 (NON-CORE)
WIDGET-3
PATENT

FRAND

GIZMO INC
(MEMBER)
WIDGET-1 (CORE)

WIDGETECH (MEMBER)
REQUESTS WIDGET-1,
WIDGET-2, WIDGET-3,
AND WIDGET-4

FRAND

FRAND
HF GADGET INC
(MEMBER)
WIDGET-2 (CORE)

WIDGECOM
(NONMEMBER)
REQUESTS WIDGET-1
AND WIDGET-2

G-TECH, CORP.
(MEMBER)
WIDGET-4 (NOT IN
STANDARD)

WIDGET-2B
PATENT
PATBUY INC
(NONMEMBER)

Figure 1. Widget SSO Hypothetical

This hypothetical illustrates several problems. A court evaluating the following
problems is likely to first refer to the IPR policy of the Widget SSO. For our
purposes, assume that the Widget SSO’s IPR policy requires FRAND commitments
and the disclosure of SEPs, but is vague about essentiality.
(1) Application to Nonmembers. Widgecom is not a member of the Widget SSO.
Gizmo asserts that when it made its FRAND promise to the SSO, this promise only
applied to SSO members. Can Widgecom benefit from the promise and obtain a
license for the Widget-1A even though it is not a member of the Widget SSO?
(2) Widget-3, Essentiality and After-Acquired Patents. The Widget-3 patent is
now held by Gizmo, but it was acquired after Gizmo made the FRAND promise to
license its patents. This situation contains two distinct problems with their own
complications. At their cores, these two problems focus respectively on whether the
FRAND commitment applies to a particular patent, and whether the FRAND
commitment applies to a particular patent holder.
(a) The first problem concerns the Widget-3 patent’s status as a noncore
essential patent that now may also be commercially essential, and this problem
contains three parts.
(i) First, the parties will need to look at the IPR policy of the Widget SSO to
determine whether noncore essential patents are considered SEPs. If the answer is
yes, the FRAND commitment will apply to this patent, and the analysis for this
problem ends here.
(ii) If the above answer is no, the parties then ask whether the Widget SSO
considers commercially essential patents to be SEPs. If that answer is no, the
analysis ends and the FRAND commitment does not apply to this patent.
(iii) But if the answer to the second subpart is yes, that introduces the problem
of a noncore essential patent becoming commercially essential. The parties will
then need to analyze the Widget SSO’s IPR policy to determine the frame of
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reference for time—that is, does the IPR policy state that FRAND commitments
apply to patents that were essential at the time the standard was published?
(b) The second problem focuses on whether the particular patent holder is
bound by the FRAND commitment. This problem concerns the Widget 3 patent’s
status as an after-acquired patent, which Gizmo acquired only after making the
initial FRAND commitment. As a company that made a FRAND commitment to
license Widget patents, is Gizmo bound by this agreement such that it has to license
the Widget-3 patent on FRAND terms?
(3) Broad View of Commercial Essentiality. G-Tech is a member of the SSO and
made a FRAND promise, but G-Tech’s Widget-4 patent was not included in the
standard. However, the demand for Widget-4 capability is now very high. Should
the FRAND commitment also apply to the Widget-4 patent such that G-Tech must
license the patent on FRAND terms to Widgetech?
(4) Transferability of FRAND commitment. PatBuy was not a member of the
SSO, and did not make any FRAND promises. Does the FRAND commitment
made by HF Gadget also bind PatBuy and limit the royalties that PatBuy can seek
for the Widget-2B patent?
(5) Remedies for Patent Infringement. Gizmo owns the Widget-1A patent,
which is a core essential patent, and the Widget-3 patent, which is a noncore
essential patent that may also be commercially essential. PatBuy owns the Widget2B, a core essential patent.
(a) Is it consistent with Gizmo’s FRAND obligations to seek an injunction
preventing nonmember Widgecom from using the Widget-1A patent? What about
the Widget-3 patent? Is Gizmo’s request for an injunction to keep SSO member
Widgetech from using the Widget-3 patent consistent with Gizmo’s possible
FRAND obligations?
(b) Assuming that the FRAND obligations associated with the Widget-2B patent
“ran with the patent” and bound PatBuy as a successor in interest, the court will
have to determine whether a demanded royalty of 20% of the sale price for each
unit sold is “fair and reasonable.” This is fairly unlikely, but in the absence of a
royalty agreement between the parties, the burden may be on the court to determine
a royalty amount that would be consistent with PatBuy’s FRAND obligations.
A final policy matter illustrated in this hypothetical that deserves a brief mention
is transparency—that is, whether and to what extent recordation of assignments
should be required. If patent transfers were required to be recorded with the
USPTO, the above assignments to Gizmo and PatBuy might have been easier to
track down. If the assignees had been easier to track down, the party seeking a
license could have made a formal, prompt licensing request. Instead, Widgetech
and Widgecom pushed forward with production of standard-compliant products to
remain competitive, with the danger of patent litigation looming overhead, relying
only on the earlier FRAND commitment to assure them that a license would be
made available. Most of the above issues could be addressed through government
intervention or through voluntary collaboration by SSOs, but it would likely be
unreasonable to expect an SSO to keep track of patent transfers. Thus a
transparency solution would likely require government intervention and would not
have a corresponding private market solution.
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1. Transparency
The recordation of patent transfers already exists in some form in U.S. patent
law, which currently allows patent assignments to take priority over subsequent
transfers of the patent, but only if the patent assignment was recorded.87 However,
this provision does not make recordation mandatory. On the other hand, Executive
Order 9424, which was issued on February 18, 1944,88 does make recordation
mandatory, but only for interests in patents held by government entities.89
Some prominent policy actors, including academics,90 the FTC, and the USPTO,
have expressed support for requiring recordation of patent assignments. The FTC,
in a 2011 report on patent law issues, asserted that accurate patent assignment
records would assist parties in clearing patent rights.91 In November 2011, the
USPTO published a request for comments (RFC) concerning a possible rule change
to make assignment recordation mandatory.92 Like the FTC, the USPTO also noted
that uncertain patent ownership has the potential to complicate patent clearance and
interfere with market efficiency.93 These justifications for transparency are
especially relevant in the standards context, where incomplete information can lead
to very costly harm.
If the USPTO implements regulations to require the recordation of assignments,
this could benefit parties, like Widgecom and Widgetech in the above hypothetical,
who could more easily identify the new owners of the patents that they sought to
license. However, to be useful, such regulations must balance concerns about costs
and timing. As indicated by several comments in response to the RFC, the issue of
costs is controversial because many fear that a recordation requirement would
increase the costs associated with patent ownership.94
The added cost of recordation should be weighed against the need for
recordation to be timely. If the patent assignments to Gizmo Inc. and PatBuy went
unrecorded for five years, Widgecom and Widgetech would not be benefited by the
recordation requirement, because they needed that information less than a year after
the transfer. We recommend that in the case of SEP transfers, prompt recordation
of assignments should be required, perhaps within ninety days of an assignment. A

87. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
88. Exec. Order No. 9424, 9 Fed. Reg. 1959 (Feb. 18, 1944).
89. 37 C.F.R. § 3.11(b) (2012).
90. E.g., Colleen Chien, Comment to the USPTO: Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest
Information (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/rpii-f_chien
_130125.pdf.
91. FTC, supra note 8, at 131 (“Recording assignments of government-conferred rights
to exclude is necessary to ensure public notice and will not unduly burden patent transfers.”).
92. Request for Comments on Eliciting More Complete Patent Assignment Information,
76 Fed. Reg. 72372 (Nov. 23, 2011).
93. See id.
94. E.g., Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n’s Response to the USPTO “Request for
Comments on Eliciting More Complete Patent Assignment Information” (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/a_ipo_120123.pdf (pointing out that in the case
of some organizations, patent prosecution and patent ownership issues may be handled by
two separate departments, or perhaps even by two entirely separate sets of outside counsel).
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ninety-day deadline would be consistent with the current structure of § 261, which
allows an earlier assignment to take priority when it is recorded within three
months.95 This kind of recordation requirement for SEP transfers is what Merrill
and Smith would refer to as a “notice strategy,” in that it provides a method to
facilitate the disclosure of new information.96 Notice strategies are typically
associated with rights in rem, a topic that we examine in more detail as it relates to
SEPs in Part III.A.2.
F. SSOs and IPR Policies
In the hypothetical above, we intentionally omitted a detailed discussion of the
Widget SSO’s IPR policy. This is because the IPR policies of SSOs often vary
significantly. An SSO might, for example, require members to add their patent to
the “patent pool,” which the SSO may then license to standard implementers as a
package deal.97 In contrast, an SSO that emphasizes FRAND commitments
typically leaves it to the patent owner and potential licensee to determine license
terms.
The first major aspect of an SSO’s IPR policy is the approach that the SSO takes
to licensing obligations. Merges and Kuhn suggest that if the patent owner takes on
an obligation, it is in the public interest to make that promise binding.98 We
assume, as a baseline, that courts will generally conclude that patent owners are
bound by the obligations that they accept in IPR policies.
For our purposes, there are three main options for these obligations: (1) the SSO
might request that members grant FRAND licenses; (2) the SSO might establish a
patent pool to which members can contribute; or (3) the SSO might require patents
to be licensed on royalty-free terms. The effectiveness of each of these three
options is influenced by the industries and the business models of the participants.
Devlin warns that FRAND-RF agreements could potentially lead to reduced
innovation in some circumstances.99
Patent pools are often discussed as an alternative to an SSO model,100 though
some SSOs also include a patent pool licensing option. For example, the IPR policy
of China’s Audio and Video Coding Standard (AVS) Workgroup allows members
of the subgroup developing a standard to select between these three types of
licensing obligations (FRAND, FRAND-RF, or participation in the patent pool).101

95. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
96. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 805 (2001).
97. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 7. But see Lemley, supra note 19, at 1951
(considering SSOs to be similar to patent pools, but not the same).
98. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 23.
99. See Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, 65 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 217, 227 (2009) (“But an SSO's insistence on royalty-free licensing may
be undesirable with respect to technological innovation in the long run if other forms of
compensation to the patentee are not forthcoming.”).
100. Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing (Feb. 13, 2013) (unpublished working paper) ( on file with authors).
101. See AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83, at 5–6.
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Under the AVS policy, if a member is not a part of the relevant subgroup when the
standard is adopted, the member has a fourth option in addition to the above three
options: to not take on any licensing obligation.102 Contreras proposes a “pseudopool” arrangement to mix the benefits of patent pools with the benefits of SSOs,103
but a true hybrid system as he proposes has not yet been adopted. Even in the case
of SSOs like AVS, patent owners currently have to choose between FRAND
commitments and patent pools.104
SSOs that emphasize FRAND licensing vary among themselves as well. Most
limit the policy to technologically essential patents, while others allow the FRAND
commitment to apply to commercially essential patents.105 Additionally, some
SSOs use broad language to describe the parties that are entitled to FRAND
licenses, while others do not address FRAND commitment beneficiaries.106
To get a sense of the variation, Lemley analyzed the intellectual property
policies of over forty standard-setting bodies.107 Lemley categorized the SSOs
according to: (1) whether the SSO had an IPR policy, and if so, what forms of IP
were covered; (2) whether the SSO’s policy required disclosure of relevant patents;
(3) whether the IPR policy addresses an obligation to search for relevant patents;
(4) whether the SSO would permit the final standard to rely on proprietary
technology (most said yes, though some qualified that technologies covered by IP
rights would only be included if technologically necessary); and (5) what licensing
provisions the IPR policies contained (e.g., FRAND-RF or FRAND).108
Lemley’s data indicate that the IPR policies of SSOs vary significantly.109 One
of the elements that a majority of the studied policies had was a disclosure rule,
with twenty-four of thirty-six policies requiring members to disclose relevant IP
rights.110 Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee note, however, that some firms
view disclosure requirements as potentially harmful, insofar as disclosing patents
might reveal future technology strategies to competitors.111
Lemley’s conclusions also underscore what he sees as an important function of
SSOs and their IPR policies: providing private ordering to mitigate negative effects
that IP rights seem to have on innovation in some industries.112 Lemley’s empirical

102. Id. at 6.
103. See generally Contreras, supra note 100 (suggesting that a pseudo-pool model could
remedy the uncertainty of FRAND commitments).
104. AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83.
105. Compare EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 41, with INST.
OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6.1 (including commercial
essentiality).
106. Compare AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83, at
8 (defining “Licensees” as including “all Members and their Affiliates and all third party
implementers of Compliant Portions”), with EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST.,
supra note 54 (not discussing the beneficiary of the FRAND commitment).
107. Lemley, supra note 19.
108. Id. at 1903.
109. Id. at 1891.
110. Id. at 1904.
111. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 677–78.
112. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1971–72 (citing previous work indicating that patents can
block improvements in the ICT industries). However, Lemley also says that IP rules must be
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work lays an important foundation for the study of the standard-setting process.
However, his work did not examine all of the facets of possible IPR policies, and a
future study might aim at updating and expanding on Lemley’s findings from his
2002 study. For example, future research might evaluate: (1) the different
approaches of SSOs to patent transfers; (2) whether the licensing provisions apply
equally to members and nonmembers of the SSO; (3) whether the IPR policies
define essentiality; (4) whether the IPR policies address after-acquired patents; and
(5) whether the IPR policies attempt to limit remedies that patent owners can seek
in litigation over SEPs.
In preparing this Article, we conducted a cursory overview of a small sample of
IPR policies (IEEE-SA, ITU-T, ETSI, and AVS) to get a sense of whether
Lemley’s conclusions about nonuniformity are still valid over ten years later. Based
on our initial observations, we posit that Lemley’s observations in 2002 are also
applicable to SSOs in 2013, where nonuniformity continues to be the unspoken
rule. We noted that SSOs generally give members wide leeway in management of
their own IP. IEEE-SA, for example, requires members to submit “Letters of
Assurance” indicating if the member owns any “Essential Patent Claims,” but
explicitly states that the policy does not create a duty to conduct a patent search.113
Many SSOs also indicate a preference that patents be transferred subject to
FRAND commitments,114 but SSOs also typically have a policy against getting
involved in licensing matters.115 Thus, even if the IPR policies of SSOs were made
more uniform, SSOs themselves generally do not provide an effective enforcement
mechanism for these policies. Because the transferability of FRAND commitments
is a cornerstone of this Article, we turn now to a more detailed discussion of the
approaches that four SSOs take to this question.
1. IPR Policies and Patent Transfers
If an SSO specifically addresses transfers in its IPR policy, by agreeing to be
bound by the terms of the SSO’s IPR policy, the member is agreeing to be bound
by the SSO’s requirements for the transfer of intellectual property and FRAND
commitments. To have any real force, however, IPR policies requiring patents to be
transferred subject to FRAND commitments must either be combined with the
property-based approach that we propose in Part III, or provide for harsh outcomes
sufficient to deter the member from transferring the patent without obtaining the
assignee’s consent to be bound by the FRAND commitment. We view IEEE-SA’s
approach as a precursor to a full property-based approach to FRAND commitment
transferability, because IEEE-SA notes that members should provide assignees

transparent and fair to fulfill this function. Id. at 1957.
113. INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6.
114. See, e.g., id. (requiring members to transfer patents subject to the FRAND
commitment).
115. See, e.g., Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION
(2013), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (“The detailed arrangements arising
from patents (licensing, royalties, etc.) are left to the parties concerned, as these arrangements
might differ from case to case.”).
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with a “Statement of Encumbrance” that states that the patent is being transferred
subject to existing encumbrances, including accepted “Letters of Assurance.”116
In preparing this Article, we reviewed the IP policies of several SSOs, with an
eye to getting an introductory understanding of the different approaches these SSOs
take with regard to the transfer of patents covered by the standard. Even looking at
just four IPR policies (IEEE-SA, ITU, AVS, and ETSI), we saw a variety of
approaches to the issue of transferring essential patents. For instance, the
approaches varied as to whether the transfer has to be subject to the same FRAND
commitment or whether the SSO merely expresses a preference that the transfer be
made subject to the same FRAND commitment.
On this point, ITU and ETSI both require the member executing a transfer to
notify the assignee of the relevant obligation.117 ITU also requires that the member
who reasonably believes he is bound by a FRAND commitment as to the patents he
is assigning must make “reasonable efforts” to obtain the assignee’s agreement to
be bound by the FRAND commitment.118 However, if the member fails to obtain
such an agreement upon making reasonable efforts, the ITU member will have no
further express obligations with regard to the licensing commitment and the
transfer.119 The ETSI policy also addresses an inability to obtain a FRAND
commitment. Under section 8 of the ETSI policy, however, if an essential patent
becomes unavailable after the standard is finalized, the burden is on ETSI to seek a
commitment from the patent owner to license on FRAND terms, and a failure to
obtain such a commitment could even lead to ETSI scrapping the entire standard.120
On the other hand, both IEEE-SA and AVS require the patent owner to secure the
assignee’s agreement to be bound, rather than merely requiring the patent owner to
make “reasonable efforts” to do so.121
These four SSOs thus represent three distinct approaches to transfers in an
SSO’s IPR policy: (1) a statement of the SSO’s preference for transferability
without imposing concrete obligations; (2) a requirement imposing some
responsibility for obtaining FRAND commitments from new assignees on the SSO
itself; and (3) a provision consisting of explicit language that transfers must be
made subject to the FRAND commitment. Analysis of a larger sample might reveal

116. INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6.
117. Intellectual Property Rights, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (Oct. 26, 2012),
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/default.aspx; Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in
ETSI, EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST. (2012), http://www.etsi.org/about/iprs-in-etsi.
118. INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N ET AL., supra note 40, at 5.
119. See id. Section 7 of the IPR policy of the ITU, however, does specify that if the
member had specifically identified patents to the standard-setting body, the member would
be required to obtain the assignee’s consent to be bound by the same agreement as the
member. Id.
120. EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 37–38. The approach
taken by ETSI, where the SSO reserves a right to scrap the entire standard if a FRAND
commitment cannot be obtained, is mostly unique because it is explicitly stated. Some
indications suggest that this approach is fairly common in the standard-setting context, but
many SSOs do not expressly refer to it in their IPR policies.
121. See INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6; AUDIO
VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83.
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even more options. The fact that we found three different approaches to transfers in
four SSOs, however, supports Lemley’s conclusions about nonuniformity in SSOs’
IPR policies and suggests that this nonuniformity is pervasive throughout IPR
policies and is not limited to the categories that Lemley examined.
Ultimately, we urge that SSOs should amend their IPR policies to address the
issues that we raise in this Article. Further analysis may be beneficial to determine
whether these IPR policy changes should be prospective or retrospective. Requiring
the new IPR policy to only bind future standards might be easier to handle under
traditional contract law, because otherwise new consideration might be required to
bind parties to the amended policy.122 On the other hand, if the same SSO develops
two standards that often are used in the same device, but one standard is governed
by the pre-amendment IPR policy and one standard is governed by an amended IPR
policy, the same lack of uniformity that is currently a problem between SSOs
would actually exist within the same SSO.
Uniformity among the approaches of different SSOs could also be beneficial,
and this uniformity could be achieved through a voluntary consortium or through
government intervention and oversight. As discussed below in Part II.B.3, formal
contract law would likely be adequate for addressing issues relating to
nonmembers, after-acquired patents, and essentiality, provided the IPR policy
contained sufficient detail on these topics. However, contract law alone will not
cause FRAND commitments to be binding on assignees in the absence of the
assignee giving explicit consent to be bound.
As the above discussion demonstrates, there are many issues that may arise
when SSOs adopt standards that rely on patented technologies. The IPR policies of
SSOs may attempt to address some of these issues ex ante, but SSOs are generally
unable to exercise any control over the transfers of patents owned by members if
the SSOs do not impose explicit terms to that effect. The law also appears to keep a
largely “hands-off” approach with respect to patent assignments, deferring to the
patent owners to make private deals with minimal oversight. This approach may be
a positive attribute of the IP system in most contexts, but when SEPs are in issue,
some additional oversight could be beneficial to ensure that patent owners also take
the public interest into account. We turn now to the main category of legal
oversight that has been thus far utilized in the context of standards issues: civil
litigation resulting from a dispute.
II. STANDARDS, LITIGATION, AND LEGAL THEORIES
Due to the complexity of standards and IPR policies, there are many
opportunities for companies to engage in unfair or inefficient behavior. In the
interest of inclusiveness, we have decided to eschew the terms “patent holdup” and
“patent ambush” in this Part. Each term is informative and descriptive, but the
problems that arise in the standard-setting context may justify new terminology.
“Patent holdup,” for example, is a phrase that describes the effect of an action, but

122. See, e.g., Glisson v. Global Sec. Servs., LLC, 653 S.E.2d 85, 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding that continued employment was not sufficient consideration to make a noncompete
agreement an enforceable contract).

2014]

FRAND’S FOREVER

257

not the action itself. On the other hand, “patent ambush” implies a degree of
premeditation that may not exist when the ambushing patent was recently
transferred from a FRAND-complying assignor to a FRAND-denying assignee.
The patent misuse problems that are associated with the standard-setting process
are also likely to be narrower than the implications of either of these terms.
In our view, there are three main situations in which a patent holder may
unfairly leverage his patent in the standard-setting context: (1) a patent may be
concealed during the standard-setting process (“concealment”); (2) a patent holder
may change his mind after making a FRAND commitment or otherwise seek
arguably non-FRAND terms (“bait-and-switch”);123 and (3) a patent holder who
made a FRAND commitment may transfer the patent to a third party that refuses to
honor the FRAND commitment (“succession”).
The first situation, concealment, may arise when a party has a patent that is
essential to a standard under development, but intentionally fails to disclose this
patent to the SSO. Once the standard has been adopted, this patent holder might sue
good faith adopters of the standard for infringement. Concealment could be
considered a specific type of patent ambush that is made possible because of the
relationship between the patent owner and the SSO. Some SSOs address the
problems raised by the threat of patent concealment by including provisions in their
rules that require FRAND-RF licenses to be granted by patent owners that have
intentionally concealed patents.124 If the patent holder would otherwise at least be
entitled to a reasonable royalty for the use of the patent by standard adopters, a
requirement that the patent holder license the patent on a royalty-free basis would
be less appealing to a company that wants to earn revenue from its patents; thus,
the IPR policy discourages concealment.
In the second situation, bait-and-switch, a party may disclose his patent to the
SSO and initially agree to license the patent on FRAND terms to anyone who
requests a license. The patent owner might then later change his mind or otherwise
demand excessive royalties from competitors that want to implement the standard.
This situation is problematic in part because the potential licensee may have
already made substantial investments in reliance on the FRAND promise.
The third situation, where a patent is assigned to a successor in interest who did
not make a FRAND commitment with the SSO, is less clear. The effect of patent
transfers on the enforceability of FRAND commitments is currently an open
question. The FRAND commitment is typically construed as a contract between the
initial patent holder and the SSO,125 so the question arises of when and under what

123. Here, we are using the term “bait-and-switch” in much the same way that Merges
and Kuhn use the term. In their 2009 article, Merges and Kuhn refer to two potential types of
patent holdup: snake-in-the-grass and bait-and-switch. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 10.
Our category of “concealment” is similar to the Merges and Kuhn category of “snake-in-the
-grass,” but we used the term concealment because it is more in keeping with our theme of
focusing on the actions rather than the effects.
124. See, e.g., VITA STANDARDS ORG., supra note 81, at 14 (“If a WG Member fails to
adequately and timely disclose . . . a patent claim or license terms for it as set forth in this
Section 10 . . . the VITA Member Company must license it to the extent it is essential to a
Draft VSO Specification on a royalty free basis . . . .”).
125. E.g., Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (N.D.
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circumstances a successor in interest can be bound by that contract and by whom.
The approaches of SSOs vary on this point. Many state in their policies a
preference that future assignees be bound by the FRAND commitment.126
However, some SSOs merely require the contracting party to make a reasonable
effort to obtain the assignee’s agreement to be bound, while others require that any
assignment have the express condition of being subject to the FRAND
commitment.127 SSOs also may vary on whether the agreement explicitly addresses
granting licenses to nonmembers and whether the FRAND commitment applies to
core essential, noncore essential, and commercially essential patents.128
A. Litigation over FRAND Commitments
Litigation over a FRAND commitment may come in several forms, which are
most commonly focused on antitrust law or contract law.129 If the FRAND
commitment creates a duty to negotiate in good faith, as some courts have
suggested,130 the reality of negotiation introduces more complications. For
example, in normal negotiations, if the party seeking a payment is the first to offer,
it will often highball the other party, thus causing future negotiations to use that
high initial offer as a reference point.131 Similarly, if the party that will be making a
payment is the first to offer, it will often lowball the other party, and future
negotiations may thus be anchored lower due to the lower initial reference point.132
But what about negotiations when there is a FRAND commitment? Both parties
know that the end result has to be fair and reasonable. The district court in
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. recently emphasized that an initial offer must be
at least made in good faith.133 Additionally, some SSOs use language requiring that
negotiations must be on FRAND terms, suggesting that the initial offer must also
Tex. 2008) (referring to the FRAND commitments made to IEEE and ETSI as contracts).
126. E.g., EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 36 (“FRAND
licensing undertakings made pursuant to Clause 6 shall be interpreted as encumbrances that
bind all successors-in-interest.”).
127. See supra Part I.F.1 for a brief discussion of four SSOs and their very different rules
about the effect of patent transfer on FRAND commitments.
128. See, e.g., INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73
(permitting narrowly commercially essential patents to be considered SEPs and including
patents that are essential to mandatory or optional portions of the standard); EUROPEAN
TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 41 (defining “essential” as referring to
patents that would be infringed by efforts to comply with a standard but explicitly excluding
the concept of commercial essentiality).
129. E.g., Research In Motion, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 796–98 (examining antitrust and
breach of contract claims).
130. E.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (“Moreover, both parties agree that Samsung’s contractual
obligation arising from its FRAND declarations to ETSI at the very least created a duty to
negotiate in good faith with Apple regarding FRAND terms.”).
131. See Steven J. Pasternak, An Overview of the Development Process, 8 SW. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 1, 19 (2001) (referring to different approaches taken by sellers and purchasers in
negotiations).
132. See id.
133. 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1038 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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abide by FRAND principles.134 If the initial offer is required to be on FRAND
terms, this may restrict the ability of negotiators to use either highballing or
lowballing techniques.
When a patent owner has previously entered into a FRAND commitment, she
may attempt to comply with this agreement at first and engage in negotiations with
the potential licensee. However, if the negotiations are unsuccessful or not likely to
be successful, the parties might file suit and request that a court intervene and set
the FRAND terms. A court that is tasked with setting FRAND terms for a license
may use a similar approach as when the court is asked to set a reasonable royalty or
determine if a proffered royalty amount is reasonable. If a court is asked to
determine if a royalty is reasonable, the court will often weigh a number of factors,
possibly applying the fifteen-factor test of Georgia-Pacific.135 This can quickly
become very complicated, as Judge Robart’s recent 207-page decision in Microsoft
v. Motorola indicates.136 In the FRAND context, a court that is asked to set a
royalty amount will likely have to consider the increased value that a patent enjoys
merely by being essential to a standard and may eventually set the royalties at the
level that would be appropriate if the patent’s value had not been inflated by its use
in a standard.137
As is true with most litigation, FRAND litigation is rarely focused on a single
issue. Litigation over a FRAND commitment may raise antitrust issues, with one or
both parties asserting that the other is behaving in an anticompetitive manner and
violating antitrust law.138 Even if the FRAND commitment portion of the dispute is
governed by principles of contract law, the parties are likely to raise patent issues
as well, including patent validity.139 Because of the importance of contract law,
however, FRAND commitment claims may be brought in state court or federal
district court, and appeals may be heard by many different courts other than the
Federal Circuit, which handles appeals of patent cases.
If the case involves claims of patent infringement, the patent holder may also be
seeking an injunction, a common remedy sought in patent cases. Under eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC,140 a four-factor test for determining the appropriateness of an

134. See, e.g., Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, supra note 115. At least
one court has read ITU’s patent policy as applying the FRAND requirement at the
negotiation stage. ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-TEL, Inc., No. C-99-20292 RMW, 1999 WL
33520483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999).
135. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
136. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); see also Eingestellt von Florian Mueller, A Closer Look at the 207Page, Landmark FRAND Rate-Setting Decision in Microsoft v. Motorola, FOSS PATENTS
(Apr. 28, 2013, 11:49 PM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/a-closer-look-at-207-page
-landmark.html.
137. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(referring to this situation as being one of the purposes of FRAND commitments).
138. E.g., Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Tex.
2008).
139. See, e.g., Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 923 (ruling on requests for declaratory
judgments of invalidity and infringement).
140. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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injunction applies to patent disputes. To obtain a permanent injunction under that
test, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) irreparable injury; (2) the
inadequacy of money damages to compensate for the injury; (3) that a remedy in
equity is warranted after considering the balance of hardships between the parties;
and (4) that a permanent injunction would not be harmful to the public interest.141
Patent law inherently gives patent owners a right to exclude others from practicing
their invention,142 so when a court determines that an injunction is not appropriate
but that the nonowner was infringing the patent, the court may set an ongoing
royalty rate; this resolution will provide reasonable compensation to a patentee who
has effectively given up his right to exclude the infringer from practicing the
patent.143 A study by Chien and Lemley found that there has been a reduction in
injunctions since eBay, but the authors suggest that this reduction may be offset by
the continued availability of injunctions in litigation before the International Trade
Court (ITC),144 an issue that we discuss in more detail in Part IV.C.
Bankruptcy is another area that these disputes occasionally implicate. Above,
we noted that patents are often bought and sold. Sometimes, these purchases are not
between two solvent companies, but instead occur when one of the companies is
declaring bankruptcy and its patent portfolio is being sold to satisfy debts.145 Under
the bankruptcy law of the United States, patents are generally treated as assets
subject to sale by the trustee in the event that the patents are found to be nonexempt assets of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to the bankruptcy code.146 Merges
and Kuhn note that the interests of a bankruptcy estate are often very different from
the interests of the original patent owner, as the bankruptcy estate has a fiduciary
duty to creditors, and thus the estate has the incentive to maximize short term
profits.147 IP licenses are granted some protection, with licensees generally being
given the power to elect to retain their rights.148
However, a FRAND commitment does not create an express license, though it
arguably imposes on the patent owner a duty to negotiate in good faith; as such, the
agreement’s fate under a bankruptcy proceeding is unclear. Because of the
importance of FRAND commitments to public interest concerns, one option is for
bankruptcy courts to treat FRAND commitments in a way similar to
nondischargeable priority debts.149 The court and the parties can also take action to
clarify this issue. In the bankruptcy proceeding for Nortel Networks Inc., the
bankruptcy court stated that debtors would take assets free of any other liens or

141. Id. at 391.
142. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (setting out conditions for patent infringement).
143. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
144. Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 3–4 (warning that PAEs have started seeking
exclusion orders from the ITC in greater numbers since eBay was decided in 2006).
145. See, e.g., In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09-10138(KG), 2011 WL 4831218 (Bankr.
D. Del. July 11, 2011).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (sale of assets by trustee); 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(5) (2006) (exemptions).
147. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 36.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006).
149. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 37–38 (suggesting the adoption of a similar
approach in the authors’ proposed standards estoppel doctrine).

2014]

FRAND’S FOREVER

261

interests, except for a few categories of interests.150 One of the enumerated
categories that Nortel’s debtors took assets subject to was enforceable agreements
with SSOs.151 The Nortel example shows that bankruptcy courts are receptive to
arguments regarding the value of FRAND commitments made to SSOs, and that
these courts have the power to prevent these commitments from being discharged
in bankruptcy.
Litigation over FRAND commitments is likely to involve many different legal
areas and theories. Bankruptcy law may be implicated when the question is whether
a FRAND commitment survives a bankruptcy proceeding, but this is likely to come
up in a more narrow circumstance. Instead, much of the litigation in this context
begins based on the patent owner’s claim for infringement, so defenses under
patent law may be relevant. Because the effects that patent exclusivity has on
competition can be especially harsh when the patents are part of a standard,
arguments may also assert that the patent owner engaged in unfair competition or
anticompetitive behavior. Finally, at its core, a FRAND commitment is a contract,
so contract law doctrines are likely to influence outcomes of litigation. Thus, we
turn now to a more detailed evaluation of these three areas of law (patents, antitrust,
and contracts), and how they currently affect some of the major problems that we
argue arise in the context of FRAND commitments and patent transfers.
B. The Law of FRAND Commitments and Transferability
When a patent holder assigns her patent to a third party, and the patent was
previously subject to a FRAND commitment with an SSO, is the third-party
assignee bound by this agreement? This is a difficult question that current law
inadequately addresses. Currently, the discussion of these topics mostly focuses on
patent law, antitrust law, and contract law.152 Patent law offers the weakest options
for addressing FRAND disputes. The options under antitrust are somewhat stronger
than under patent law but are fundamentally limited by the current nature of
antitrust law in the United States. In terms of the legal theories that have been
examined for these purposes, contract law has the most potential for addressing the
problems set forth in the above hypothetical, but it still has many shortcomings.
In this Part, we will discuss some of the current aspects of several areas of law,
and then go into more detail in an attempt to conclude which theories, if any, are
best suited to address the first four problems faced by the parties in our Widget
hypothetical: (1) the transferability of FRAND commitments; (2) the enforcement
of FRAND commitments by nonmembers of the SSO; (3) the application of
FRAND commitments to “core” essential patents, “noncore” essential patents, and
commercially essential patents; and (4) the application of FRAND commitments to
after-acquired patents. The question of appropriate remedies is addressed separately
in Part IV because these issues are most likely to be raised in the context of patent
litigation, which historically has been associated with injunctions.

150. In re Nortel Networks, 2011 WL 4831218, at *9.
151. Id.
152. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 1909 (asserting that the IP rules of SSOs should be
enforced through contract and IP law but acknowledging that there are issues that make it
difficult to enforce the rules effectively through these means).
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1. Patent Theory
Some principles of patent law may be applicable to the current controversy,
including laches, equitable estoppel, implied licenses, or a theory that allows the
original patent owner’s wrongdoings to be imputed to the successor in interest.
a. Patent Law Cases
Laches is a patent law doctrine that resembles a statute of limitations in that it
prevents patent holders from profiting by their delay in bringing suit for
infringement.153 A laches defense tends to follow the patent, and a patent assignee
will be bound by the conduct of his predecessor in interest.154 When raising a
defense of laches, the defendant must establish two things: (1) there was an
unreasonable delay before the patent owner asserted a claim; and (2) the delay
caused prejudice or injury to the defendant.155 The length of time necessary for a
delay to be unreasonable varies with the situation, but a delay of six years or more
is generally viewed as prima facie unreasonable.156 The prejudice prong may refer
to economic prejudice or evidentiary prejudice.157 An inquiry concerning economic
prejudice would focus on investments or damages that would not have accrued if
the patent owner had brought suit sooner.158 An inquiry concerning evidentiary
prejudice would focus on circumstances where the defendant’s ability to present a
full defense on the merits has been prejudiced due to factors like a witness’s death
or loss of records.159
However, laches depends on notice of specific infringement and typically
requires there to be a communication between the owner and infringer about that
infringement.160 In the standards context, a patent holder may not have specific
notice of every implementation of the infringing standard. Thus, even if the patent
holder decides to wait several years to track down and sue specific infringers, the
clock for laches would probably not start running unless the patent holder has
notice about a particular infringing incident and has contacted the infringers about
the possibility of litigation.161 Additionally, courts typically do not find economic
prejudice based on the cost of infringing,162 and Merges and Kuhn suggest that this
indicates that courts may not be receptive to an argument that the delay in bringing

153. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 33–34.
154. Id. at 35.
155. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
156. Id. at 1028; Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 44.
157. A.C. Auckerman, 960 F.2d at 1033.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 1028.
161. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 41–42 (noting that the “knew or should have
known” requirement of laches does not protect the entire group of standards adopters).
162. E.g., Globe-Union, Inc. v. Tiegel Mfg. Co., 228 U.S.P.Q. 58, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(“The mere fact that if plaintiff had sued defendant earlier, defendant would have stopped
infringing does not constitute actual prejudice under the applicable case law.”).
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suit deprived the standards adopter of the chance to find a noninfringing
workaround.163
A defense related to laches is equitable estoppel, which allows an accused
infringer to claim that the patent owner’s “course of conduct reasonably gave rise
to an inference” that the patent would not be enforced.164 Equitable estoppel and
laches are both defenses that focus on nonenforcement, but equitable estoppel
focuses on the mindset of the potential licensee, rather than that of the patent
owner.165 Where laches requires the patent owner to be aware of specific
infringement and fail to take action, equitable estoppel requires, at a minimum, that
the accused infringer is aware that the patent owner made statements addressing
nonenforcement of the patent and that the accused infringer then relied on that
statement.166 The Federal Circuit, in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Construction Co., stated that reliance requires for the infringer to “have had a
relationship or communication with the plaintiff which lulls the infringer into a
sense of security.”167 Lemley notes that equitable estoppel arguments may also
apply to statements made in the marketplace or directly to customers.168 Merges
and Kuhn observe that in limited situations, silence may also contribute to an
equitable estoppel defense as a misrepresentation if there was a clear duty to
speak.169
In the SSO context, Lemley suggests that equitable estoppel should exist when
the standard adopter is aware of a statement that the patent owner made to the SSO
concerning enforcement of the patent.170 However, Lemley expresses doubt that
equitable estoppel would protect standard adopters who rely on FRAND promises
because the promise does not prompt a reliance on nonenforcement of the patent,
but rather it elicits an expectation that the patent will be asserted and reasonable
royalties sought.171 The affirmative communication requirement of equitable
estoppel may also limit the FRAND commitment to only benefiting other members
of the SSO to whom the FRAND commitment was made.172 Additionally, if the
patent owner fails to disclose relevant patents, it is unclear whether this failed
disclosure passes the high bar for silence to be deemed misrepresentation.173 Thus,
a slightly amended approach to equitable estoppel might be needed to address
repudiated FRAND commitments, allowing a standard adopter to estop a patent
owner from denying a license or seeking an injunction, even if the patent owner

163. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 45–46.
164. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1918 (quoting A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028).
165. See A.C. Auckerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 1043 (evaluating claims based on laches and
equitable estoppel).
166. Id. at 1028–29, 1043–44.
167. Id. at 1043.
168. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1921.
169. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 39.
170. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1920–21.
171. Id. at 1923.
172. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 23.
173. Compare id. at 39–40 (suggesting that misrepresentation might not be found in a
failure to disclose), with Lemley, supra note 19, at 1918 (positing that nondisclosure of
patents to an SSO might count as silence when there is a duty to speak).
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was not the party that initially made the commitment to the SSO.174 Under the
approach proposed by Merges and Kuhn, the proposed affirmative defense of
standards estoppel should also survive assignment of the patent.175
Case law about de facto standards suggests that courts may be receptive to
arguments based on equitable estoppel. The idea that users of standards become
reliant on the availability of the technology can be found in patent cases like Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.176 In Lotus, the reliance interest
was effectively created in the user who devoted time to learning the spreadsheet
application Lotus 1-2-3.177 The court acknowledged that Lotus 1-2-3 “represented
the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet commands,” but concluded that if a
better spreadsheet product became available, Lotus users should be able to apply
their Lotus 1-2-3 knowledge and macros to the superior products instead of either
learning a new system from scratch or being locked in to Lotus 1-2-3.178
Another patent law option that might assist standard adopters when a patent
owner reneges on a FRAND commitment is the possibility of implied licenses. An
implied license is a quasi-contract doctrine that turns on the expectations of the
parties in a sales transaction.179 Merges and Kuhn note that the implied license
issue may arise in the case of a patented process that requires the use of a
nonpatented item.180 In such a situation, a court might say that the purchaser of the
nonpatented good has an implied license to use the patented process that the
purchaser acquired the nonpatented good to use.181 Lemley has argued that viewing
a FRAND commitment as an implied license would allow all of the standard
adopters to benefit, regardless of whether they would have had standing to sue for
contract damages, and that such an approach would also reduce opportunism in
litigation over SEPs.182 However, Merges and Kuhn argue that such implied
licenses would probably be construed very narrowly, and thus would not be likely
to provide an effective remedy.183
We have not located any FRAND-specific cases that emphasize an implied
license theory, but implied licenses are an accepted possibility in patent law.184
However, the cases addressing implied licenses generally focus on contexts where
there is a relationship between the patent owner and the party claiming an implied
license. For example, in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics

174. Merges and Kuhn suggest an alternative that they call “standards estoppel.” Merges
& Kuhn, supra note 30, at 20.
175. Id. at 34.
176. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
177. Id. at 819–21 (Boudin, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 821; see also Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 20 (discussing the Lotus
case).
179. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1923–24.
180. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 35.
181. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1924 (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241 (1942)).
182. Id. at 1925.
183. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 35.
184. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
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America, Inc., the Federal Circuit found an implied license where Wang had
entered into an agreement with Mitsubishi to manufacture (and then sell back to
Wang) SIMM cards that Wang had developed.185 Wang did not inform either
Mitsubishi or the SSO that it was seeking a patent on the SIMM technology.186
Lemley has suggested that the implied license doctrine may assist in resolving
disputes over FRAND commitments, arguing that the FRAND commitment creates
an implied license under proper circumstances,187 but it is currently unclear how
courts would respond to this argument.
The final approach that we noted under patent law, imputing the wrongdoings of
a predecessor in interest, is likely insufficient to address most of the disputes that
would arise in the context of transferring patents subject to a FRAND commitment,
but is worth noting. If the previous owner of the patent made an intentional
fraudulent representation to the SSO or to the USPTO, that misrepresentation could
potentially lead to the patent being ruled unenforceable because of the inequitable
conduct.188 In Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., the court allowed such a claim to
proceed where the claim was based on an assertion that LSI’s predecessor in
interest (Lucent) “intentionally and knowingly made material misrepresentations
and/or omissions in connection with standards-setting organizations.”189 The court
in Barnes & Noble also noted that fraud, both prior and subsequent to patent
issuance, can make a patent unenforceable.190 This theory may thus be an option for
standard adopters if the potential licensee can establish that the patent was
transferred for the purpose of avoiding the obligations of the FRAND commitment,
but it is not likely to help in situations where the previous owner did not engage in
intentional wrongdoing.
The patent-related claims that concern FRAND commitments occasionally
overlap with contract law claims, but not always in the same litigation. The
interrelated nature of disputes over patents and FRAND commitments can lead to
litigation being severely impeded, especially when the disputes are being addressed
by different courts. Consider, for example, the Delaware case of Rembrandt
Technologies v. Harris Corp.191 and the concurrent multidistrict litigation (MDL),
In re Rembrandt Technologies, LP.192 In the litigation against Harris, one of the
issues concerned the ‘627 patent and the application of a FRAND commitment that
AT&T, Rembrandt’s predecessor in interest, made to the Advanced Television

185. Id. at 1582.
186. Id. at 1575.
187. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1923–24.
188. See Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(noting that fraud prior to issuance and subsequent to issuance can make a patent
unenforceable).
189. Id. at 930.
190. Id. at 932.
191. No. 07C-09-059-JRS, 2009 WL 1509103, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 22, 2009) (“At
the initial scheduling conference, the Court was advised that multi-district patent litigation
(to which Harris is not a party) involving the ‘627 patent was ongoing in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware.”).
192. 493 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2007).
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Systems Committee (ATSC) during the promulgation of the HDTV standard.193
Harris was not a party to the MDL, but the ‘627 patent’s validity was being
challenged in the MDL, so Rembrandt sought Harris’s admission as to the ‘627
patent’s validity.194 If Harris had admitted to the patent’s validity in the FRAND
litigation, Rembrandt could have used that admission as evidence in the patent
litigation. The concurrent disputes led to changes in the parties’ positions in the
Delaware litigation when there were changes in the status of the MDL proceedings,
to the occasional frustration of the courts.195 Patent issues, patent-based theories to
address FRAND commitment issues, and contract claims would ideally be treated
by the same court that has full access to information from the parties, but as
Rembrandt shows, jurisdiction issues may make this difficult. This is another topic
that is ripe for further analysis by policy professionals and academics.
b. Insufficiency of Patent Law to Address FRAND Problems
Patent law does not provide viable recourse when FRAND commitments are
disregarded by assignees. The patent law doctrines of equitable estoppel and
implied licenses are likely to be ineffective as defenses against patent litigation
over SEPs. These doctrines are derived from some representation made by the
patentee that is relied on by the infringer.196 Because of the lack of relationship
between nonmembers and patent owners, an argument is likely to fail if it argues
that a defense of laches, equitable estoppel, or an implied license supports FRAND
commitment enforceability by nonmembers. A defense of equitable estoppel may,
however, be available to SSO members if a court concludes that membership in the
same SSO is sufficient to infer a relationship. These defenses, however, are
unlikely to be very helpful in the context of after-acquired patents, as it is likely
unreasonable to infer that a representation was made as to a patent that is not yet
owned.
2. Antitrust and Unfair Competition
A second major area of law that is raised in the SSO context is antitrust and
unfair competition.197 Lemley notes that to establish an antitrust violation of

193. Rembrandt Techs., 2009 WL 1509103, at *6 n.8.
194. Id. at *1 (“If Harris admitted infringement, then the admission could be used as
evidence in the prosecution of the patent litigation. If Harris denied infringement, then, based
on the language of the commitment on which Harris' demand for the license was based,
Rembrandt would not owe a license to Harris and this case would be over. The Court denied
the motion.”).
195. Id. (“Throughout the life of this litigation, the parties have used this action
principally as a device to gain strategic advantages in related multi-district federal patent
litigation. Positions taken here come and go with the changing tides of the federal
litigation.”).
196. See Wang Labs. Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (implied license); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020,
1043 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (equitable estoppel).
197. Because of the nature of SSOs as organizations of competitors, there are sometimes
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monopolization or attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act, the party
must prove the defendant’s “market power, anticompetitive conduct, and intent.”198
Remedies for antitrust violations may include treble damages, attorney’s fees, and
enforcement by antitrust authorities.199 The law of unfair competition, especially as
set forth in section 5 of the FTC Act,200 is a body of law that often overlaps with
antitrust law, though the term “antitrust” may also be understood in a more limited
sense to refer to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. We discuss both Sherman Act
claims and section 5 unfair competition claims in Part II.B.2.a.
The overlap of antitrust law and patent law is the subject of much discussion
among academics.201 Antitrust law aims to prevent abuses through monopolistic
and anticompetitive behaviors, but some monopolies are lawful and permitted.
Patents, for instance, always create a monopoly, and courts generally act with more
deference to the patent system when weighing monopolistic behaviors by patent
owners.202 SEPs, however, have the potential to be more harmful to competition
and the market if that monopoly power is abused. When a patent owner has an SEP,
therefore, a court may weigh the owner’s behavior as a patent owner against his
obligations under antitrust law, affording somewhat less deference to the nature of
the patent as a legal monopoly.203 However, Mossoff notes that there are many
concerns about whether courts that shape antitrust law have an adequate
understanding of the effects that such rulings might have on future technological
innovation.204
In the following Parts, we examine antitrust case law in more detail. As analysis
of the case law shows, the viability of antitrust claims in the FRAND litigation
context is ultimately unclear under U.S. law.

questions about whether the SSOs themselves violate antitrust law. See Lemley, supra note
19, at 1937 (noting the existence of this argument). However, courts typically acknowledge
the pro-competitive value of SSOs. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Via Techs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d
1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“Without [technology standards], the industry would
balkanize, improvements would slow, and consumers would suffer.”). Some scholars note,
however, that the risk of violating antitrust law might partially explain why SSOs keep a
“hands off” approach to licensing and the interpretation of FRAND. E.g., Layne-Farrar et al.,
supra note 42, at 678–79.
198. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1928.
199. Id. at 1927.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
201. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 761 (2002) (discussing the intersection of patent and antitrust law); James Gould &
James Langenfeld, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Landing on Patent Avenue in the
Game of Monopoly, 37 IDEA 449 (1997) (discussing the Clinton administration’s approach
to antitrust issues in intellectual property).
202. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 14 (noting that authorities faced with antitrust
claims often defer to patent law because of patent law’s inherent tradeoff between
competition benefits and incentives for innovation).
203. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding
that patent holdup in the form of unexpected enforcement of a declared essential patent was
actionable under antitrust law).
204. Adam Mossoff, A Simple Conveyance Rule for Complex Innovation, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 707, 735–36 (2009) (noting the institutional competence concerns).
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a. Antitrust and Unfair Competition Cases
Scholars and courts alike have often focused on competition law’s potential to
address issues relating to standards and FRAND commitments.205 Antitrust law and
the law of unfair competition are areas that are largely based on case law, because
the governing statutes (e.g., the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Sherman Act,
and the Clayton Act) are written in very high-level and general language. Thus,
fact-specific inquiries are very important in antitrust and unfair competition
cases.206
Perhaps due in part to antitrust’s reliance on fact-specific inquiries, the legal
conclusions about FRAND commitments and antitrust have been spotty. The case
of Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,207 for example, emphasizes that there may
be antitrust liability when there is active deception of the SSO.208 Similarly, in
Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc.209 the court concluded that Motorola’s
breach of a FRAND commitment was harmful to competition.210 The court in Vizio,
Inc. v. Funai Electric Co.211 reasoned that there may also be antitrust liability when
there is an active attempt to conspire to harm competition.212 However, under the
reasoning in Vizio, the mere transfer of a patent is likely not enough to show
anticompetitive behavior, and a refusal to abide by the FRAND commitment made
by a predecessor in interest is not inherently harmful to competition.213
The cases also indicate a trend toward requiring active deception of an SSO for
antitrust liability to attach under the Sherman Act. The important case of Rambus
Inc. v. FTC214 held that mere failure to disclose a patent application, even when the
patent owner appears to have intentionally amended a patent application to make
the claims fall within the standard specifications, would not sufficiently establish
anticompetitive harm if the concealment was intended to avoid the royalty limits
imposed by a FRAND commitment with the SSO.215 The Rambus court also held
the FTC to a high causation bar, requiring a showing that, but for the concealment,
the SSO would have chosen an alternative technology.216 Rambus further

205. E.g., George S. Cary, Mark W. Nelson, Steven J. Kaiser & Alex R. Sistla, The Case
for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 913 (2011); Speegle, supra note 23; Joshua D. Wright & Aubrey N. Stuempfle, Patent
Holdup, Antitrust, and Innovation: Harness or Noose?, 61 ALA. L. REV. 559 (2010).
206. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2009) (referring to the rule-of-reason standard as turning on
a fact-specific inquiry).
207. 501 F.3d 297 (3d. Cir. 2007).
208. Id. at 314.
209. 644 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
210. Id. at 796.
211. No. CV 09-0174 AHM (RCx), 2010 WL 7762624 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010).
212. See id. at *6.
213. Id. at *4–5.
214. 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
215. Id. at 459 (“But the latter—deceit merely enabling a monopolist to charge higher
prices than it otherwise could have charged—would not in itself constitute
monopolization.”).
216. Id. at 466–67.
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emphasizes the Supreme Court case of NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.217 for the
principle that fraudulent behavior along with harm to consumers in the form of
increased prices was not a per se antitrust violation where the increased cost to the
consumer could be attributed to the exercise of a lawful monopoly power.218 The
Rambus court’s reading of NYNEX is problematic for plaintiffs in antitrust cases
concerning patents in general and is potentially broad enough to restrict or
eliminate the application of antitrust law in cases involving patents that are part of a
standard.
Because of cases like Rambus and Vizio, the application of antitrust law as a
solution for a FRAND commitment dispute may be very limited. When there is an
omission instead of an active attempt at deception, the reasoning of Rambus may
persuade a court to find against antitrust liability. Similarly, Vizio seems to stand
for the idea that antitrust liability does not automatically follow the patent. While
Vizio left it open for antitrust liability to attach to conspiracies to harm competition,
it also deferred to the patent owners with respect to the issues of patent transfer and
repudiation of commitments made by a predecessor in interest.
Similarly, as seen in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., the NoerrPennington doctrine may limit the ability of defendants to raise antitrust issues as
counterclaims upon being sued for infringement.219 Because of the NoerrPennington doctrine, antitrust counterclaims in response to a patent infringement
suit may be limited to the extent that assertion of patent rights is viewed as the
anticompetitive conduct.
The FTC, which is one of the agencies authorized to enforce antitrust law, has
also been very involved with these issues.220 Rambus overturned an FTC opinion
where the FTC concluded that Rambus’s actions did amount to anticompetitive
conduct.221 When the FTC decided the case against Rambus, it drew on both
section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act, finding that Rambus
had unlawfully monopolized several technology markets through its deceptive
conduct.222 However, the D.C. Circuit did not address the section 5 aspects,
because the FTC did not raise section 5 in its case before the D.C. Circuit.223
Some FTC adjudications result in consent decrees, which focus on prohibiting
future actions like the behavior under investigation, and the entry of a consent

217. 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
218. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 465 (citing NYNEX Corp., 525 U.S. 128).
219. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (W.D. Wis.
2012). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is often understood as being based on the First
Amendment. In Apple v. Motorola, the court held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
applied because Apple’s claim about Motorola’s anticompetitive conduct arose from
Motorola’s attempt to enforce its patents in court, and thus the counterclaim was dismissed
on summary judgment. Id.
220. Raymond Z. Ling, Note, Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The Growing Divergence
Between the DOJ and the FTC in Merger Review After Whole Foods, 75 BROOK. L. REV.
935, 937 (2010) (noting that “the DOJ and the FTC have shared responsibility for
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws”).
221. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 469.
222. See id. at 461.
223. Id. at 467.
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decree requires the parties to withdraw the matter from adjudication.224 Many of
these involve section 5 of the FTC Act.225 One of the first examples in the
information age where the FTC investigated a company for standards-related
misbehavior is In re Dell Computer Corp.226 There, the FTC found that Dell had
violated section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to disclose its interest in an SEP and
then exercising its rights against implementers of the standard eight months after
the standard was adopted.227 Under the consent decree, Dell agreed that it would
not assert its IPR in the relevant standard.228
Another section 5-based FTC adjudication, which also resulted in a consent
decree, involved the actions of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (NData).229 In that
case, the FTC ordered NData to comply with the terms of FRAND commitments
that its predecessor in interest (National Semiconductor Corp.) made with the
Standards Association of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
(IEEE-SA).230 In the NData adjudication, the FTC concluded that NData’s actions
with regard to the patent amounted to unfair competition under section 5 of the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, but the FTC did not establish a standard for determining
when there are unfair practices in the standard-setting context.231 Merges and Kuhn
also point to the lack of a unanimous decision in NData as indicative of antitrust’s
inadequacy to address issues in the SSO context.232
Recently, the FTC investigated Google’s activities relating to patents obtained
when Google acquired Motorola Mobility (MM).233 MM had many patents that
were considered to be SEPs, and prior to Google’s acquisition, MM threatened to
seek injunctions against companies like Microsoft, Apple, and RIM for their use of
these SEPs.234 Google then continued these practices, and the FTC’s initial order,
published in January 2013, asserts that this pattern of injunction-seeking behavior
in the case of SEPs is a violation of section 5.235
As the Rambus case shows, the FTC is held to strict standards on review when
FTC adjudication is based on the Sherman Act, claims of monopolistic behavior,
and outright restraints on trade.236 The FTC currently has broader discretion to

224. 16 C.F.R. § 3.25 (2013).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
226. 121 F.T.C. 616, 618–19 (1996) (consent decree).
227. Id. at 617–19.
228. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1928–29.
229. In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. C-0510094 (decision and order,
Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122do.pdf.
230. See id.
231. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 3 (commenting on the FTC’s findings in the
NData proceeding).
232. Id. (suggesting that NData should have been an obvious case for finding
anticompetitive behavior).
233. Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to
Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 2398, 2399 (Jan. 11, 2013).
234. Id. at 2400, 2405.
235. Id. at 2400 (“The Proposed Complaint alleges that Motorola and Google's conduct
violates Section 5 of the FTC Act, both as an unfair method of competition and an unfair act
or practice.”).
236. See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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adjudicate possible violations of section 5’s unfair competition language.237
Application of section 5 of the FTC Act through FTC adjudication thus may still
preserve a viable outlet for antitrust and unfair competition theories in the context
of the transferability of FRAND commitments. However, the remedies available
for FTC actions under section 5 are narrower than those available for violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as we examine in more detail below. In the
alternative, Speegle suggests that rulemaking under section 5 might prove
beneficial to addressing issues that arise in the standards context.238
b. Insufficiency of Antitrust to Address FRAND Problems
In the standard-setting context, competition law has been one of the most visible
aspects of the law governing these disputes. As noted above, however, the case law
on antitrust issues indicates that this body of law may not be well suited for the
current controversy. As is the case in other areas of ex-post adjudication, antitrust
claims ultimately cannot be brought until an injury has already occurred, and any
positive resolution for the injury must then wait until the conclusion of potentially
protracted and complicated litigation. Thus, consumer injury may be magnified by
the inherently ex-post nature of antitrust remedies.
The nature of antitrust law in the United States is the primary reason why this
area of law will not be sufficient to address FRAND problems. For a claim to be
brought under the Sherman Act, the law typically requires a showing of specific
intent to engage in anticompetitive behavior,239 and the existence of anticompetitive
behavior is evaluated through a number of tests that each set very high bars. First,
antitrust claims under the Sherman Act are dismissed if the court does not think
that sufficient harm to competition has been alleged, which in the patent and
standards context, typically requires a showing of harm to competition in general,
not just harm to the alleged infringer.240 Second, as Rambus shows, a broad
application of the principles of NYNEX to the standard-setting context can lead to a
conclusion that harm to consumers arising from a party charging others more for
access to the party’s lawful monopoly (e.g., a patent) might require a stronger
showing to establish an anticompetitive harm that can be addressed under antitrust
law.241 Third, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the ability to raise antitrust
issues in a counterclaim is severely impeded,242 so antitrust theories might not be
helpful for supporting a counterclaim in a suit for patent infringement. There is also
case law that suggests that relying on antitrust law for the transferability of FRAND
commitments would not work, because as a default rule, the obligations under

237. See Speegle, supra note 23, at 849–50.
238. Id. at 847.
239. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1928.
240. E.g., ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-TEL, Inc., No. C-99-20292 RMW, 1999 WL 33520483,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999) (“The court finds that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege
injury to competition beyond the impact on plaintiff.”).
241. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 465 (citing NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128
(1998)).
242. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (W.D. Wis.
Aug. 10, 2012).
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antitrust law with respect to FRAND commitments would primarily apply to the
party that makes the FRAND commitment and would not transfer to a successor in
interest.243
Claims brought under section 5 of the FTC Act, claiming “unfair methods of
competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” may be more likely to
succeed, but with lesser remedies than under the Sherman Act. In civil litigation
brought under the Clayton Act, civil litigants may be able to obtain treble damages
and attorney fees,244 and in FTC adjudication under the Sherman Act, a company
may be fined or ordered to disgorge profits.245 In contrast, section 5 authorizes the
FTC to grant orders requiring the violator to cease and desist from the found
violations,246 but case law suggests that this “cease and desist” authority does not
include the power to order the violator to pay restitution to injured parties.247
Violation of a final order may result in a fine of up to $10,000 per violation, with
federal district courts also being authorized to grant mandatory injunctions in the
interest of enforcing the final order.248 While the possibility of injunctions to
enforce FTC orders has promise in the SSO context, the threat of a $10,000 fine per
violation may not have much bite. The $10,000 fine has been in the statute since
1973,249 when $10,000 had the buying power of over $50,000 in 2012 dollars.250
Though antitrust law is unlikely to assist in issues relating to the transfer of
SEPs, the law of unfair competition may have promise for extending FRAND
commitments to commercially essential patents and for applying the FRAND
commitment to benefit nonmembers of the SSO. Applying European competition
law, the European Commission (EC) recently examined the possibility of requiring
owners to grant access to commercially essential technologies in the context of

243. Vizio, Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co. Ltd., No. CV 09-0174 AHM (RCx), 2010 WL
7762624 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010). However, agreements or external forces can intervene to
make these agreements transfer. For example, in the Nortel bankruptcy proceeding, the court
specified that the patents would be transferred subject to agreements with standard-setting
organizations. The Department of Justice has also indicated (after an initial investigation)
that it would continue to watch Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Research In Motion to ensure
that these companies do not use newly acquired SEPs in a way that would be
anticompetitive, and that these companies comply with their own promises to be bound by
the previous patent owners’ promises to SSOs. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of
Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of
Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research In Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/280190.htm.
244. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
245. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 35–37 (D.D.C. 1999) (evaluating the
FTC’s authority to seek injunctions and disgorgement of profits); see also Edward
Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147 (2005).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006).
247. See Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Peter C. Ward,
Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good Intentions or
Congressional Intentions?,41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (1992).
248. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (2006).
249. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(c), 87 Stat. 591.
250. CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
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evaluating Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility.251 There, the Commission
noted that “in exceptional circumstances, notably where a technology has become
an indispensable input for competitors, a refusal to grant access to that technology
may be abusive.”252 However, the Commission’s opinion emphasized that this
would be a fact-intensive inquiry.253 If policymakers decree that competitors should
be granted access to commercially essential patents or face possible investigations,
the policy could strike a balance between acknowledging this obligation and not
imposing excessive liability on patent owners by limiting claims to redress under
section 5 of the FTC Act.
We also anticipate that antitrust law and the law of unfair competition could
permit nonmembers of the SSO to benefit from the FRAND commitment. The
focus of these areas of law is on the market as a whole rather than on specific
parties to a contract.254 As the Dell adjudication shows, the FTC has been willing to
require patent owners to agree to not assert their IP rights in a standard.255 Further
clarification and analysis on this point may be beneficial, but it appears that a
consent decree that is adopted in response to a patent owner’s refusal to negotiate
for a license could require the patent owner to engage in good faith negotiations
with potential licensees.
We express doubts, however, that either antitrust law or the law of unfair
competition would assist with the problems surrounding after-acquired patents in
the United States. For after-acquired patents, we look to the reasoning of the
Rambus and Vizio cases to conclude that antitrust law is not likely to apply to afteracquired patents in the absence of a conspiracy to monopolize.256 If the SSO’s
policy addresses after-acquired patents, this may make the problem capable of
being redressed under contract law, but we do not think that such contract language
would automatically affect the antitrust issues. Because of the importance of
contracts in these disputes, we now turn to an examination of contract law.
3. Contract
Contract law is especially relevant to these disputes, because FRAND
commitments are typically recognized as being valid contracts between the SSO
and the patent owning member.257 The IPR policies of many SSOs say that, if the
patent owner refuses to make a FRAND commitment, the SSO may decline to use

251. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6381,
Google/Motorola Mobility Commission Decision Pursuant to Article 6(b)(1) of Council
Regulation No 139/2004 [hereinafter Commission Regulation], available at http://ec.europa.eu
/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf.
252. Id. at ¶ 59.
253. Commission Regulation, supra note 251.
254. See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasizing that to
be actionable, behavior must have an anticompetitive effect on the market, not just an
adverse effect on specific competitors).
255. In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) (consent decree).
256. See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 463; Vizio, Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co. Ltd., No. CV 09-0174
AHM (RCx), 2010 WL 7762624 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010).
257. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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the patented technology in the standard. Lemley’s analysis suggests that a FRAND
commitment that is part of an SSO’s bylaws becomes an enforceable contract when
the SSO member accepts these terms of membership,258 but some SSOs specifically
state that the SSO will not get involved with licensing disputes.259 If the FRAND
commitment is a contract that is enforceable against the patent owner, and the SSO
states that it will not get involved in licensing disputes, Merges and Kuhn note that
this raises difficult questions relating to whom can enforce the contract and what
the available remedies might be.260
This Part focuses mostly on the application of formal contract law but also
discusses the application of detrimental reliance. A detrimental reliance theory
would be partially grounded in contract law, but the available remedies would be
equitable rather than legal.261
a. Contract Cases
Because a FRAND commitment is typically viewed as a contract, much of the
litigation in the FRAND commitment context focuses on formal contract law. The
FRAND commitment is between the patent holder and the SSO, but does it really
create a contract? When approaching these problems from a formal contract
perspective, this is the threshold question. Fortunately, it is also a threshold
question that has been repeatedly answered in the affirmative, at least when the
question is whether the agreement creates a contract between the patent owner and
the SSO.262 In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court concluded that a FRAND
commitment is a valid contract, because the commitment involves an offer, an
acceptance, and consideration.263 There, the court concluded that the SSO’s

258. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1910–11.
259. E.g., INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N ET AL., supra note 40, at 1 (“The
Organizations should not be involved in evaluating patent relevance or essentiality with
regards to Recommendations | Deliverables, interfere with licensing negotiations, or engage
in settling disputes on Patents; this should be left—as in the past—to the parties
concerned.”).
260. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 14.
261. See id. at 4 (suggesting that a “reliance interest” should be recognized when a
standard adopter uses a standard over time).
262. However, courts in several countries have rejected an argument that a FRAND
commitment is an offer to license that can be accepted by use of the patent. E.g., Apple Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *14 (N.D. Cal. May 14,
2012) (“[I]t is not plausible that Samsung’s FRAND declarations constitute an offer to
license.”); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 45629-112011 (Ct. of Milan Jan. 5, 2012)
(section specialized in industrial and intellectual property matters); Samsung Elecs. Co. v.
Apple Inc., No. LJN: BT7610 (District Ct. of The Hague Oct. 14, 2011); see also Gen.
Instrument Corp. v. Microsoft Deutschland GmbH, Landgericht Mannheim [Regional Court
of Mannheim] May 2, 2012, 1, 38 (Ger.), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/94523005
/Translation-of-Mannheim-2O240-Ruling-Motorola-v-Microsoft (“[T]he Patent Statement
and Licensing Declaration Form . . . cannot be understood as a binding license offer to any
number of third parties unknown to the Plaintiff, requiring only acceptance by a third party,
but as a request to license seekers to submit their own FRAND offers . . . .”).
263. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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promise to include or consider including the patent in the standard in exchange for
the FRAND commitment was consideration.264 On an interlocutory appeal
concerning a related injunction issued against Microsoft by a German court, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court’s characterization of a FRAND
commitment as a valid contract was not legally erroneous.265
So there is a valid contract, but the contract was created by an agreement
between the patent owner and the SSO. If a patent owner violates the agreement,
the SSO could sue as the other party to the contract, but the policies of many SSOs
indicate that the SSO will not get involved in licensing disputes.266 If the SSO will
not hold the patent owner liable for violating a FRAND commitment, who else
can? What about the potential adopters of the standard? Do they have a claim
against the patent owner for breach of contract? So far, under the law of the United
States, the answer has been yes.267 The standard adopters are likely to be third-party
beneficiaries under the contract, which means that they receive a direct benefit
from the contract even though they are not a party to the contract.268 In the case of
FRAND commitments, these contracts are specifically intended to benefit parties
that want to adopt the standard, so there is a solid argument for these adopters
being third-party beneficiaries. In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court specifically
noted that Microsoft (a member of the SSO) was a third-party beneficiary of the
FRAND commitments that Motorola made to the SSO.269 It would also lead to
unjust results if a patent owner who makes a FRAND commitment was permitted
to sue standard adopters for infringement, but the standard adopters were not
allowed to rely on the FRAND commitment as part of their legal theory. However,
this conclusion is not universal across all jurisdictions. German contract law, for
instance, typically does not recognize third-party rights in a contract.270
But many questions are still unresolved. So far, most of the litigation involving
questions of third-party beneficiaries to a FRAND commitment has occurred in a
context where the third-party beneficiary was a member of the SSO.271 Thus, case
law is currently unclear as to whether a nonmember would be considered a
third-party beneficiary, though there is at least one case where a court permitted a
claim to proceed where a nonmember of the SSO in question sought to enforce a

264. Id. at 1024.
265. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012).
266. See, e.g., INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6
(stating that IEEE is not responsible for determining if a proposed license is reasonable and
nondiscriminatory).
267. E.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451-RMW, 2013 WL
2181717, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013).
268. Id.
269. Microsoft Corp., 864 F. Supp. 2d at 1032.
270. E.g., Gen. Instrument Corp. v. Microsoft Deutschland GmbH, Landgericht
Mannheim [Regional Court of Mannheim] May 2, 2012 1 (Ger.), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/94523005/Translation-of-Mannheim-2O240-Ruling-Motorola-v
-Microsoft (stating that the ITU Patent Statement and Licensing Declaration is not “a
contract to the benefit of third parties.”).
271. E.g., Microsoft Corp., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023.
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FRAND commitment made by a patent owner and its predecessor-in-interest.272 In
the ESS Technology case, the question of SSO membership did not figure into the
analysis, which may indicate that protests based on the member-nonmember
distinction are purely academic in nature.
Lemley, however, warns that allowing nonmembers to enforce a FRAND
commitment would make the public at large into third-party beneficiaries.273 In our
view, nonmembers of the SSO who fall within the class of “standard adopters”
should be eligible to enforce a FRAND commitment as a third-party beneficiary,
because the class of “standard adopters” is a distinct class and is not the same thing
as allowing the FRAND commitment to be enforced by the public at large. The
patent owner would not be bound by the FRAND commitment in the case of all
infringements, just infringements that involve use of the patented technology to
comply with the standard.
What does this contract create? In the case of Apple v. Samsung, the parties
agreed that Samsung’s FRAND declaration to ETSI was a contract that at least
created a duty for Samsung to negotiate licenses in good faith.274 In Microsoft v.
Motorola, Motorola attempted to argue that the FRAND commitment imposes this
duty to negotiate in good faith on the potential licensee, such that if the patent
owner makes the first contact with the potential licensee, the obligation to license
on FRAND terms is expunged.275 However, the court rejected this argument,
reasoning that it would defeat the purpose of a FRAND promise if the patent owner
could evade the obligation by making first contact.276 The court further rejected
Motorola’s argument that Microsoft repudiated the FRAND commitment by filing
suit against Motorola instead of negotiating for a license.277 In the court’s February
27, 2012, ruling granting a partial summary judgment, the court opined that a
potential licensee would not be repudiating an agreement if the potential licensee
filed suit to request that a court determine whether terms comported with the
FRAND commitment.278 This dicta was made official in the court’s June 6, 2012,
ruling on separate summary judgment motions.279

272. See ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-TEL, Inc., No. C-99-20292 RMW, 1999 WL 33520483,
at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999).
273. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1915.
274. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493 (N.D. Cal.
May 14, 2012). The court rejected Apple’s argument that it already had a license based on a
theory that the FRAND commitment constituted an offer to license that Apple could accept
by using the patent. Id. at *13–14.
275. Microsoft Corp., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023.
276. Id. at 1034–35.
277. Id. at 1036.
278. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
(“As stated above, the court believes that reasonable parties may disagree as to the terms and
conditions of a RAND license, leaving the courthouse as the only viable arena to determine
the meaning of ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances. It would be illogical, therefore, to
deem it repudiation of one’s rights under a policy to file a lawsuit to enforce one’s rights
under that same policy.”).
279. Microsoft Corp., 864 F. Supp. 2d at 1034 (“[T]he court determines that it was not
the intent of the contracting parties (Motorola and the IEEE/ITU) to require that implementer
of a standard first apply for a license and then negotiate for a license in good faith before
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If the SSO only requires the license to be granted on FRAND terms, is the
patent owner obligated by the FRAND commitment to make an initial offer on
FRAND terms? In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court said no, but ruled the initial
offer “must comport with the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.”280 This
reasoning suggests that negotiations for royalty payments must start at a point that
is not so far from FRAND that it appears to be made in bad faith. There,
Motorola’s initial offer to license the patent to Microsoft was at a 2.25% royalty per
unit.281 By including the “good faith and fair dealing” language, the court retained
the authority to review the propriety of the initial offer, without inserting new
language into a contract that, on its face, only refers to the granted license and not
the initial offer.282
While a standard implementer might choose to sue for breach of contract due to
an excessive initial royalty offer, a more likely scenario is that the parties might fail
to reach an agreement after prolonged negotiations. The standard implementer
might then file suit, claiming that by failing to reach an agreement, the patent
owner breached the contract with the SSO. In one such case, the mobile phone
companies Ericsson and Samsung sued each other after reaching a stalemate in an
attempted renegotiation of a cross-license of SEPs.283 Both companies asserted that
the other party’s failure to reach an agreement was a breach of contract of the
FRAND promise that each made to ETSI.284
If a FRAND commitment is construed as an enforceable contract, and the
litigation continues to a final judgment, the court may be asked to determine a
reasonable royalty under the contract. When analyzing the reasonable royalty
question, some courts look to the 1970 case of Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood Corp., which set forth a very detailed fifteen-factor test for determining a
reasonable royalty.285 The Georgia-Pacific factors, however, do not provide any
guidance for calculating royalties, but only for determining whether proffered
royalties are reasonable.286 In April 2013, Judge Robart of the Western District of
Washington issued a 207-page decision in Microsoft v. Motorola, in what some are
calling a landmark decision in FRAND commitments,287 where the court
painstakingly goes through the most relevant Georgia-Pacific factors and several
different theories to calculate royalties that would be consistent with Motorola’s
FRAND obligations.288
Sometimes, the reasonable royalty question is simplified by the existence of a
number of other licenses for the same patent, but a court following the GeorgiaMotorola’s RAND obligations are triggered.”).
280. Id. at 1038.
281. Id. at 1029.
282. Id. at 1038.
283. Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:06-CV-63, 2007 WL 1202728 (E.D.
Tex. 2007).
284. See id. at *1.
285. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, *16–20 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (applying
the Georgia-Pacific factors to FRAND licensing).
286. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 681–82.
287. Mueller, supra note 136.
288. Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *18–20.
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Pacific factors may emphasize that the existence of comparable royalty
arrangements is only part of the test.289 Because owning an SEP gives the owner a
greater power in negotiations, courts have also discussed a reasonable royalty for
an SEP as being guided by the royalty that the patent would have warranted on its
own in the absence of the standard.290 This is also a position supported by the FTC
in its recent Intellectual Property Marketplace Report, in which the FTC
recommended capping royalties at the licensing value of the patent at the time the
standard was defined.291
b. Litigation over FRAND Commitments—Transferability
While contract theories are pretty straightforward when the litigation focuses on
the obligations of the party who made the promise, the topic gets muddled when the
patent starts changing hands. As we noted above in the context of bankruptcy law,
licenses are often an easier case than FRAND commitments.292 The same is true in
theories based on formal contract principles. In Intel, Inc. v. Negotiated Data
Solutions, LLC,293 the court held a 1976 license valid even though the patent had
been assigned multiple times and had been granted reissue by the USPTO since the
license was initially created.294 Similarly, in Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v.
AOL LLC,295 the current owner of the patent was found to be bound by the prior
license agreement and subsequent sublicensing agreements.296 In that situation,
both the patent and the license had been assigned multiple times.297
FRAND commitments, however, are potentially more complicated, because they
do not create a license, and instead only leave open the possibility for a license. In
Rembrandt Technologies, LP v. Harris Corp., which we also discuss in Parts
II.B.1.a and III.B.4, a Delaware court ran the gamut, and so did the litigants. 298
Harris sought a FRAND license from Rembrandt for the ‘627 patent, an HDTVrelated patent that was originally owned by AT&T.299 The same patent was also the
subject of MDL in federal court, though Harris was not a party to that litigation.300
Based on the terms of the FRAND commitment that AT&T entered into with the
ATSC, the court initially granted Harris’s motion for partial summary judgment on
the issue that Rembrandt, as AT&T’s successor in interest to the relevant patent,

289. Id. at *20 (discussing comparable licensing arrangements as one of the factors for
determining a royalty rate, but not the sole controlling factor).
290. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
291. FTC, supra note 8, at 194.
292. See supra text accompanying note 148.
293. 699 F. Supp. 2d 871 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
294. Id. at 876.
295. 641 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
296. Id. at 1338.
297. See id. at 1333–35.
298. No. 07C-99-059-JRS, 2008 WL 4824066 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2008).
299. Id. at *1.
300. Rembrandt Techs., L.P. v. Harris Corp., No. 07C-09-059-JRS, 2009 WL 2490873
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2009).
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owed Harris a FRAND license to essential patents.301 This ruling could potentially
have helped standard adopters, but it quickly unraveled from there after a Markman
hearing in the MDL suggested that the patent might be invalid, and the parties
altered their theories in the Delaware proceeding accordingly.302 The Delaware
court later vacated the earlier grant of partial summary judgment.303 Nonetheless,
the court’s initial approach to the question of whether a successor in interest is
bound by the previous owner’s FRAND commitment shows that courts may be
receptive to contract-based arguments for the assignability of FRAND obligations,
at least when, as here, the party seeking to enforce the FRAND commitment is a
member of the SSO.304
i. Transferability of FRAND Commitments in the EU
Though the post-assignment status of FRAND commitments is unclear under
U.S. law, the European Commission (EC) takes a much stronger position about
FRAND commitments and the transferability of FRAND commitments pertaining
to essential patents. The EC approach to transferability, however, is more likely to
focus on competition law than on contract law.
In 2001, the EC set out guidelines for applying European competition law to
“horizontal cooperation agreements,” including SSOs.305 Specifically, paragraph
174 of the guidelines specifies that when industry actors work together to create a
standard, “access to the standard must be possible for third parties on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.”306 Paragraph 285 of the “Guidelines on
the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements” duplicates this language, also
adding a recommendation that the FRAND commitment be binding against
assignees.307 In 2009, the EC reacted favorably to IPCom’s agreement to abide by

301. Rembrandt Techs., 2008 WL 4824066, at *1. Harris is listed as a member of ATSC.
ATSC Members, ADVANCED TELEVISION SYS. COMM., http://www.atsc.org/cms/index.php
/policies/50-details/146-members.
302. Rembrandt Techs., 2009 WL 2490873, at *1.
303. Id.
304. However, we question in Part III.B.4 whether this court’s analysis can really be
fairly considered to be based on formal contract law.
305. Commission Notice—Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty
to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 003), available at http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001Y0106(01):EN:HTML; see also Press
Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Welcomes IPCom’s Public FRAND
Declaration (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09
-549_en.htm.
306. Commission Notice—Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty
to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, supra note 305.
307. Commission Notice—Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011
O.J. (C 011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:
2011:011:0001:0072:EN:PDF.
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the FRAND commitment made by Bosch, its predecessor in interest to a number of
SEPs.308
As noted above, antitrust law in the United States takes a potentially more
restrictive view of FRAND commitments than does European competition law.
Thus, transferability of FRAND commitments under U.S. law currently turns on
the application of contract law, with antitrust law largely not being as applicable.
On the other hand, transferability of the same agreements in the EU will likely rely
on European competition law, with some European jurisdictions taking a position
against the third-party beneficiary theory that allows for viable FRAND
commitment enforcement under the formal contract law of the United States.309 In
our view, a property-based approach may serve to unify both the United States and
the EC on the issue of FRAND commitment transferability.
c. Formal Contract Law and the FRAND Problems
Parties to a contract can generally agree to anything that doesn’t violate the law,
isn’t contrary to public policy, and doesn’t render the contract so unfair as to be
unconscionable.310 When a contract addresses all of the possible issues, and there is
valid offer, acceptance, and consideration sufficient to support the formation of a
contract, there would be no problem.311 However, there is currently no standard for
standards—that is, SSOs vary significantly in how they address IP rights and
FRAND commitments, and there are many things that may be left out of these
agreements.
The first problem that we introduced in the above Widget hypothetical
concerned the enforceability of a FRAND commitment by a party who was not a
member of the SSO. This issue will largely be influenced by the IPR policy of the
SSO and is likely to be resolved under U.S. contract law by reference to the thirdparty beneficiary doctrine. The FRAND commitment is typically recognized as
being a valid contract, and the potential licensee is a third-party beneficiary of that
contract. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that a party may be the
intended beneficiary of a contract if the agreement indicates an intention to provide
a right to the third party under the contract.312
In our view, a FRAND commitment in which the patent holder agrees to license
on FRAND terms to anyone who intends to implement the standard clearly creates

308. European Comm’n, supra note 305.
309. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
a German ruling in Motorola’s favor, a jurisdiction that does not allow third-party
beneficiaries to enforce a contract).
310. See, e.g., Abigail Lauren Perdue, For Love or Money: An Analysis of the
Contractual Regulation of Reproductive Surrogacy, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279,
286 (2011) (“Furthermore, the contract’s enforceability could be challenged because, inter
alia, the agreement is unconscionable, illegal, or void against public policy.”).
311. See, e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, Artistic License or Breach of Contract? Creator
Liability for Deceptive or “Defective” Documentary Films and Television Programs, 33
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 67, 85 (2013) (“Fundamentally, a contract is an exchange of
promises, consisting of an offer, acceptance, and consideration.”).
312. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (2007).
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a category of intended beneficiary for all potential adopters of the standard. Thus,
accepting that the agreement is a valid contract and that potential licensees are the
intended beneficiaries under the contract, there is a good legal basis for potential
licensees bringing suit in court to enforce a FRAND commitment, whether they are
SSO members or not. However, Lemley expresses concern that this broad
interpretation of “intended beneficiary” as including nonmembers may be
impermissible under contract law in the absence of explicit language in the
FRAND commitment.313 An SSO can address this ambiguity by inserting language
indicating that the FRAND commitment is intended to benefit all potential standard
adopters, including nonmembers. If the Widget SSO adopted such language, the
fact that Widgecom was not a member of the Widget SSO would clearly not
prevent it from enforcing the FRAND commitment against parties who are
otherwise bound by it.
Jurisdiction raises another potential conflict. As noted above, European courts
may not be as receptive to third-party beneficiary arguments as U.S. courts. Faced
with the inability of standard adopters to enforce the FRAND commitments as
third-party beneficiaries, some SSOs may need to reconsider their current policies
against getting involved in licensing disputes, because otherwise the parties that are
the intended beneficiaries of FRAND commitments may not have the standing to
enforce these commitments.
Problem 2b of the hypothetical raises the issue of after-acquired patents.
Assume that Gizmo Inc. promised in 2010 to license patents on FRAND terms to
adopters of the Widget standard, back when the only relevant patent held by Gizmo
Inc. was the five-inch Widget-1A patent. In 2011, Gizmo Inc. obtained Doodad
LLC’s patent on the Widget-3 technology. Assuming that the FRAND commitment
applies equally to “core” essential and “noncore” essential patents, can Widgetech
and Widgecom demand the ability to negotiate for a FRAND license to the Widget3 patent as well as the Widget-1A patent? This question of after-acquired patents is
another issue that an SSO could address in advance in its IPR policy.
Of all of the options that we consider in this Article, contract law is probably the
best suited to address the problem of after-acquired patents. Contract terms that
create an interest in after-acquired property are not new to the law: commercial
contract law and the UCC already address the issue of interests in after-acquired
property.314 Specifically, Article 9 of the UCC allows for the creation of security
interests in after-acquired collateral, for example, if a small retail business obtained
a loan from a bank, and in exchange for this loan, the business owner granted the
bank a security interest in present and after-acquired inventory.315
Security interests and FRAND commitments are similar to each other in a
number of ways. First, both are promises relating to something that may not exist

313. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1915. However, Lemley is arguing that it would be
inconsistent with contract law to read a contract as making the public at large an intended
third-party beneficiary. In the SSO context, the public is not the intended beneficiary. The
class of intended beneficiary consists of potential implementers of the standard. If a member
of the public was using the patent for a purpose other than to comply with the standard, the
FRAND commitment would not apply.
314. U.C.C. § 9-204 (2001).
315. Id.
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yet, and these promises are being offered as consideration for something desirable.
With security interests, the promise is that the entity that makes a loan will have
protection in the event that the borrower defaults.316 When a patent owner enters
into an agreement with an SSO to license its patent on FRAND terms, this is often
as a condition of the patent’s claims being adopted as part of the standard. The
patents of mechanical devices are often not worth much on their own except as part
of a larger product that relies on several technologies, but when a standard relies on
a particular patent, that patent owner can then expect an increase in the demand for
licenses.
Second, neither a security interest nor a FRAND commitment is a concrete
thing, and neither would line up perfectly with contract law in the absence of
specific provisions. If after-acquired collateral were not already an accepted
premise in the law of secured transactions, loan terms allowing a lender to claim as
yet undefined collateral might be argued as being vague and unenforceable under
contract law. Similarly, a FRAND commitment to license as-yet-unacquired patents
to undisclosed parties on undisclosed terms may lead to arguments from patent
owners that the FRAND commitment is too vague to be an enforceable contract.
This argument for unenforceability is likely to fail, because the modern rule of
contract law permits parties to leave some terms subject to future determination,
such as references to a “reasonable market price.”317
Analogizing FRAND commitments to security interests is instructive in another
way as well. The after-acquired collateral provisions of Article 9 can be fairly
viewed as a legislative approach to addressing a problem that was faced by
commercial lenders prior to the enactment of Article 9. These provisions aided in
the development of the commercial lending industry in the middle of the twentieth
century.318 Thus, to the extent that the desire to apply FRAND commitments to
after-acquired patents can be analogized to security interests, this analogy suggests
that legislative intervention may be advisable, rather than pure reliance on common
law approaches.
FRAND commitment transferability, however, remains problematic. Contract
law focuses on mutual assent to contract terms,319 so in order for the FRAND
commitment to apply to PatBuy, Inc., PatBuy would have to have agreed to be
bound by this prior agreement. The current solution to the FRAND commitment
transferability problem is for SSOs to address the transferability of the agreement
in the initial contract with the patent owner. If the Widget SSO stated in its IPR
policy that transfers must be made subject to the FRAND commitment, the focus
would be on whether HF Gadget obtained the required consent to be bound.

316. See id. § 9-601 (describing a secured party’s rights after debtor defaults).
317. See, e.g., id. § 2-305 (allowing contracts for sale even when the contract does not
specify a price).
318. See Benjamin D. Beard, The Purchase Money Security Interest in Inventory: If It
Does Not Float, It Must Be Dead!, 57 TENN. L. REV. 437, 463–65 (discussing the evolution
of the acceptance of floating liens on present and after-acquired inventory).
319. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 199 (2009) (“With the exception of reliance and restitution, the rest of
contract law is implicated only if a ‘traditional contract,’ that is, one formed via mutual
assent and consideration, exists.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
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However, it is unclear what the proper recourse would be if a patent owner violated
the terms of the SSO’s bylaws by failing to secure the assignee’s consent to be
bound by the agreement. There may be a possibility of the implementers or the
SSO holding the original patent owner liable for failure to abide by these terms, but
even if damages could be obtained from the original patent owner, the
implementers could not likely use the previous patent owner’s breach to compel a
license from the current owner. In Part I.F.1, we discuss the differing approaches of
four SSOs to the issue of FRAND commitment transferability.
With the exception of the patent transfer issue, the four main issues that we
raised in the Widget hypothetical could be resolved through contract language as
long as the language was not excessively broad or unreasonable. SSOs could
impose a requirement that SEPs be transferred subject to the FRAND commitment
made by the prior owner, but a breach of this term by the assignor likely could not
be held against the assignee. The SSO could also make it explicit that the FRAND
commitment is a promise to license on FRAND terms to all adopters of the
standard, not just adopters who are also members of the SSO. The SSO could also
include a provision addressing the after-acquired problem, explicitly stating that the
FRAND commitment also applied to SEPs that the agreeing party obtained after
entering into the agreement. Finally, the SSO could clarify whether the term
“standard essential patent” includes core essential patents, noncore essential
patents, and commercially essential patents. If the SSO considers commercially
essential patents to be SEPs, the SSO should further clarify whether it is adopting a
broad, intermediate, or narrow definition of commercial essentiality.
But to what end? Recent analysis of FRAND commitments has treated the
commitment as a kind of affirmative defense to infringement, limiting the remedies
available to the patent owner.320 Thus, in Part IV, we examine the options that a
court might consider when determining the appropriate remedy for infringement of
an SEP. For the purposes of this Part, we note that the typical contract damages of
expectation and reliance damages are likely to be difficult to calculate in the
standards context, and even if a value was determined, pure money damages are
likely to be less attractive than requiring the patent owner to grant a license
permitting the contract beneficiary to manufacture a product and compete in the
relevant market.
d. Applying Detrimental Reliance to the FRAND Problems
Sometimes, the law of formal contracts will not be effective. While the
third-party beneficiary doctrine may protect standard adopters as the intended
beneficiaries of a FRAND commitment, and the law of security interests provides
helpful guidance for dealing with after-acquired patents, there are still gaps that
formal contract law does not fill. For that reason, scholars like Lemley, Merges,
and Kuhn have suggested turning to an estoppel argument to permit standard
adopters to argue that they relied to their detriment on the patent owner’s assertion

320. E.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 915–16 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (noting that a FRAND obligation may provide defenses that limit available remedies).
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that it would license on FRAND terms.321 A theory of detrimental reliance would
focus on whether a specific agreement is binding against other entities outside the
four corners of the agreement because of the expectation that the agreement creates
for third parties.322 Contreras suggests that a detrimental reliance theory would be
more helpful than formal contract theory when addressing FRAND commitment
issues.323
Detrimental reliance is often discussed in the context of implied licenses and
equitable estoppel defenses in patent law,324 but for the purposes of this Part, we are
viewing detrimental reliance as an alternative to formal contract law. A detrimental
reliance theory is likely to be more helpful than a formal contract theory in the case
of patent transfers. Under formal contract law, the FRAND commitment would
likely have to be accepted by the assignee for the agreement to be binding after the
patent is transferred. On the other hand, a detrimental reliance theory is focused on
the standard adopter’s investments in reliance on the availability of a license.325 In
this situation, the standard adopter is fully willing to pay the cost of licensing, but
in the interest of competition, may feel pressured to adopt the standard prior to
solidifying a licensing agreement.
However, detrimental reliance is not perfect either. First, as Mueller notes, it
may not be reasonable for parties who are not members of the SSO to rely on a
patent owner’s promise to the SSO.326 In terms of addressing the problem of
whether the FRAND commitment binds subsequent owners, detrimental reliance
may suffer from the same drawbacks as equitable estoppel and implied licenses as
defenses under patent law because the assignee may have made no representations
concerning licensing. And even if the detrimental reliance theory is effective at
addressing some SEP licensing problems, it is unclear if the same theory could
apply to noncore essential patents, commercially essential patents, or after-acquired
patents. Detrimental reliance is also not likely to assist in the case of after-acquired
patents unless the previous owner made a FRAND commitment to the same SSO
concerning that patent.
Ultimately, neither formal contract law nor detrimental reliance effectively
addresses all of the primary problems that threaten to arise in the context of
FRAND commitments. Contract law may assist with several of the problems, but it
contains no legal tools to enable a FRAND commitment to be binding against
subsequent assignees in the absence of the assignee giving explicit consent to be
bound. Considering how often patents are transferred, this threatens to reduce
FRAND commitments to a meaningless formality that can be enforced against no

321. E.g., Lemley, supra note 19, at 1915–16; Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 4.
322. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 1920; Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 46–47.
323. Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges (Working Paper, Aug. 15, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309023.
324. E.g., Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 659 (2002).
325. See supra text accompanying note 164 (discussing the related principle of equitable
estoppel under patent law).
326. Mueller, supra note 324, at 659 (“Third parties who did not participate in the
standards-setting activity and had no contact with the patentee would be unable to establish
detrimental reliance.”).
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one. At the most basic level of contract law, it does not seem like this would be a
fair reading of the FRAND commitment, because an SSO would likely not require
members to make a commitment that the SSO did not intend to have legal force.
But the nature of contract law also would prevent a FRAND commitment from
transferring to a subsequent assignee unless the assignee agrees to be bound by the
commitment. During the development of a standard, if an SSO member refuses to
make a FRAND commitment, the SSO will typically adopt an alternative
technology and bypass the technology of the refusing member. An SSO that has
already adopted a standard and now faces an assignee that refuses to commit to
FRAND licensing has encountered a much bigger problem, because an entire
industry may now be locked in to the version of the standard that includes the
assignee’s patent.
Thus, we propose a fourth option for analyzing FRAND commitment problems:
examining these problems through the lens of property law and servitudes, based
on the theory that the FRAND commitment creates an encumbrance on the patent.
4. Property
As discussed above, there are a number of fundamental flaws with relying on
patent law, antitrust law, and contract law to address problems that might occur in
the standards context. A final body of law that could potentially apply to these
situations, though there has been no discussion of this option up to this point, is
property law. While the question of FRAND commitments has not been addressed
using a property theory, there is growing literature asserting that intellectual
property licenses are analogous to traditional property rights.327 These arguments
typically run counter to the traditional view of licensing as creating only a contract
promising that the licensor will not sue the licensee for the licensee’s use of the
intellectual property.328 In the following Part, we argue that, like licenses,
commitments to license have traits that resemble property interests. Both licenses
and commitments to license create an encumbrance on the intellectual property
owner’s right to exclude. The biggest difference between the two is the identity of
the beneficiary. With licenses, it is clear who is favored by that encumbrance. With
commitments to license, on the other hand, the encumbrance is the IP owner’s
commitment to be open to future license negotiations and to not refuse to negotiate
with parties entitled to seek a license.

327. See generally Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”:
Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1101 (2013) (suggesting that licenses are a property interest); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,
The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008) (comparing modern licensing practices to
servitudes).
328. See, e.g., Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert &
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“As a
threshold matter, a patent license agreement is in essence nothing more than a promise by the
licensor not to sue the licensee.”); Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent
and Notice in Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 109 (2012) (“This Article
argues that the weight of judicial authority and sound policy support a contractual approach
to license formation.”).
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In Part III, we examine the possibility that the law of real property can offer some
useful analogies to buttress arguments that FRAND commitments “run with the
patent.” For example, by treating FRAND commitments like servitudes, the main
issue would become whether the assignee had notice of the agreement, rather than
whether the predecessor in interest secured a commitment from the assignee to be
bound by the agreement. It is to this new characterization of FRAND commitments
that we now turn.
III. FRAND COMMITMENTS AND THE LAW OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY
“No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property,
and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most
necessary to the establishment of human society . . . .”329
Patents have aspects that resemble several different areas of law. Under U.S.
patent law, patents are deemed to “have the attributes of personal property.”330 When
a patent owner grants a license to another party, the license is often analyzed as a
contract.331 Patent law also has flavors of tort law, with patent infringement claims
being based on principles of strict liability.332 We noted above that there is currently a
debate about the extent to which patent licenses should be viewed as property
interests instead of purely as creations of contract. In our view, this argument has
merit, but we view the property and contract traits of patent law as being interrelated,
rather than a strict either/or matter. Contracts and property are not as independent of
each other as the first year law school curriculum might suggest. As Newman
observes, some typical contract language, like “title shall pass upon delivery,”
focuses on legal consequences under property law and is impossible to breach.333
A FRAND commitment is an enforceable contract, but it is also an enforceable
contract that pertains to the treatment of intellectual property. While patents are
statutorily decreed to have the attributes of personal property,334 Mossoff argues that
historically, patents were treated as having attributes of both real property and
personal property.335 It therefore might be instructive to analogize to real property in
the case of standards and patent transfers. With real property, promises to do or not
do something with the property may “run with the land.”336 In light of the importance

329. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 491 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1978) (1739).
330. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
331. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e treat the
licenses as ordinary contracts . . . .”); H. Justin Pace, Note, Anti-Assignment Provisions,
Copyright Licenses, and Intra-Group Mergers: The Effect of Cincom v. Novelis, 9 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 263, 267 (2010) (“Copyright and patent licenses are contracts and as
such are interpreted according to state law.” (emphasis in original)).
332. Siddharth Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability
to Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 179, 197 (2007).
333. Newman, supra note 327, at 1129.
334. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
335. Mossoff, supra note 204, at 719.
336. See Lawrence Berger, Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167,
169 (1970) (discussing the importance of obligations running with the land).
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of FRAND commitments for facilitating the adoption of new technology standards, we
view it as reasonable to argue that FRAND commitments should “run with the patent.”
Ultimately, however, intellectual property is a sui generis construction,337 and
direct analogies may not always be accurate. While drawing comparisons to other
types of property may be helpful, Menell warns there are still important distinctions
between patents and tangible property.338 For instance, unlike land or personal
property, a patent is nonrivalrous and thus can be used by many people at once. This
fundamental distinction contributes to the difference between the more formalistic
approaches to tangible property and the more flexible approaches to intellectual
property.339 However, some property rights scholars argue that intellectual property
rights share the same functionalist policy concerns as tangible property rights.340
Mossoff found that an examination of legal history supports this view and argues that
nineteenth century patent law in the United States reflects a judicial approach to
patents that was much more similar to property law approaches than modern theorists
believe.341
A. Analyzing a Property Approach to FRAND Commitments
Because we view a FRAND commitment as a prelude to a license, we begin this
Part with a discussion of how property theory has been applied to licenses, before
treading into more theoretical grounds with discussions of the property-contract
interface, informed by insights from the work of Hohfeld and more contemporary
scholars like Merrill and Smith.
1. Licenses as Property
Newman, a proponent of the property theory of IP licenses, acknowledges that
licenses have traits of a contract and are often granted as part of a contractual
relationship, but also observes that a license shapes the allocation of resources, which
is a fundamental concern of property.342 Some argue that a license should be viewed as
a contract, not a property interest, based on the idea that a license is a “covenant not to
sue.”343 As Newman critically observes, this argument, at its core, relies on a view

337. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1074–75 (2005) (criticizing analogies to other areas of law because intellectual
property law has unique traits).
338. Menell, supra note 22, at 739 (warning that “extrapolating from real property law to
intellectual property law overlooks important distinctions between the underlying resources
at issue.”).
339. Id. at 751 (arguing that the absolutist view of the property rights movement does not
align with the IP rights system).
340. See Mossoff, supra note 204, at 707 (discussing the position of Richard Epstein).
341. Id. at 711–12 (noting that patent exhaustion doctrine is derived from traditional
property law).
342. Newman, supra note 327, at 1108–09.
343. See Jennifer Ying, The Plain Meaning of Section 365(c): The Tension Between
Bankruptcy and Patent Law in Patent Licensing, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1225, 1260 (2010)
(describing a patent license as “merely a covenant not to sue for infringement”).
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that what the licensee is doing constitutes trespass or infringement and is only
permitted because the licensor made a promise beforehand not to sue the
licensee.344 After all, if the action of the licensee was not still a violation of the
licensor’s rights, a promise not to sue would be unnecessary. Thus, asserting that a
license is a promise not to sue implicitly assumes that a license contract does not
create a privilege to use the licensed property,345 which is not logically sound.
Newman argues that this approach is also not reconcilable with the aspect of
copyright law that allows multiple co-owners the power to grant nonexclusive
licenses without obtaining the consent of the other owners,346 or with the fact that
revocable licenses can be created without contract formalities.347
The idea that a patent license is a “covenant not to sue” is a very old one that
represents the view of federal courts for over a century.348 However, this does not
mean that courts view patent licenses as purely creatures of contract. This position
is based on an even older view of patents themselves: that obtaining a patent does
not give the owner a right to practice the invention, but instead gives the owner a
right to exclude everyone else from practicing the invention without the owner’s
permission.349 The patent is thus a “right against the world,” like other property
rights.350 An assignment of a patent involves a full transfer of this right, whereas a
patent license involves transfer of a lesser interest.351 As Mossoff’s research shows,
patent case law in the United States has long recognized that patentees could
convey lesser interests in the patent and that the recipient of these lesser interests
may be liable if they exceed the scope of these interests.352 Newman observes that
as a legal instrument that permits use of a resource in a way that would otherwise
be a trespass, a license can thus be understood as a use privilege similar to other
recognized property interests.353 Thus, even if patent licenses are viewed as
covenants not to sue, this does not prevent the license from also being a property
interest.
This Part extends this reasoning to FRAND commitments, arguing that FRAND
commitments can be characterized as contractually created property interests in
covered patents. We noted above that a patent license may be viewed as creating a

344. Newman, supra note 327, at 1130.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1131.
347. Id. at 1142.
348. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 24 (1912) (“As a license passes no interest in
the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.”);
see also De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1926)
(affirming the above quoted language of Henry).
349. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“The franchise which
the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or
vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains
by the patent.”).
350. See Lee Kovarsky, Note, Tolls on the Information Superhighway: Entitlement
Defaults for Clickstream Data, 89 VA. L. REV. 1037, 1079 (2003) (noting that when property
law applies, the right is good against the whole world).
351. Mossoff, supra note 204, at 714.
352. Id. at 715.
353. Newman, supra note 327, at 1158–59.
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use privilege. However, a FRAND commitment cannot be said to do the same
thing. On the other hand, a FRAND commitment could fairly be categorized as
creating a negotiation right to benefit the adopters of the standard, with the patent
owner retaining a duty to not refuse to negotiate. A FRAND commitment is not a
license, but when a patent owner makes a FRAND commitment, we argue that this
acts as a conditional covenant not to sue, whereby the patent owner promises to not
sue standard implementers for infringement unless and until good faith attempts at
negotiation fail.
2. Hohfeldian Approaches to Jural Relations and the Intersection of Property and
Contract
Even though the career of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was short, he nonetheless
made lasting contributions to the way that the language and philosophy of law are
understood. Hohfeld’s 1913 article, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, sets forth a helpful guide for describing legal
relations.354 This hundred-year-old article is so widely read and referenced that it
landed a spot at number fifty in Shapiro and Pearse’s recent study ranking the one
hundred most-cited law review articles.355
In his article, Hohfeld abandons an attempt at formally defining each term and
focuses on defining the terms as they relate to each other, emphasizing the relations
between the concepts of rights, no-rights, privileges, powers, immunities, duties,
disabilities, and liabilities.356 Hohfeld noted that the term “right” is often used
broadly to refer to privileges, powers, and immunities, but he emphasizes that these
ideas should be understood separately.357 Hohfeld pairs these eight concepts and
indicates which are jural opposites of each other, and which are jural correlatives of
each other.358 The jural opposite pairs are rights and no-rights, privilege and duty,
power and disability, and immunity and liability; the jural correlative pairs are
rights and duty, privilege and no-right, power and liability, and immunity and
disability.359
To say that rights and duties are jural correlatives of each other is to say that
invading a right inherently involves the violation of a duty.360 Thus, a patent that
gives its owner a right of exclusivity imposes on all others a duty to not infringe the
patent. To say that duty and privilege are jural opposites of each other is to say that
the privilege of doing a specific action negates the duty to not do a specific
action.361 If a patent licensee has a privilege to use the licensed patent, this indicates
that the licensee has no duty to refrain from using the patent. Rights and privileges

354. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
355. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2012).
356. Hohfeld, supra note 354, at 30.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 32.
361. Id.
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are also related, in the sense that a right indicates an affirmative claim against
another, whereas a privilege indicates “freedom from the right or claim of
another.”362 Analogously, the word power is generally used to indicate that one
person has affirmative control of a particular legal relation, whereas immunity
indicates that one person has freedom from the control that another might otherwise
exercise over a particular legal relation.363 Yaniv Heled notes, however, that having
immunity from the power of another does not imply that a right to act has been
conferred.364
Newman notes that under traditional property law, a property owner can create
use privileges, such as easements or licenses, and bestow these use privileges on
another while otherwise retaining full ownership of the property.365 If A gives a use
privilege to B that allows B to cross A’s land, this suggests that A has no right to
interfere with B’s exercise of his use privilege. Use privileges can either be
revocable or irrevocable.366 Let us again assume that A grants a use privilege to B.
If A declares that B’s use privilege is irrevocable, this will generally mean that if A
assigns his full interest in the property to C, then C will have no right to interfere
with B’s existing use privilege.367 However, use privileges are likely not
irrevocable unless the property owner states that they are.368 In Hohfeldian terms,
an irrevocable license may be understood as granting the licensee immunity from
revocation,369 which is the same thing as saying that the licensor has no power to
revoke the license.370
By the license itself being a use privilege, this suggests that the licensee obtains
a privilege to use the property, whereas the property owner has a no-right and
cannot prevent the use by the licensee.371 An irrevocable patent license thus creates
a use privilege, and the patent owner has no right to interfere with the licensee’s
use. The FRAND commitment may be understood as imposing on the patent owner
a duty to negotiate in good faith,372 and through Hohfeldian analysis, this means
that there is a correlative right to good faith negotiation that is held by the potential
licensee. Thus, an irrevocable license creates a use privilege with which the patent

362. Id. at 55.
363. Id.
364. See Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Immunities—An Emerging Class of
Intellectual Property, at 24 (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
365. Newman, supra note 327, at 1120 (noting the existence of use privileges in property
law).
366. Id. at 1124.
367. Id. at 1123.
368. Id. at 1147.
369. Id. at 1115.
370. Hohfeld, supra note 354, at 55.
371. Id. at 32.
372. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493 *12
(N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (noting that the parties explicitly acknowledged that the FRAND
commitment creates a “duty to negotiate”); see also Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI
Corp., No. C-12-03451RMW, 2012 WL 4845628 *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012) (indicating
that a bad faith initial offer may violate the duty of good faith); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1038 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (noting that negotiations are subject to
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing).
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owner has no right to interfere, and a FRAND commitment bestows on the standard
adopter a right to negotiate that the patent owner has a duty to recognize.
Having established that the FRAND commitment creates a right for the benefit
of the potential licensee, we turn next to the characterization of this right. In a later
article, Hohfeld recognizes two categories of rights: in rem and in personam.373 A
conclusion that FRAND commitments create an in personam right would be
consistent with a conclusion that contract law should govern, while a conclusion
that FRAND commitments create an in rem right would be consistent with a
conclusion that property law should govern.
Hohfeld refers to in personam rights as “paucital rights” and to in rem rights as
“multital rights.”374 Merrill and Smith provide a very helpful and detailed analysis
of Hohfeld’s discussion of in rem and in personam rights and the overlap between
these ideas in the modern context.375 Rights in rem may pertain to tangible objects,
but they may also pertain to intangibles, like patents or a right to privacy.376 Rights
that are in rem are typically viewed as being binding against the rest of the world,
creating negative obligations that prevent everyone else from taking particular
actions.377 Rights that are in personam are typically viewed as being binding
against only definite parties, creating affirmative obligations that require the
specified parties to take affirmative actions.378 In rem rights are generally
associated with a limited number of forms that the rights can take, while in
personam rights are associated with flexibility and default rules.379 In personam
rights impose a large informational burden on a small class of actors with very little
effect on third parties, while the exclusion strategy of in rem rights imposes the
informational burden on a large, undefined class.380
To mitigate the harmful effects of the informational burdens, Merrill and Smith
note that the law typically uses either a notice strategy or a protection strategy.381 A
notice strategy focuses on facilitating the generation of information about the
relation, while a protection strategy involves specific legal interventions, like
default rules, designed to favor the uninformed party.382 Merrill and Smith suggest
that notice and protection strategies could be permitted to overlap, such as in the
case of a notice strategy that includes a penalty default rule favoring the
nontransferring party if there is a failure to disclose.383 Merrill and Smith’s analysis
suggests that notice strategies would be appropriate when the information can be

373. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (1917).
374. Id. at 716.
375. Merrill & Smith, supra note 96, at 780–83.
376. Hohfeld, supra note 373, at 733–34.
377. Merrill & Smith, supra note 96, at 776–77, 788.
378. Id. at 776–77, 789.
379. Id. at 778.
380. Id. at 790.
381. Id. at 805.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 808.
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produced in a cost effective manner, while protection strategies would be
appropriate when information production would not be cost effective.384
Notice and protection strategies can already be seen in the private governance
structures of SSOs. Many SSOs, for example, require members to disclose essential
patents that the members own.385 The disclosure rule acts as a notice strategy that
aims to put adopters on notice of the rights of others. Some SSOs also make
records of FRAND commitments publicly available.386 In the case of IEEE-SA, the
member’s Letter of Assurance concerning IP rights is posted on the organization’s
website, thus serving a notice function.387 Some SSOs, such as VITA, go further
and specify that a member who fails to disclose an SEP would then be required to
license that patent on a FRAND-RF basis.388 This type of FRAND-RF rule could be
fairly characterized as a protection strategy that favors the party who has an
informational disadvantage.
FRAND commitments thus can be addressed through a combination of notice
and protection strategies. As we examine below, there are many examples of
instances where FRAND commitments behave like contract interests and property
interests. This overlap is consistent with the theories of Merrill and Smith, who
observe that some legal situations can be purely in rem, others purely in personam,
but that some demonstrate a mixture of the two concepts.389 Merrill and Smith thus
propose that there are four primary categories of rights: pure paucital rights,
compound-paucital rights, quasi-multital rights, and pure multital rights.390 As
discussed above, in personam, or paucital rights, avail against singular identified
persons, while in rem, or multital rights, avail against numerous unidentified
persons.
These two factors, numerosity and identification, also combine into two other
possible intermediate characterizations. Merrill and Smith view compound-paucital
rights as availing against numerous identified persons, whereas quasi-multital
rights avail against singular, unidentified persons.391 According to Merrill and
Smith, an example of a compound-paucital situation is a standard form contract,
where the possible people bound by the agreement are numerous and definite; and
an example of a quasi-multital situation is an assignment of interest, where the
possible people bound by the agreement are nonnumerous but indefinite.392 Even
though “in personam” and “contract” are not synonyms, nor are “in rem” and
“property” synonyms, for our purposes, we consider compound-paucital rights to
be “contract with property traits” and quasi-multital rights to be “property with
contract traits.”

384. Id. at 805–06.
385. E.g., EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54.
386. Records of IEEE Standards-Related Patent Letters of Assurance, INST. OF ELEC. &
ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/patents.html.
387. Id.
388. VITA STANDARDS ORG., supra note 81.
389. Merrill & Smith, supra note 96, at 777.
390. Id. at 778.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 785.

2014]

FRAND’S FOREVER

293

Merrill and Smith’s characterization of intermediate rights in the propertycontract interface has proved very important in developing our own theory for
characterizing FRAND commitments, which we quickly recognized were creations
neither purely of contract nor purely of property. In the study by Merrill and Smith,
the authors examined four separate areas of law that cannot be clearly characterized
as purely in rem or purely in personam: bailments, landlord-tenant law, security
interests, and trusts.393 In our view, the treatment of patents in the standard-setting
context is a fifth area where the rights cannot be characterized as solely in rem or
solely in personam. When a patent is declared essential to a standard, the patent
owner has in rem rights which the law must protect against a large and indefinite
class of potential infringers, and all of the adopters of the standards have a duty to
respect the IP rights of those who own SEPs. When a patent owner enters into a
license with a standard adopter, this creates an in personam relation with
affirmative obligations exchanged between defined parties.
We argue that a FRAND commitment also has traits of both property and
contract. By promising to license SEPs on FRAND terms to eligible parties, a
patent owner takes on specific duties with regard to a large, undefined class of
standards adopters. In other words, the right created by the FRAND commitment
avails against a singular, identified person. This makes the FRAND commitment
seem like an instrument that creates in personam rights. But unlike a typical in
personam situation, where both sides of the agreement are identified, FRAND
commitments involve a singular, identified party who has a duty under the
commitment and a numerous class of unidentified parties who have a right under
the commitment.
This facet prevents FRAND commitments from fitting easily into either
Hohfeld’s primary categories or Merrill and Smith’s intermediate categories.
Merrill and Smith arrive at their intermediate categories by characterizing
Hohfeld’s approach as focusing on the numerosity of duty holders and the
definiteness of duty holders.394 It may thus be helpful to add two more categories to
the theoretical approach of Merrill and Smith: numerosity and definiteness of the
right holders. In a typical in rem relation, the right holder will be nonnumerous and
definite, while the duty holder will be numerous and indefinite. A FRAND
commitment is a reversal of this, with a nonnumerous and definite duty holder, and
a numerous and indefinite class of right holders. We argue that this gives the
FRAND commitment itself some qualities of both property and contract.
The intermediate nature of the FRAND commitment is especially apparent when
a patent, which is subject to a FRAND commitment, is then transferred. In that
case, the patent owner against whom these rights may be asserted is unknown,
giving the transfer traits of a quasi-multital relation. The class of potential licensees
still has a negotiation right, but the right now avails against a singular, unidentified
person. To protect FRAND commitments when patents are transferred, either a
notice or protection strategy may be appropriate. In the case of patent transfers, a
notice regime that provides for mandatory recordation of assignments might be

393. Id. at 814.
394. Id. at 785.
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effective at reducing the informational burden when the potential licensees must
determine the current owner of an essential patent.
In this Part, we have taken the view of a license as a use privilege and extended it
to conclude that a FRAND commitment is a negotiation right. This right creates a
corresponding duty to not interfere with the authorized activity. The FRAND
commitment can either be characterized as a contract with property traits or as
property with contract traits. Building on the theories of Hohfeld and the work of
Merrill and Smith, we argue that under some circumstances it is appropriate to take a
property-based approach to FRAND commitments and patent transfer issues in the
standards context. As this Part shows, viewing FRAND commitments through the
lens of property interests is part of a logical progression building on work concerning
the intersection of property and contract. Having established the theoretical
underpinnings, we turn now to the more concrete application of the law of servitudes.
B. Analogizing to the Law of Servitudes
There are several defined interests in real property law, including fee simple
estates, life estates, and leaseholds.395 In addition to these, parties can make land use
arrangements based on private agreements, and these arrangements can result in the
creation of servitudes.396 Servitudes are nonpossessory property interests by which
the holder gains a right in an asset, and servitudes are generally enforceable against
successors in interest, provided the successor has notice of the servitude.397
There are four general categories of servitudes: easements, profits, licenses, and
covenants.398 Covenants can either be real covenants or equitable servitudes,
depending on how they are enforced, but the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes indicates that there is no longer a significant difference between real
covenants and equitable servitudes.399 Equitable servitudes arose under English
common law. Analysis often traces their development to Tulk v. Moxhay,400 an 1848
case concerning an encumbrance on a lot in Leicester Square, where the Chancery
Court concluded that the prior restrictions ran with the land, provided the subsequent
purchaser had notice of these restrictions.401
A servitude can be characterized as having a benefited party and a burdened
party.402 For the benefit to run under the common law test, the party had to

395. D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 8 (2009) (listing types of estates in American property law).
396. Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation
Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 928 (1988) (“By using
servitudes, land owners can make permanent changes in the default allocations of rights and
obligations to their land.”).
397. Van Houweling, supra note 327, at 891–92.
398. French, supra note 396, at 933 (listing the five primary types of servitudes, with real
covenants and equitable servitudes listed separately).
399. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1 Introductory Note (2000).
400. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143.
401. Id. at 1144; see also, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 327, at 895.
402. See Berger, supra note 336, at 169–70 (discussing the concepts of property being
benefited and burdened by a covenant).
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establish intent that the benefit would run to successors and that the agreement
“touche[d] and concern[ed]” the land.403 For the burden to run, the party had to
establish intent that the burden would run, that the agreement “touched and
concerned” the land, and that the burdened party was on notice of the interest.404
Under the traditional rule for whether an agreement touches and concerns the land,
such a promise would need to relate to the use of the land.405 However, the current
Restatement discards the concept of “touch and concern,” instead saying that
servitudes are valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or contrary to public policy.406
In our view, it is fairly uncontroversial to conclude that a FRAND commitment
relates to the use of the patent. A FRAND commitment that leads to a license
clearly relates to the benefited licensee’s use of the patent. Similarly, the burden
created by a FRAND commitment also relates to the use of the patent, because the
FRAND commitment restricts the owner’s ability to exclude others from practicing
the invention. As discussed above, using the patent to exclude others from
practicing the invention is a fundamental right of patent ownership.407 Thus, a
FRAND commitment touches and concerns the patent, so even if a court applies
the common law “touch and concern” test, rather than the Restatement’s less
restrictive standard, a FRAND commitment will satisfy the analysis.
For a FRAND commitment to be a valid servitude that will run with the patent,
the assignee must also have notice of the FRAND commitment. This is another
aspect that we think will prove to be uncontroversial. Standards documents are
publicly available, and many SSOs also make FRAND commitments publicly
available.408 Professionals who work in the ICT industries, especially those whose
work implicates standards, will likely know about these standards and
commitments because of their work. Because the issues here will primarily relate to
publicly available standards, the notice requirement will be quite easily satisfied.
Thus, if the patent is assigned to an entity that is a participant in the market for the
products that rely on the patent, the assignee should be held to have notice of the
FRAND commitment and the corresponding servitude.
The primary hurdle to analogizing to servitudes is that patents are treated as
having the attributes of personal property, and servitudes on personal property are
generally disfavored in the law,409 though Van Houweling argues that such

403. Id. at 173 (discussing the requirement of clear intention); id. at 207 (discussing the
touch and concern requirement).
404. John Walliser, Conservation Servitudes, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 47, 66–
70 (1997) (discussing notice as an equitable concept in the context of equitable servitudes).
405. Berger, supra note 336, at 210 (citing traditional formulations of the touch and
concern requirement).
406. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000). However, not all states
have adopted the Restatement’s approach. See Christopher D. McEachran, Sometimes
Jumping on the Bandwagon is a Good Thing: An Analysis of North Carolina’s Prohibition
of Transfer Fee Covenants, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2201, 2221 (2011) (noting that North Carolina
still applies the “touch and concern” standard).
407. See supra text accompanying notes 142 and 143.
408. See, e.g., Records of IEEE Standards-Related Patent Letters of Assurance, supra note 386.
409. Van Houweling, supra note 327, at 911 (noting the traditional hostility to chattel
servitudes).
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servitudes may be permissible.410 Van Houweling notes that the law of servitudes has
become more liberalized over the years, though this liberalization has primarily
focused on servitudes in real property.411 When cases have considered servitudes on
personal property, such as use restrictions, these cases have often been analyzed
under competition law.412 There have also been use restriction cases focusing on IP
rights that emphasized the first sale doctrine of copyright law and the exhaustion
doctrine of patent law.413 Van Houweling’s work focuses on use restrictions in items
embodying IP to argue that the liberalization of servitudes should apply to personal
property, specifically in the case of end user licensing agreements (EULAs).414 We
argue that Van Houweling’s reasoning can also be extended to the negotiation rights
that we propose are created by FRAND commitments.415 Compared to Van
Houweling’s argument for viewing EULAs as creating servitudes, the informational
burden is likely less significant if FRAND commitments are viewed as creating a
servitude-like interest that runs with the patent, because patent licensees and
assignees arguably already have more incentive to read contract terms than individual
purchasers of consumer software.
A servitude theory of FRAND commitments would also assist in addressing
problems that might arise in the bankruptcy context. Under the Restatement (Third) of
Property, servitudes are explicitly noted as not being dischargeable in bankruptcy.416
Viewing FRAND commitments as creating servitudes thus helps fill in a gap within
bankruptcy law. Current bankruptcy law gives a licensee the power to elect to retain
their license,417 but a FRAND commitment would likely be treated as less than a
license unless the bankruptcy court explicitly states otherwise, as in the case of Nortel
Networks.418 If the commitment is treated as creating a servitude, a FRAND
commitment may more easily survive bankruptcy without extra steps being required
of the bankruptcy court.
One last general advantage that should be noted for a servitude theory is the
available remedy. By applying property law, the possibility of specific performance
becomes viable for holders of the FRAND commitment-derived negotiation right.419

410. See id. at 888–89.
411. Id. at 897.
412. See id. at 908–09 (discussing cases about conditions placed on consumer products).
413. Id. at 910–12.
414. Id. at 927.
415. However, the IP servitudes that Van Houweling’s work focused on are typically in
the context of restrictions being placed on patented items that are sold, not the sale of patents
themselves. Thus, while Van Houweling’s work and her reasoning are instructive, the ideas
behind patent exhaustion and the legality of conditional sales of patented items are relevant
but are ultimately very different from the FRAND commitment issues. The importance of
the transferability of FRAND commitments is a matter of symmetry and equity, not a matter
of a property owner exercising continued control over the final product.
416. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.9 (2000).
417. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006).
418. In re Nortel Networks, Inc., No. 09-10138(KG), 2011 WL 4831218, at *9 (Bankr.
D. Del. July 11, 2011).
419. Andrew Russell, Comment, The Tenth Anniversary of the Restatement (Third) of
Property, Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 757 (2011) (discussing
specific performance and equitable servitudes).
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This specific performance, however, does not require the patent owner to grant a
license immediately, but rather requires the patent owner to give the holder of the
negotiation right the opportunity to negotiate for a license that meets specified
parameters. Thus, the remedy for a violation of the FRAND commitment is that the
patent owner cannot play the patent holdout game. The fact that this specific
performance will end with the holder of the negotiation right paying royalties to the
patent holder does not matter in our view. It is often the case that servitudes in real
property are acquired through purchase, sometimes through recurring payments.420
As we noted above, other areas of law do not seem to fully address some of the
legal issues that are raised by FRAND commitments. If we analogize FRAND
commitments to creating entitlements similar to those created under the law of
servitudes, this greatly simplifies the issue of FRAND commitment transferability,
though application of contract law principles for the other FRAND problems is
likely still desirable.
1. Servitudes and Transfers
The most significant effect of adopting a servitude theory is that it would make
it clear that, as a negotiation right that is partially in rem, FRAND commitments
run with the patent. We begin this analysis with further discussion of benefits and
burdens.
The law of servitudes focuses on benefits and burdens that are either
appurtenant or in gross. To say that a burden or benefit is “appurtenant” means that
it is “tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land.”421 A
burden or benefit that is “in gross,” on the other hand, is not tied to such ownership
or occupancy.422 The law of servitudes allows an appurtenant benefit or burden to
transfer automatically with the property interest.423 For example, if a large parcel of
land is subdivided into multiple lots, only one of which faces the main road, an
appurtenant easement will likely be created by the landowners, who will then
construct a driveway perpendicular to the main road to reach the back lots. This
appurtenant easement would thus give access to the main road to owners of lots
that are not adjacent to the road by creating a right of way across parcels owned by
others. According to the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, benefits in
gross were historically prohibited, as were benefits created in third parties.424
However, the rule set forth in the Restatement permits both of these and also allows
for a burden to be appurtenant while a benefit is in gross.425

420. E.g., Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard Oil Co., 2011 ND 95 ¶¶ 12–17,
797 N.W.2d 770, 776–78 (affirming the district court's conclusion that the existence of an
annual payment was more in line with an easement than a license); Smith v. Huston, 251
S.W.3d 808, 815 (Tex. App. 2008) (discussing the creation of an access easement involving
a $200 per year charge).
421. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.5(1) (2000).
422. Id. § 1.5(2).
423. Id. § 5.1.
424. Id. § 2.6 illus. 2 (providing an example of a burdened parcel of land).
425. Id. § 2.6 cmt. a.
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The issue of transferring the burden created by the FRAND commitment is
almost completely resolved if we view the FRAND commitment as creating an
appurtenant burden and a benefit in gross. Rather than requiring an active
acceptance on the part of the assignee, as is likely the case under a formal contract
law approach, an appurtenant burden can be binding on an assignee automatically,
though the transfer of the burden will require the assignee to be on notice of the
FRAND commitment. Because a property interest theory would rely on notice for a
burden to transfer, rather than assent to the agreement as would be required for a
contract to transfer, a servitude approach could resolve the problem of how to
ensure that these agreements are binding against new assignees. If an assignee does
not explicitly consent to the agreement, but has actual or constructive notice that he
is acquiring an SEP, this property theory could help avoid “innocent purchaser”
defenses raised by assignees that seek excessive royalties for newly acquired SEPs.
In other words, provided there is constructive or actual notice, the agreement will
“run with the patent” and prohibit excessive rent-seeking behaviors by new
assignees. In the SEP context, notice could likely be inferred when the assignee is a
participant in the market for products that implement the standard, because such
standards are typically publicly available.
The nature of the interest created also gives the property theory an advantage
over a detrimental reliance theory. With detrimental reliance, the interest is created
based on the actions of the patent holder and the standard adopter.426 On the other
hand, when a property interest is properly created, the interest will exist
independently of the actions and perceptions of the patent holder and standard
adopter. Thus, the burden for establishing a negotiation right is potentially easier to
demonstrate with the property theory than it is when applying a detrimental
reliance theory.
It is true that a patent is generally not being transferred when a FRAND
commitment is made. But there is no property transfer when a servitude in real
property is created either, just the creation of a use privilege.427 An illustration in
the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes provides a strong justification for
our analogy to apply in this case. Illustration 2 of section 2.6 explains the current
law of benefits in gross as follows:
As a condition of granting planning approval, the City of X requires
Developer, the owner of Blackacre, to execute an agreement limiting
the density of development on Blackacre. The agreement states that the
burden shall run with Blackacre and the benefit shall be held by the
City in gross. The agreement creates a servitude burdening Blackacre.
The City of X holds the benefit in gross.428
This illustration offers an excellent analogy to the transfer of SEPs subject to
FRAND commitments. Borrowing the above language, the FRAND commitment

426. See supra Part II.B.3.d.
427. See Lee Ann Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 893–94
(noting the creation of servitudes based on use privileges in private development
communities).
428. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.6 cmt. d, illus. 2 (2000).
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problem with SEPs and the corresponding solution from adopting the law of
servitudes can be described as follows:
As a condition of [including the patent owner’s patent in the standard
under development], the [standard-setting organization] requires [the
owner of Patent X] to execute an agreement limiting [licensing
agreements to fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms]. The
agreement states that the burden shall run with [Patent X] and the
benefit shall be held by [implementers of the standard] in gross. The
agreement creates a servitude burdening [the owner of Patent X]. The
[SSO and implementers of the standard] hold[] the benefit in gross.
The possibility for servitudes to have an appurtenant benefit or a benefit held in
gross also provides an opportunity for distinguishing between licenses and FRAND
commitments. With a FRAND commitment, as discussed above, the benefit must
be characterized as being held in gross. On the other hand, if a patent license also
creates a servitude, we would characterize that servitude as having an appurtenant
benefit. The consequence of this characterization may be that the party asserting his
right to a benefit will more easily be able to prove the entitlement if the benefit is
appurtenant instead of in gross.
Generally, FRAND commitments address the issue of the agreement being
enforceable against successors in interest.429 However, these agreements generally
do so under the theory that a FRAND commitment is governed solely by formal
contract law, where consent to be bound will need to be obtained.430 If consent to
be bound is not obtained, the assignor may have violated the agreement with the
SSO, but the assignee has committed no wrong and likely cannot be required to
comply with the commitment. If FRAND commitments can be viewed as creating a
property interest analogous to interests created under the law of servitudes, this
could resolve one of the major problems that arises in the context of transferring
SEPs.
2. Servitudes and Other FRAND Problems
Most of the problems relating to FRAND commitments can be resolved through
contract language, with the exception of the transferability issue. Binding a
successor in interest to an ordinary contract typically requires the successor’s assent
to be bound.431 On the other hand, viewing a FRAND commitment as creating a
servitude resolves this issue by allowing the commitment to run with the patent.

429. Supra Part I.F.1.
430. The bylaws of IEEE-SA explicitly state that once a Letter of Assurance is accepted,
there is an “encumbrance” that the patent owner must transfer with the patent. INST. OF ELEC.
& ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, at § 6. However, this approach is still
based on contract language and does not mean that a FRAND commitment is automatically
considered to be an encumbrance on the SEPs of other SSOs.
431. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) (noting that
“the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an
unconsenting successor to a contracting party”).
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A servitude theory of FRAND commitments also has some application to the
other problems that we have examined in this Article. A servitude by necessity, for
example, may be created by implication when the absence of such a servitude
would deprive one party “of rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the
land.”432 The idea of a servitude by necessity thus supports a view that if a FRAND
commitment creates a servitude, the commitment should at least bind assignees
when the assigned patent is an SEP. Because servitudes can also be created by
express agreement, this supports the view that a FRAND commitment should bind
an assignee when the SSO’s IPR policy requires the commitment to cover essential
noncore patents or commercially essential patents.
A servitude theory could also address the issue of whether nonmembers should
be able to enforce a FRAND commitment. Like formal contract law and the idea of
intended beneficiaries, some jurisdictions applying the law of servitudes would
permit the benefit of a servitude to be created in a third party.433 Formal contract
law, however, does not include the concept of a contract benefit held in gross. The
idea of a “benefit in gross” assists not only in addressing the transfer issue but also
in addressing the question of whether FRAND commitments are enforceable by
nonmembers. If the benefit of a FRAND commitment is understood to be held in
gross for standard implementers, it will not matter whether the implementer is a
member of the SSO. Thus, a servitude approach could resolve the membernonmember issue. However, this will likely require the SSOs to not include
limiting language that restricts the FRAND obligation to member licensees. Thus,
just like the issue of attaching the servitude to noncore essential patents or
commercially essential patents, the language of the SSO’s IPR policy will govern.
A servitude theory, however, is less likely to be helpful with the issue of afteracquired patents. This is because our property theory relies on the idea that the
servitude attaches at the time of the FRAND commitment. Thus, a contract theory
analogizing to the law of secured transactions would likely still be necessary to
address after-acquired patents.
3. Invalidating Servitudes
According to the current Restatement, servitudes are valid unless illegal,
unconstitutional, or contrary to public policy.434 Under the Restatement, a servitude
may be contrary to public policy if the servitude: (1) is arbitrary, spiteful, or
capricious; (2) is unreasonably burdensome of a fundamental constitutional right;
(3) unreasonably restrains alienability; (4) unreasonably restrains trade or
competition; or (5) is unconscionable.435 A patent owner looking to invalidate a
servitude created by a FRAND commitment may argue that the agreement imposes
an unreasonable restraint on alienability, but we expect that this argument would
fail. The applicable restriction on alienability is addressed in section 3.5 of the

432. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.15 (2000).
433. Id. § 2.6(2); see also Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal.
1972) (holding that when deeding real property to one person, a grantor may reserve an
easement that benefits a third party).
434. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000).
435. Id.
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Restatement, which says that indirect restraints on alienation do not cause a
servitude to be invalidated.436 Under the Restatement, an indirect restraint may
include use limitations, reducing the realizable amount from transferring the
property, or some other act that reduces the property’s value.437 We would thus
characterize the restriction on acceptable royalties imposed by a FRAND
commitment as an indirect restraint on alienation that would not affect the
servitude’s validity.
On the other hand, requiring a PAE to be bound by a FRAND-RF agreement
could arguably be contrary to public policy as a restraint on the trade of this entity
if licensing patents is its primary source of income. Some of the litigation that
arises in the FRAND and SEP transfer context involves patents that were obtained
by PAEs with this sort of business model.438 In these situations, if the agreements
with the SSO required FRAND-RF agreements, thus depriving the PAE of any
income from the patent that they likely purchased as part of a patent portfolio, this
total loss of value might amount to an unreasonable restraint on alienation or an
unreasonable restraint on trade. However, a PAE that found itself subject to a
servitude created by a FRAND commitment could still obtain some value from the
patent in its possession, and thus the servitude would probably be valid.
4. Adopting a Servitude Doctrine
Servitudes in real property can be traced back to English common law and the
seminal case of Tulk v. Moxhay.439 Because servitudes were created by common
law, legislative intervention would not be necessary to create a legally binding
servitude approach to FRAND commitments. Such an approach could instead be
adopted in case law by a court that recognizes the need for FRAND commitments
to run with the patent. This would be consistent with how servitudes arose in
property law.
In fact, there is some evidence that such a step would be a natural progression in
terms of how courts currently view the transferability of FRAND commitments.
Consider, for example, the 2008 ruling in Rembrandt v. Harris.440 The ruling is
unpublished, and was later reversed for reasons unrelated to the court’s initial
conclusion on this point, but the Delaware court there stated, “[A]ccording to the
clear and unambiguous terms of the 1995 patent statement issued by Rembrandt's
predecessor, AT&T, Rembrandt owes Harris a license to the ‘627 patent under
RAND terms to the extent the patent is ‘essential’ to the implementation of the
HDTV standard set by the Advanced Television System Committee.”441 The
“patent statement” in that case is what we have characterized as a FRAND

436. Id. § 3.5.
437. Id.
438. E.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(concerning a PAE that initiated litigation against businesses that provided wireless service
for their customers).
439. Supra text accompanying notes 400 and 401.
440. Rembrandt Tech. LP v. Harris Corp., 2008 WL 4824066 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31,
2008), vacated, 2009 WL 2490873 (Aug. 14, 2009).
441. Id. at *1.
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commitment, and under the patent statement, AT&T committed to granting
nonexclusive licenses authorizing the use of essential patents in exchange for a
reasonable royalty.442 AT&T later assigned the patent to Rembrandt.443 The court
noted that Rembrandt had notice of the patent statement and was thus bound by it
to the extent that the patent in issue was essential.444 There, the court characterized
Harris’s right to a license as “a creature of contract,” suggesting that the contract
theory of FRAND commitments is what makes this patent statement binding on
Rembrandt.445
But is calling it a “creature of contract” really a fair characterization of what is
going on here? How often does contract law focus on notice when determining if a
contract is enforceable against a nonparty? Certainly, as discussed above, there is
plenty of support for the idea that a nonparty to a contract may be a third-party
beneficiary who is entitled to enforce the contract in appropriate circumstances.446
But outside specific exceptions, like binding a principal to a contract that an agent
entered into on the principal’s behalf,447 a trustee’s assumption of a contract during
bankruptcy proceedings,448 and using principles of equitable estoppel to prevent a
party from claiming the benefits of a contract while denying burdens under the
same contract such as arbitration provisions,449 contract law typically relies on
mutual assent in order to obligate a party to take on contractual burdens.450 So
while the patent statement made by AT&T was a contract, and Rembrandt had
notice of the patent statement, this alone would likely not be enough to obligate
Rembrandt to license the essential patents on FRAND terms—unless the contract is
understood as creating an encumbrance that runs with the patent.
The court in Rembrandt explicitly relied on Rembrandt’s having notice of the
patent statement in concluding that Rembrandt was bound by the patent
statement.451 This position is a direct echo of Tulk v. Moxhay, where the court
asserted that “if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one
purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the
party from whom he purchased.”452 In the language of Tulk v. Moxhay, the FRAND
commitment is an instrument by which the patent owner attaches an “equity” to the

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
See supra Part II.B.3.
12 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 35:34 (4th ed. 2001).
448. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006) (permitting the trustee to “assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor”).
449. Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 418
(4th Cir. 2000); WILLISTON, supra note 447 § 57:19.
450. See Hart, supra note 319, at 208 (“Mainstream modern contract law, as expressed in
contract law hornbooks, focuses on the parties' intent to be bound to determine whether
mutual assent has been manifested.”).
451. Rembrandt Tech. LP v. Harris Corp., 2008 WL 4824066, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct.
31, 2008).
452. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144.
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patent.453 Tulk v. Moxhay involved the creation of an entirely new legal doctrine for
allowing encumbrances on real property to run with the land, and it is a seminal
case that the majority of first-year property courses discuss.454 But when the
Delaware court used very similar language, it was just a “creature of contract.”455
We believe that the Rembrandt court felt constrained to use contract theory, so
while the analysis tangentially alluded to a servitude theory of FRAND
commitments, the court did not take the analysis one step further to explicitly
recognize the FRAND commitment as creating a property interest.
Discussion of cases involving patent transfers thus hints at an undercurrent of
servitude theory, and we argue that there should be formal recognition of the
property theory that we advance for understanding the nature of the encumbrance
created by the FRAND commitment. We urge that courts should explicitly
recognize that the FRAND commitment attaches to the patent, and that the
obligation to license on FRAND terms will run to subsequent assignees. Once
courts explicitly recognize these commitments as attaching an encumbrance to the
patent in a manner analogous to a servitude, the market will respond to the new
legal certainty. Patent buyers will have an incentive to inquire into the existence of
FRAND commitments as part of normal due diligence and will price the offer
accordingly. For example, a patent encumbered by a FRAND commitment will
likely bring in licensing income. To the purchaser, a FRAND-encumbered patent
may be worth less than an unencumbered patent that is currently being licensed, but
more than an unencumbered patent that is not currently being licensed.456
This new legal certainty is also desirable from a law and economics perspective.
As Coleman notes in discussing the market paradigm, markets require contracting
or exchange, and uncertainty threatens exchange.457 Coleman further observes that
the appropriate application of law can reduce uncertainty and foster market
cooperation.458 A clear definition of property rights and effective enforcement of
contractual arrangements are two hallmarks of a robust economy.459 An
understanding that FRAND commitments run with the patent creates an
environment where investors are assured that these types of commitments will be
enforced. Awareness of these carefully circumscribed property rights will then, as
an ex ante matter, foster investment and support the adoption of the standardized
technologies.

453. Id. at 1143.
454. Id.
455. Rembrandt, 2008 WL 4824066, at *5.
456. Estimates suggest that only a minority of existing patents are actually licensed, and
approximately half of existing patents have been commercialized. Jason Rantanen, Lee
Petherbridge & Jay P. Kesan, Debate, America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 229, 242 (2012) (citing studies estimating that between 5%–29% of patents are
licensed).
457. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 68 (1992).
458. Id. at 69.
459. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 523 (2001) (concluding that “the strong association between secure
property and contract rights and growth is causal, and not simply a consequence of
simultaneity”).
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Because of the nature of the FRAND commitment, courts should consider
principles of both property and contract law when resolving disputes. The effects of
the commitment should largely be determined by the language of the contract, and
many of the problems noted in this Article could be resolved by a sufficiently
detailed IPR policy. But if a patentee could extinguish the benefits of a FRAND
commitment by transferring the patent to a third party, this would lead to
inequitable results. Once FRAND commitments are formally recognized as
creating an encumbrance on patents that “runs with the patent” to subsequent
assignees, this will add legal certainty to situations where SEPs are assigned.
Because the modern economy involves the frequent transfer of intellectual
property, we expect that increased certainty concerning the availability of licenses
after an assignment will strengthen competition and the standard-setting process.
However, this new legal certainty will need to be complemented by the certainty
of license availability, which may be lacking if patent owners are permitted to seek
injunctions for the infringement of SEPs. Thus, any efforts to improve legal
certainty in the standards context must also consider the availability of injunctions
as a remedy for patent infringement, a topic that we turn to next.
IV. FRAND COMMITMENTS, INJUNCTIONS, AND LIABILITY
We now turn to the fifth problem in our hypothetical: May a patent owner seek
an injunction against the use of an SEP by a standard adopter? This analysis is
typically shaped by the presence of a FRAND commitment; specifically, the extent
to which a FRAND commitment affects the possibility of an injunction.
The wide availability of injunctions, formerly a hallmark of patent law, has
become more restricted over the last seven years since eBay v. MercExchange,
when the Supreme Court enumerated a four-part test for determining if a permanent
injunction is appropriate in cases involving patent infringement.460 The narrowing
of the injunction standard is likely to be especially relevant when patent litigation
concerns SEPs. In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Motorola sought an injunction
against Apple for infringement of the ‘898 patent.461 Judge Posner, sitting by
designation, concluded that by making the FRAND commitment, Motorola
“implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to
use that patent.”462 The theoretical basis for this approach is examined in more
detail in Part IV.B. below.
Before eBay v. MercExchange, injunctions were frequently sought and obtained
when a patent was found to be infringed.463 The standard of the Federal Circuit

460.
461.
462.
463.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
Id. at 914.
Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property in the Cathedral, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND
KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE
GOVERNANCE 5 (Dana Beldiman ed., forthcoming 2013) (noting that before eBay, there was a
presumption in the lower courts “in favor of an almost automatic permanent injunction for
patent owners who proved their cases against infringers”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170093 (last modified Nov. 20, 2012).
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required defendants to establish that an injunction would be too harmful,464 rather
than the current legal test where the plaintiff is required to establish that an
injunction would not be too harmful.465 Injunction-seeking behavior was often
motivated by the added leverage that an injunction gave its holder.466 For example,
when NTP, Inc., a PAE, sued Research In Motion (RIM) for patent infringement, a
jury initially awarded NTP $23 million in damages in November 2002.467 The
damages award was followed by an injunction, which was stayed pending appeal,
and was then vacated by the Federal Circuit.468 In February 2006, the litigation was
still ongoing. The district court judge, impatient with the parties’ failure to
negotiate, suggested that he was considering granting an injunction that would
prohibit the U.S. sale of RIM’s Blackberry line of products.469 Settlement
negotiations quickly concluded, with RIM agreeing to pay NTP $612.5 million in a
full and final settlement with no provisions that might have required NTP to return
the funds if the USPTO later invalidated the patents in issue.470 The threat of
another injunction effectively turned a $23 million jury verdict into a $612 million
payout.
A. Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange
The patentee’s right to exclude has long figured importantly in the issue of
injunctions in patent litigation.471 In May 2006, the Supreme Court decided eBay v.
MercExchange, replacing the Federal Circuit’s injunction-friendly approach with a
four-factor test for injunctions.472 Under eBay, a party seeking an injunction must
show that irreparable injury has occurred, that money damages would be
inadequate, that the balance of the hardships favors an equitable remedy, and that a

464. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing previous ruling in the Federal Circuit, MercExchange
LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d. 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which applied that court’s “general
rule” that in cases of patent infringement, injunctions should issue “absent exceptional
circumstances”).
465. Id. at 393.
466. Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay
v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J. L. & TECH. 26, 27–28 (2009) (“[I]njunction requests are often
motivated by the leverage that they provide in subsequent licensing negotiations.”).
467. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
468. Id. at 1325.
469. Tom Krazit, Judge Faces “Reality” in Blackberry Case, CNET NEWS (Feb. 24,
2006, 4:27 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Judge-faces-reality-in-BlackBerry-case/2100-1041_3
-6043212.html? (providing a transcript of the judge’s remarks to the parties); see also Tom
Krazit & Anne Broache, BlackBerry Saved, CNET NEWS (Mar. 3, 2006, 2:27 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/BlackBerry-saved/2100-1047_3-6045880.html.
470. Krazit & Broache, supra note 469.
471. See Menell, supra note 22, at 731 (noting arguments from the property rights
movement “that exclusive patent rights meant that the patent owner should be free to decide
who may use a claimed invention”).
472. eBay Inc. v. MerExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). For criticism of the
potentially sweeping effects of the eBay decision, see Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden &
Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012).

306

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:231

permanent injunction would not be harmful to the public interest.473 This has
generally made it more difficult to obtain an injunction in patent litigation, with
courts increasingly awarding ongoing royalties instead.474 Ongoing royalties are
similar to compulsory licenses, except an ongoing royalty only applies to a
particular set of defendants.475 Thus, a prevailing patentee might seek money
damages for past infringement and ongoing royalties for future infringement but is
less likely to successfully obtain an injunction post-eBay.476 According to research
by Chien and Lemley, before eBay, approximately 95% of requests for injunctions
in patent cases were granted, but after eBay, this number was down to about
75%.477
In the context of standards, it is likely that the four factors of eBay will weigh
against an injunction, especially when a FRAND commitment exists.478 When the
Ninth Circuit decided an interlocutory appeal in Microsoft v. Motorola, the court
noted in dicta that injunctive relief “is arguably a remedy inconsistent with the
licensing commitment.”479 While the Ninth Circuit did not state its position on this
matter as a legal conclusion, its choice of wording did provide some hints as to the
court’s position. In addition to noting that an injunction was “arguably”
inconsistent with a FRAND commitment, the Ninth Circuit also noted that “it could
well be” that the only remedy that a patent owner could seek consistent with
FRAND commitments made to ITU would be for the court to set a reasonable
royalty rate and have it apply retrospectively.480 In Realtek v. LSI, the district court
relied on Microsoft v. Motorola in granting a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of an ITC exclusion order.481 Thus, if a patent owner sues a standard
adopter for infringement, trends in case law in the United States suggest that a court
that finds infringement might limit remedies to reasonable royalties, reasoning that
injunctions are an inappropriate means of redress when the patent in issue is an
SEP. A court that does so and orders payment of past royalties at a reasonable rate,

473. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
474. E.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630 (E.D. Tex. 2009)
(determining an ongoing royalty by applying the 25% Rule of Thumb, whereby the royalty is
initially set at 25% of the profit margin on the product, and then reducing the amount
accordingly in light of other factors, yielding a royalty of 1.5% of the value of the infringing
part of the product).
475. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 n.13 (7th Cir. 2007)
(distinguishing the equitable remedy of an ongoing royalty from the grant of a compulsory
license).
476. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 1 (noting that parties are generally unable to
obtain injunctions in patent cases after eBay).
477. Id. at 9–10.
478. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 28–29.
479. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 885 (9th Cir. 2012).
480. Id. (“Whatever the appropriate method of determining the RAND licensing rate, it
could well be that retrospective payment at the rate ultimately determined and a
determination of the future rate, not an injunction banning sales while that rate is determined,
is the only remedy consistent with the contractual commitment to license users of ITU
standard-essential patents.”).
481. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451-RMW, 2013 WL
2181717, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013).
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to be determined by the court, would effectively be enforcing the FRAND
commitment by refusing the patent owner the option of denying a license.
In his concurring opinion in eBay, Justice Kennedy suggested that it might be
inappropriate to grant injunctions “[w]hen the patented invention is but a small
component of the product,”482 a condition that will almost certainly be met in the
context of standards that read on dozens of individual patents. However, Merges
and Kuhn question whether merely making it more difficult to obtain an injunction
provides sufficient protection for good faith adopters of open standards, suggesting
that it would be beneficial to address the public interest factor relating to standards
earlier in litigation than eBay permits.483 But addressing the issue earlier in
litigation will only benefit good faith adopters of standards if there is not an
alternative to Article III courts that still provides a viable possibility of injunctions.
As we discuss in Part IV.C, the ITC offers just such an alternative.
Injunctions in the FRAND context are arguably very different from injunctions
in typical patent litigation. Thus, we now turn to a theoretical analysis of the effect
that FRAND commitments have on the entitlements held by the patent owner and
prospective licensee.
B. Property Rules and Liability Rules
When the interests of two or more groups conflict, the government must
generally decide which interest should be protected. As Calabresi and Melamed
assert in their foundational article, entitlements may generally be protected by
either property rules or liability rules.484 An injunction is an example of an
entitlement protection under a property rule.485 In this framework, property rules
are generally understood as conferring a right to exclude, whereas liability rules
confer a right to be paid.486
By analogizing to criminal sanctions, Calabresi and Melamed suggest that
applying property rules can deter actions that society views as harmful in a way
that liability rules would not.487 If a thief is caught and a liability rule is applied to
only require the thief to compensate the victim for the value of the stolen item, this
would convert all property rules into liability rules488 in a regime where anyone
could claim any property as long as he paid for it after the taking. Property rules
may also be more efficient than liability rules when the lowest cost avoider is

482. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
483. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 48.
484. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). Shapiro and
Pearse list this article as the sixth most-cited law review article of all time. Shapiro & Pearse,
supra note 355, at 1489.
485. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) (referring to injunctions as being “the classic instance of a
property rule”).
486. Burk, supra note 463, at 1.
487. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 484, at 1124–27.
488. Id. at 1124–25.
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known.489 If a potential thief knows that he wants a specific item, he can attempt to
negotiate with the rightful owner instead of stealing it, because the potential thief is
the lowest cost avoider. But if an item is damaged or destroyed in an accident, a
liability rule to compensate the owner would be appropriate. In that case, a property
rule would be inefficient, because that would require parties to negotiate value
before an unforeseen accident.490
While the certainty of liability rules may be desirable in the case of patents,
Calabresi and Melamed’s analogy to criminal sanctions may be instructive. Though
injunctions in patent cases may be harmful, it may be in the best interests of society
to preserve injunctions in egregious cases of willful infringement. It may also be
socially desirable to preserve the availability of injunctions in the standards context
in very limited circumstances, such as when the implementer of the standard
refuses anything less than a royalty-free licensing arrangement.491
Some argue that in the context of IP, property remedies like injunctions or
exclusive rights may promote settlements and efficiency,492 though Menell warns
that such remedies may also lead to inefficiencies and holdout under some
circumstances.493 If Menell is correct, it follows that there are some situations
where converting the property rule into a liability rule would be appropriate. Lee
goes so far as to suggest that when an innovator improves on a patent, the situation
should be analogized to accession in the property context, with ongoing royalties
being favored over injunctions.494 However, Lee’s approach may be too broad and
thus remove the incentive for competitors to innovate around blocking patents. In
our view, the standards context would likely fit Menell’s characterization of
circumstances where exclusivity may be undesirable. The potential harm to
consumers in the form of increased prices and enforced injunctions persuades us to
argue against injunctions as a general rule, especially in the context of standards.
This conclusion is also supported by Reichman’s reasoning in his widely cited
article on liability rules in hybrid intellectual property systems, where Reichman
urged that a liability rule would be more appropriate than an exclusionary property
rule in the context of technical standards.495
At its core, the current discussion about injunctions demands that we determine
how to allocate liability and entitlement. Burk’s analysis of property and liability
rules in the intellectual property context examines four possible allocative rules,496
which we summarize in the table below:

489. Id. at 1119.
490. Id. at 1126–27.
491. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Policy Statement on
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments 6–7
(Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf.
492. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 485, at 2664 (“IPR cases fit the criteria set up by
Calabresi and Melamed for application of a property rule . . . .”).
493. Menell, supra note 22, at 730.
494. Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 175, 175 (2011).
495. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2554–55 (1994).
496. Burk, supra note 463, at 2.
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Table 1. Possible Property Allocative Rules

Property Rule

Liability Rule

Owner has
entitlement

Owner needs exclusivity.

Damages are adequate.

Injunction against infringer.

Infringer must pay owner
damages.

Potential
infringer has
entitlement

No infringement, or
infringer is prior user.

Reverse liability.

Non-owner may continue
use.

Owner may pay damages to
non-owner, non-owner will
halt the use.

In some types of patent litigation, where the patent owner practices the patent
and needs exclusivity, protection by a property rule in the form of an injunction
may be appropriate. Injunctions arguably encourage innovation by requiring
competitors to work around blocking patents, and therefore in some situations, the
possibility of injunctions can benefit both patent owners and the market in general.
However, in the standards context, we argue that a patent owner who has made a
FRAND commitment has essentially stated that, as to their SEPs, damages will be
adequate. This type of reasoning can also be found in multiple recent cases
concerning FRAND commitments.497 Thus, by making the FRAND commitment,
the SEP owner has waived a claim to using a property rule to preserve exclusivity.
The FRAND commitment can thus be said to have converted the property rule into
a liability rule, under which the patent owner would be entitled to money damages,
but not an injunction, when the owner asserts his rights in the patent.
The lower right cell’s “reverse liability” rule may be illustrated by property
cases about moving to the nuisance, especially as depicted in Spur Industries, Inc.
v. Del E. Webb Development Co.498 In such a case, the party that causes the
nuisance is entitled to payment from the injured party for the cost of abating the
nuisance.499 Burk suggests that a reverse liability approach could potentially apply
in the standards context if a court focused on a breach of the FRAND commitment
as the injury instead of focusing on patent infringement.500 If a court found both
that a FRAND commitment was breached and a patent was infringed, then instead
of requiring the infringer to pay ongoing royalties, the court might choose to
require the patent owner to compensate the infringer for the cost of adopting a noninfringing alternative. In normal patent infringement cases, we do not think this
option would be appropriate, since it requires the patent owner to pay for the right
to exclude after having already paid to develop the technology and obtain the

497. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 885 (9th Cir. 2012); Apple, Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
498. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (applying the “coming to a nuisance” doctrine).
499. Burk, supra note 463, at 5.
500. Id. at 7.
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patent. However, Burk suggests that a reverse liability rule may provide a deterrent
effect for abusive use of an SEP in the case of standards.501
While it may sound good in theory, a reverse liability rule would likely not work
in practice, even in the context of standards. If the patent owner were required to
pay the infringer for the cost of designing around the patent, this would be very
impracticable on several levels. First, such a design around may not even be
feasible. Second, such a payment may effectively amount to the SEP owner paying
off a competitor to exit the market for the standardized good, which may raise
antitrust concerns. Third, the payment is likely to be so high that no reasonable SEP
owner would be interested. Thus, a reverse liability theory would likely not have
any lasting impact in the context of SEPs, and the effect of a FRAND commitment
would be limited to converting the property rule into a liability rule.
Even if FRAND commitments are understood as converting a property rule
favoring injunctions into a liability rule where only damages may be sought, this
conversion would likely only occur in traditional court settings. We turn now to the
existence of different kind of injunction that remains available to patent holders—
the exclusion order.
C. ITC Exclusion Orders
In eBay, the Supreme Court overruled the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that
permanent injunctions should issue in patent cases unless there were “unusual
circumstances” such that denial of an injunction was necessary to protect the public
interest.502 However, this general rule still survives elsewhere in patent-related
litigation: the ITC. The ITC is not discussed as often in patent literature as litigation
before Article III courts, but Chien and Lemley provide a detailed analysis of patent
disputes before the ITC in their 2012 article.503
The ITC allows patent owners to seek exclusion orders under section 1337 of
title 19.504 According to the Federal Circuit, as a non-Article III court, the ITC is
not bound by the equitable test of eBay.505 Under section 1337, if the ITC
determines that the section has been violated, the articles concerned shall “be
excluded from entry into the United States,” unless an exception applies.506 Thus,
the burden is inverted. In Article III courts, eBay puts the burden on the patentee to
establish that an injunction would not violate the four factors,507 whereas in cases
before the ITC, the infringer carries the burden of establishing that an exclusion
order would be too harmful.508
The ITC’s standard resembles the pre-eBay standard of the Federal Circuit,
which required a showing of exceptional circumstances to support not granting an

501. See id.
502. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
503. Chien & Lemley, supra note 38.
504. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
505. Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
506. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006).
507. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
508. See Spansion, Inc., 629 F.3d at 1358 (listing the statutory factors for not granting an
exclusion order).
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injunction.509 Adequacy of money damages is not considered by the ITC, likely in
part because the ITC cannot award damages.510 The presence of irreparable injury
and the balance of the hardships between the patent owner and the infringer are also
not factors before the ITC, which instead focuses on several categories of harm that
we would characterize as public interest harms: (1) public health and welfare; (2)
competitive conditions across the whole U.S. economy; (3) the existence of
competitive articles produced in the United States; and (4) the effect on U.S.
consumers.511 However, the ITC has only rarely found that public interest factors
weigh against an exclusion order, and in these cases, the products in issue were
necessary for a purpose related to health and welfare, and there was no other
supplier who could meet the demand in a reasonable time period.512 Chien and
Lemley found that in the ITC relatively little emphasis has been placed on
competitive conditions or harm to consumers as factors that might weigh against an
exclusion order.513 Thus, while the presence of patents in standards might weigh
against granting an exclusion order, the ITC’s current lack of emphasis on these
two factors may make it more difficult to avoid an exclusion order, even in the
standards context.514
Thus, while eBay seemingly offers some protection against injunctions for
adopters of a standard when the litigation is in an Article III court, the ITC
continues to grant exclusion orders as its sole statutorily authorized method of
indicating that a patent owner’s exclusive rights have been violated.515 The ITC’s
approach to patents in the standards context should be revised. We are in favor of
the approach promoted by the DOJ and USPTO in a letter to the ITC dated January
8, 2013, wherein the two agencies make a joint recommendation that exclusion
orders should not be granted in the case of SEPs unless the putative licensee has
refused to pay any royalties.516
An alternative solution is for Article III courts to grant injunctions against the
enforcement of exclusion orders entered due to the alleged infringement of SEPs.
This approach was recently taken by Judge Whyte in the Northern District of
California in Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp.517 In Realtek, Judge Whyte
relied on Microsoft v. Motorola to conclude that LSI’s failure to offer a license on
FRAND terms prior to seeking an exclusion order from the ITC violated LSI’s

509. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing previous ruling in the Federal Circuit, MercExchange
LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d. 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which applied that court’s “general
rule” that in cases of patent infringement, injunctions should issue “absent exceptional
circumstances”).
510. Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 14.
511. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006); Spansion, Inc., 629 F.3d at 1358.
512. Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 19–20.
513. Id. at 25.
514. See id. at 41 (expressing the authors’ opinion that the ITC should not grant
injunctions for SEPs).
515. Spansion, Inc., 629 F.3d at 1358 (noting the “legislative determination that an
injunction is the only available remedy for violations of Section 337”).
516. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 491, at 6–7.
517. No. C-12-03451-RMW, 2013 WL 2181717 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013).
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obligations to IEEE pursuant to its FRAND commitments.518 Accordingly, Judge
Whyte granted Realtek’s request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement
of the ITC exclusion order, pending resolution of a trial to determine the proper
FRAND royalty rate.519
The structure of section 1337 also permits the President to disapprove an
exclusion order within sixty days of issuance.520 The use of this power is very rare,
but in August 2013, the Obama administration disapproved an ITC exclusion order
that would have permitted Samsung to keep several Apple devices from being
imported into the United States.521 In the letter, U.S. Trade Representative Michael
Froman emphasized that public policy considerations weighed against an exclusion
order in this instance, where the infringed patents in issue were SEPs that were
subject to FRAND commitments.522
In our view, neither injunctions nor exclusion orders should be available to
patentees bound by a FRAND commitment unless extreme circumstances exist. For
example, if the adopter refuses to pay royalties at any price, this type of behavior
may justify an injunction. Beyond that sort of narrow circumstance, however, the
FRAND commitment should be understood as converting the property rule into a
liability rule, since by making the commitment, the patentee has freely
acknowledged that royalties would provide adequate compensation for the loss of
exclusivity. We argue that a general prohibition on injunctive relief when a
FRAND commitment exists would be consistent with well-established approaches
to property and liability rules, and is a logical progression following the Supreme
Court’s recent narrowing of injunction policy in patent litigation.
CONCLUSION
Information is like currency. Some sources indicate that over 50% of the
business output of industry in the United States is comprised of intangible assets,
many of which are protected by intellectual property rights.523 Companies are often
bought and sold based on the value of their IP portfolios, especially patents.524
These patent transfers have significant implications for technology-reliant
industries like ICT industries. These industries often utilize standards to facilitate
interoperability, with SSOs often requiring owners of essential patents to commit to
licensing these patents on FRAND terms to future licensees.

518. Id. at *6.
519. Id. at *9.
520. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j) (2006).
521. Letter from Michael B. G. Froman, U.S. Trade Rep., to Hon. Irving A. Williamson,
Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n. (August 3, 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov
/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF.
522. Id.
523. Request for Comments on Eliciting More Complete Patent Assignment Information,
76 Fed. Reg. 72372 (Nov. 23, 2011).
524. See Ron Corbett, IP Strategies for Start-up eCommerce Companies in the Post-DotBomb Era, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 643, 649 (2002) (“A strong patent portfolio may signal
an attractive buy-out opportunity by entities prospecting for high-technology companies that
are considered to be undervalued because of their unused or unrealized IP assets.”).
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Numerous court decisions demonstrate the types of problems regarding FRAND
commitments that we have delineated in this Article. But despite these problems,
the theoretical foundations that might help us understand the nature and scope of
the FRAND commitment have not been studied. In this Article, we examined these
theoretical foundations and exposed the limitations of theories grounded in patent,
antitrust, and contract in terms of enabling the analysis of issues and problems
concerning the FRAND commitment. We noted that a contract-based theory offers
a good approach in many situations, but we also exposed the significant limitations
of contract theory as applied to FRAND commitments. In particular, contract
theory fails to effectively address the problem of enforcing FRAND commitments
after an SEP has been transferred.
In this Article, we posited for the first time that understanding a FRAND
commitment through the lens of property would be an effective approach to support
the public interest in favor of having a FRAND commitment run with the patent.
We also concluded that such an approach would be consistent with U.S. law
concerning servitudes, and that this theoretical approach could resolve one of the
major problems that arises when SEPs are transferred. By applying the classic
theories of Hohfeld and those of modern scholars like Merrill and Smith, we
established that a FRAND commitment creates a hybrid type of right that cannot be
understood purely through the lens of contract law. This approach then allowed us
to conceptualize the FRAND commitment as an encumbrance that runs with the
patent, similar to a servitude under real property law.
Finally, we examined the use of injunctions in patent litigation, and in FRAND
disputes in particular, and discussed the availability of injunctions in nontraditional forums like the ITC. Through application of theoretical insights
concerning property rules and liability rules, we established why a FRAND
commitment should be understood as a waiver of the right to seek an injunction for
infringement of an SEP. By applying the FRAND commitment theories espoused
in this Article to prohibit injunctions for infringement of SEPs and to protect the
transferability of FRAND commitments, courts and SSOs can ensure the continued
viability of a competitive marketplace for ideas and innovation.
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APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
Acronym

Meaning

ATSC

Advanced Television Systems Committee

AVS

China’s Audio and Video Coding Standard Workgroup

DOJ

Department of Justice

EC

European Commission

ETSI

European Telecommunications Standards Institute

EULA

End User Licensing Agreement

FTC

Federal Trade Commission

FRAND

Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory

FRAND-RF

Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory - Royalty-free

HDTV

High-definition television

ICT
IEEE-SA

Internet, Computing, and Telecommunications
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers - Standard
Association

IP

Intellectual Property

IPO

Intellectual Property Owners Association

IPR

Intellectual Property Rights

ITC

International Trade Commission

ITU

International Telecommunications Union

MDL

Multi-district litigation

PAE

Patent Assertion Entity

RFC

Request for Comments

SEPs

Standard Essential Patents

SSOs

Standard-Setting Organizations

UCC

Uniform Commercial Code

USPTO
VITA

United States Patent and Trademark Office
VMEbus International Trade Association

